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Writers willing to risk global comparisons have long expressed interest in the
differences between European and Chinese fertility. In eighteenth century they
include Adam Smith, François Quesnay, and Thomas Malthus; in the nine-
teenth, Adolphe Quetelet; and in the twentieth R. H. Tawney, Thomas Mallory,
Warren Thompson, and, most recently, Kenneth Pomeranz, James Lee,
Cameron Campbell, and Wang Feng. But despite three centuries of interest and
a great deal of speculation, quantitative comparisons are rare and the differences
between European and Chinese fertility remain ill-defined and subject to incon-
clusive controversy.
The papers included in this volume are the first fruits of an effort to repair
this situation. The strategy is to begin with two localities that have excellent data.
These are Taiwan and the Netherlands where highly reliable household registers
allow one to construct accurate and highly contextualized fertility rates. Euro-
peanists are certain to object that the Netherlands does not represent all of
Europe. They will be right. And sinologists are certain to object that Taiwan does
not represent all of China. And they will also be right. But what both parties will
have failed to consider is that when the known ranges of Chinese and European
marriage and fertility rates are compared there is no overlap. The societies of
Europe and the provinces of China are all separate entities, but the distance
between them is not significant compared to the distance between Europe and
China. For most purposes it does not matter if one compares England and
Kiangsu, France and Kwangtung, or the Netherlands and Taiwan.
The point is implicit in John Hajnal’s distinction between what he called
“the European marriage pattern” and the “non-European marriage pattern.”1 In
the small corner of the world that includes the Netherlands, women did not mar-
ry until ten or more years after menarche and many did not marry at all; in the
rest of the world, including most conspicuously China, they married at and some-
times even before menarche and all but an exceptional few married. Hajnal rec-
ognized that “significant departures from the European pattern may be found not
only as one proceeds eastward but on the southern edge of Europe as well.”2 And
he also recognized that non-European societies may show “wide variation in the
pattern of their rates.” He nonetheless insisted – rightly in our view – that “all the
varieties that exist are separated by a distinct gap from the European.”3
The first volume in this series lays the foundation for this and subsequent
volumes with a detailed examination of Hajnal’s generalization and the research
it has stimulated. This volume, the second in the series, takes the obvious next
step by examining the extent to which the difference identified by Hajnal is asso-
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1. Hajnal, “European marriages patterns in perspective”.
2. Ibid., 103.
3. Ibid., 106.
ciated with a difference in fertility. Readers who are familiar with recent research
in comparative history will recognize that the timing is fortunate. The past
decade has seen the publication of a series of books and articles arguing that the
differences between Europe and China have been greatly exaggerated.4 Hajnal
himself escapes the revisionists’ ire because no one can dispute the difference in
European and Chinese marriage rates. The target instead is Malthus who argued
that the difference in the marriage rates resulted in a difference in fertility and
consequently a difference in population pressure and general well-being. All of
the papers in this volume are relevant to the debate generated by this claim and
most address it directly.
The first two papers in the volume, by Paul Katz and Jan Kok, introduce
the reader to the sources that are the basis of the subsequent papers and the proj-
ect as a whole. They will be invaluable for anyone who is so inspired by our work
– or so incensed – that they want to undertake research of their own in Taiwan or
the Netherlands. We also intend them as justification of our strategy of initiating
detailed comparisons of China and Europe with Taiwan and the Netherlands.
The two papers demonstrate the quality of the data available in the two countries
as well as provide guidance for those who would like to pursue the questions
raised on their own.
The argumentative section of the volume opens with a paper by Hill Gates
and Marloes Schoonheim entitled “Two ethnographies of reproduction.” The
paper compares customs and attitudes in Taiwan and the Netherlands and is
therefore “ethnographic,” but it does not treat the facts presented as showcase
curiosities. They are all organized as the basis for a comparison with a strong
thesis. The thesis flows from a premise that is, surprisingly, foreign to most
demographic analyses. It is what Gates and Schoonheim take to be “a funda-
mental human commonality – pregnancy, lactation, and child care are exhaust-
ing.” The result is that “in high fertility societies, women, at least, will endlessly
reinvent antinatalism.”
Gates and Schoonheim find evidence for this antinatalism in both indi-
vidual and global phenomena. At the individual level they cite examples of Chi-
nese women using their financial contribution to their family to negotiate
reduced fertility. Gates found that in both Taipei and Chengtu the fertility of
women in family businesses was a function of how much capital they had con-
tributed to the business.5 The greater their contribution, the lower their fertility.
All of these women “wanted fewer children than they had, and fewer than their
husbands had wanted.” At the global level Gates and Schoonheim argue that the
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4. The major revisionist works are Lee and Campbell, Fate and Fortune in Rural China; Lee and Wang, One
Quarter of Humanity; and Pomeranz, The Great Divergence.
5. Hill Gates, “Cultural support for birth limitation among urban capital-owning women”.
20th century drop in birth rates among Taiwanese and Dutch Catholic women
was not precipitated by “a mental revolution regarding family planning.” “In
both, antinatal tendencies long submerged, were developed and intensified...to
meet and merge with changed ideological, social, and economic conditions.”
The reason this did not happen earlier was that in both Taiwan and the
Netherlands female antinatalism was opposed by powerful institutions. In the
Netherlands “the church...claimed a God-given power to depute parish priests to
monitor childbearing and punish couples who appeared to be limiting their own
fertility.” Many couples “internalized church teachings and struggled to conform
to them.” Others “conformed mainly for fear of being shamed or to maintain
their membership in a culturally dominant institution.” In Taiwan the analogue
to clerical power was parental power. Almost without exception young couples
spent the early years of marriage living with and under the authority of their par-
ents. “Mothers-in-law were outspoken and even punitive towards brides who
were slow to conceive, or whose birth intervals were unusually long. Overbearing
parents bullied unwilling couples into initiating sexual relations when they were
reluctant partners.”
The revisionists argue that contrary to Malthus, Chinese fertility rates were
no higher than European rates despite the fact that Chinese marriage rates were
far higher than European rates. This was possible because Chinese couples con-
trolled fertility within marriage by means of abstinence, contraception, and infan-
ticide. Gates and Schoonheim argue to the contrary that there was little, if any,
maritial fertility control in either Taiwan or the Netherlands. The means were
banned by the Church in the Netherlands and condemned by parental interest in
Taiwan. In the Netherlands the Catholic church used the confession box to moni-
tor unexcused abstinence as well as contraceptive use. In Taiwan abstinence was
possible and was practiced, but – as papers in this volume demonstrate – did not
have much effect on completed fertility. Female antinatalism was always present
but remained submerged, surfacing only in oblique ways like women’s explana-
tion of why they weaned their daughters a month or two earlier than their sons. It
is, they claim, for their own sake. “The sooner you wean a girl, the sooner she will
stop ovulating and be done with the dirty business of bearing children.”6
The core of Gates and Schoonheim’s analysis is a proposition concerning
the primary determinants of fertility in Taiwan and the Netherlands. We will call
it the proposition because it is one that is shared by most members of our project
and appears in one form or another in many of their papers. It is this: Until the
1960’s in Taiwan and the 1910’s in the Netherlands fertility levels were main-
tained at their characteristic levels by two institutionalized authorities, clerical
authority in the Netherlands and parental authority in Taiwan. Put another way,
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6. Arthur P. Wolf, “Is there evidence of birth control in Late Imperial China?”, p. 135.
the proposition says that any analysis of fertility in Taiwan or the Netherlands –
indeed, any analysis of fertility in China or Europe – must attend to the interests
of clerics and parents.
The fourth paper in the volume – the work of Hill Gates, Jan Kok, and
Sping Wang – can be read as a test of the proposition. The paper compares ille-
gitimacy rates in Taiwan and the Netherlands with what can only be regarded as
startling results. Knowing that Taiwanese women married seven or eight years
earlier than Dutch women, one anticipates a much lower illegitimacy rate in Tai-
wan than in the Netherlands, simply because Taiwanese women were not at risk
as long as Dutch women. What the authors find, however, is that the ratio of ille-
gitimate to legitimate births was actually higher in Taiwan than in the Nether-
lands. Moveover, when the authors take account of the difference in age at mar-
riage by calculating age-specific fertility rates for never-married women, they
find that “for the 20-34 age group, the risk of an illegitimate birth [was] 17 to 30
times higher for the Taiwanese than for the Dutch women.” 
The low illegitimacy rate in the Netherlands was clearly the work of the
church and the values it propagated. It tolerated – to a certain extent and in some
regions more than others – sexual play before marriage but demanded that a
pregnant girl marry. Those who would not or could not because their lover
absconded faced severe sanctions. “Illicitly pregnant girls could make no claim
on public assistance, and might even be driven from home by their kin. They
risked lowered marriage expectations, loss of employment, and social rejection
that might result in dire poverty or even prostitution.” But how, then, do we
interpret the high illegitimacy rates on Taiwan? Do they indicate a failure of
parental authority and therefore argue that the proposition is wrong in arguing
that fertility in Taiwan was largely shaped by that authority? 
This would be the only conclusion possible if one assumed that most ille-
gitimate births on Taiwan were the result of premarital sex of the kind allowed in
the Netherlands; they would then stand as flagrant violations of parental author-
ity. The fact is that few, if any, Taiwanese births were of this kind. Women were
married so young and were so walled in by restrictions before marriage that
there was no opportunity for an illicit pregnancy. What the Taiwanese illegitima-
cy rates represent is not the failure of parental authority but the determined
implementation of that authority. The girls who bore children before marriage
were almost all prostitutes sent to work by their parents. The evidence is the fact
that knowing a girl’s sibling position at age fifteen, one can predict whether or
not she will bear a child before marriage.7 In Taiwan prostitution was almost the
only way a young woman could earn a substantial amount of money. Conse-
quently, girls who had no brothers or only younger brothers often bore an illegit-
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7. Wolf and Huang, Marriage and Adoption in China, Table 19.5, 258.
imate child because, lacking sons, their parents needed the money they could
earn. Girls with one or more older brothers rarely bore an illegitimate child
because they were not needed at home and were therefore married at menarche.
The fifth paper in the volume – the first of our two papers – can also be
read as support for the proposition. The paper’s comparisons produce a surprise
that rivals that of the previous paper. We find, contrary to what we thought were
well-founded expectations, that the lowest fertility in any of the cells in our four-
fold comparison – urban Taiwan, rural Taiwan, urban Netherlands, and rural
Netherlands – was urban Taiwan. The reason is even more surprising than the
finding. It is that by age forty-five nearly a fourth of all women in Taipei City had
never married. This compares with approximately three percent of all women in
rural Taiwan, eighteen percent in the rural Netherlands, and seventeen percent
in the urban Netherlands. Urban Taiwan was, then, a striking exception to what
might be called Hajnal’s rule. It was, as regards proportions marrying, more
European than the Netherlands.
In a paper published several years ago Wolf argued that this was because
given the opportunity of wage employment in urban industries, many Chinese
women chose to avoid marriage.8 His assumption was that they did so in revolt
against parental pressure to marry. What then looked like evidence against the
proposition turned out on closer examination to be just the opposite. He found
that just as the probability of a woman’s bearing an illegitimate child depended
on her sibling position at age fifteen, so also did the probability of her ever mar-
rying. The women who never married were not the most strong-willed of the
many women who had good reason to avoid marriage. They were women who
at age fifteen had no brothers or only younger brothers. The great majority of
the women who had at least one older brother married at an early age. This can
only mean that young women were not deciding for themselves whether or not
to marry. Many of them may have been happy to remain unmarried, but the
decision was obviously made by their parents. Thus high fertility in the Tai-
wanese countryside and low fertility in the cities are both attributable to
parental authority.
The discovery of a Chinese population with lower fertility than most Euro-
pean populations could stand as evidence for the revisionists’ argument, but in
fact it underscores the weakness of that argument. Contrary to their claim that
the Chinese controlled their fertility by deliberate birth control, the case in hand
argues that in Taiwan, just as in Europe, fertility was conditioned by entry into
marriage, not control within marriage. As we put in our paper in this volume, “It
took a European-like marriage pattern to produce European-like fertility rates.”
Wolf argues in the first volume in this series that Chinese parental author-
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8. Wolf, “Women and tea in the Taipei Basin”.
ity did not depend for its effectiveness on filial piety as an idea.9 It was effective
because it was backed by the authority, and, when necessary, the force of the Chi-
nese state. The same was at least partly true of clerical authority. The authority of
clerics did not depend entirely on the ideas they preached. They were backed by
powerful institutions with the ability to withhold resources as well as the ability
to shame, ostracize, and, if necessary, excommunicate. The Catholic priest’s
counterpart in China was not the Taoist priest or Buddhist priest. It was the post-
ed official representing the imperial government.
Thus it is a fundamental assumption of the proposition that to effectively
direct people’s life courses, ideas about such matters as marriage and fertility
must have institutional support. Ideas as such may influence individuals but
they are incapable of influencing populations. The sixth paper in the volume –
the work of John Shepherd, Pan Inghai, Jan Kok, Claudia Engel, Theo Engelen,
and Melissa Brown – tests this assumption by comparing the effect of religion in
the Netherlands with the effect of ethnicity in Taiwan. Whether Catholic, Calvin-
ist, or Dutch Reformed, religion in the Netherlands was strongly institutional-
ized, more so in the case of Catholicism than in the case of Calvinism and Dutch
Reform but always in clear and obvious ways. Ethnicity in Taiwan, in contrast,
was not institutionalized. The three groups compared in the paper – Hokkien
Chinese, Hakka Chinese, and a non-Chinese minority called the Siraya – spoke
different languages and identified themselves as distinct social groups. Cultural-
ly, they differed more than the Dutch denominations, but they lacked anything
comparable to their churches.
The evidence reported in the paper is loud and clear. In the Netherlands
the influence of what the Dutch demographer E. W. Hofstee called “organized
confessionalism” was enormous. The various denominations differed as regards
age-specific marital fertility, age at birth of first child, age at birth of last child,
and the number of children surviving to age five, to name only the most impor-
tant of many differentiating variables. In the case of Taiwanese ethnic groups, in
sharp contrast, the authors could find no significant differences in fertility. “Our
overall conclusion with respect to our main question is a negative one. Cultural
differences associated with ethnicity in Taiwan do not appear to have a signifi-
cant impact on demographic indicators in ways analogous to the differences
found between Catholics and Protestants in Europe.” To put the point more
provocatively, so far as fertility is concerned, ethnicity is “just culture.”
The proposition says that the authorities, clerical or parental as the case
may be, usually got what they wanted. What they wanted varied depending on
their circumstances, as we have seen in comparing the behavior of Taiwanese
parents in the country and the city. It is clear, however, that what Dutch clerics,
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particularly Catholic clerics wanted, was conformity to behavioral norms that
resulted in high marital fertility. The question that now occupies many sinolo-
gists is what it was that Chinese parents wanted. The accepted view until recently
was that they wanted many sons, the more the better, the result being fertility as
high as poor nutrition and late weaning allowed. What more than anything else
makes the revisionists revisionists is that they reject this view. Though they never
specify how many children parents wanted, they argue emphatically that it was
well below the maximum possible. This, they claim, was achieved by means of
“late starting, wide spacing, and early stopping.”10 Chinese couples married
young but deliberately delayed their first child, deliberately avoided producing a
child in their later years, and deliberately spaced their births as widely as possible. 
The remaining three papers in the volume all mount direct challenges to
this view of Chinese fertility by means of meticulously detailed comparisons of
Taiwanese and Dutch fertility. The first of the three – by John Shepherd, Jan Kok,
and Hsieh Ying-hui – addresses the revisionists’ claims concerning early stop-
ping. The revisionists interpret data from the Ch’ing imperial genealogy and
Manchurian household registers as showing that Chinese women bore their last
child six or seven years earlier than European women and had much shorter
reproductive lives as a result. This, they argue, is evidence of “marital restraint”
in China. Our authors’ comparison of Taiwanese and Dutch populations finds a
difference of only two years and shows that this is entirely due to Taiwanese
women’s marrying six or seven years earlier than Dutch women. The revision-
ists’ claim that “whereas on average a European mother had a reproductive span
between first and last birth of 14 years, the average Chinese mother had a repro-
ductive span of only 11 years.”11 Our authors find just the opposite – 16.2 years
among the Taiwanese women as compared to only 11 years among the Dutch
women. They therefore conclude that “claims by Lee, Wang, and Campbell and
Zhao that the historical Chinese population is one characterized by deliberate
early stopping are...untenable.” 
The second paper in the concluding triad – by Jan Kok, Wen-shan Yang,
and Hsieh Ying-hui – broadens the attack initiated by the first paper. After sum-
marizing the debate stimulated by the revisionists’ claims (a summary that read-
ers who are not familiar with the literature will appreciate), the paper undertakes
two highly refined comparisons of Taiwanese and Dutch fertility. The fact that
European total marital fertility rates (tmfr) are generally higher than Chinese
rates is critical to the revisionists’ claim that the Chinese practiced deliberate fer-
tility control. The first part of our authors’ paper challenges this evidence by
arguing that “comparing tmfrs is too abstract.” To refine the comparison they
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apply to their data a decomposition technique developed by Peter McDonald that
takes into account starting, stopping, spacing and sterility. Their conclusions are,
first, that “when Taiwanese couples remained married until the wife’s meno-
pause, they produced 1.38 more children than Dutch couples,” and, second, that
where “Dutch couples who completed their marriages realized less than half of
their theoretical maximum of 10.2 children, Taiwanese couples realized about
eighty percent of their theoretical maximum of 8.13.”
The second part of the paper by Kok, Yang, and Hsieh undertakes a multi-
variate analysis of Taiwanese and Dutch birth intervals. Their models include, on
the Dutch side, mother’s age, marital duration, crude parity, net parity, occupa-
tion, religion, and education, and, on the Taiwanese side, all these demographic
variables plus form of marriage and proportion of girls among all surviving chil-
dren. Contrary to the revisionists’ thesis, the authors find no evidence that longer
birth intervals among the Taiwanese were due to conscious spacing. Intervals
were somewhat longer when a couple already had one or more surviving sons,
but the total number of children present had no effect. “Net parity, that is the
number of children present, actually tended to shorten the birth interval.” The
authors also found that “Taiwanese intervals after the birth of a surviving child
were much longer than among the Dutch.” This supports the argument that the
difference between Chinese and European birth intervals was due to longer and
more general breastfeeding in China rather than to deliberate spacing.
The final paper in the volume – our second effort – generalizes the critique
offered in the other papers by returning to Malthus and reformulating the terms
of the debate. The most important point made is that the few comparisons the
revisionists make between Chinese and European fertility are irrelevant to their
anti-Malthusian thesis. The rates they compare are all total marital fertility rates
(tmfr). What matters with respect to the Malthusian thesis is total fertility (tfr),
not total marital fertility. It may be that marital fertility was higher in Europe than
in China, but if total fertility was lower the Malthusian position stands. It could
even be that the Chinese practiced deliberate birth control, but if this was not suf-
ficient to offset the impact of their high marriage rate the revisionists have no
case. And the best evidence says that in fact total fertility was far higher in China
than in Europe – approximately 6.0 compared to 4.0 to 5.0. It is hard to believe
that the Chinese tried to limit their fertility and failed so dismally.
The debate initiated by the revisionists has distorted our view of the ques-
tions involved by focusing interest on a comparison of Europe and China. We
need to return to the global perspective taken by Malthus and Hajnal. When we
do, we see that China, with early and nearly universal marriage and a general fer-
tility rate of six or more, was typical of natural fertility populations. It was Europe
– as both Malthus and Hajnal realized – that was the exotic case. The claim that
the differences between Europe and China have been exaggerated distract atten-
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tion from the most important question – why, as Hajnal put it with regard to
marriage, was Europe “unique or almost unique in the world”?
The papers in this volume provide considerable support for what we have
called the proposition. We will therefore conclude by suggesting that what made
Europe unique was the fact that it was only there that clerical authority overruled
parental authority. In the other old agrarian empires – China, Russia, and India
– parental authority ruled as a delegate of state authority. In these societies mar-
riage was universal and marital fertility high because it was to parents’ advantage
to maximize their following. In Europe clerical authority interfered with parental
authority and deprived parents of the ability to exploit their children. The result
was that they saw no advantage in investing their resources in their children’s
















This paper explores the importance of three demographic sources compiled by
the Japanese authorities in Taiwan during the colonial era (1895-1945): 1) House-
hold registers (huji ziliao; compiled from 1905 to 1945); 2) Annual demographic
surveys entitled Statistical Data on the Population Currently Living in Taiwan (Tai-
wan genjū jinkō tōkei; later renamed Taiwan  jōjū jinkō tōkei; 1905-1943), and, 3) A
series of censuses (based partly on the registers) undertaken every five years
from 1905 to 1940, perhaps the most complete and best known being the “Sec-
ond Provisional Household Census on Taiwan” (Dainichi rinji Taiwan kokō
chōsa).4 The paper’s goals are to describe how these sources were compiled,
examine the nature of their contents, and consider how they can be used indi-
vidually or together to research Taiwanese social history.
The demographic sources mentioned above might best be considered as
one form of “colonial governmentality” that the Japanese practiced in Taiwan.5
Thus, any attempt to understand the contents and historical significance of these
texts needs to be grounded in a broad understanding of the colonial policies
enacted during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the Japan-
ese authorities were busy putting down armed uprisings and trying to extend the
colonial state’s control over Taiwan’s natural resources. Governmentality, which
has also been described using the concept “internal territorialization”, is particu-
larly notable for categorizing people within boundaries defined by the state in
maps, as well as employing taxation, census data, and security forces in order to
control what people do inside these boundaries.6 As Chakrabarty points out, “one
symptom of [the state’s] modernity was that its techniques of government were
very closely tied to techniques of measurement”.7 As a result, statistics produced
for and by the state tend to place people in categories that the state has designed
to measure them.8 This was also the case in colonial Taiwan, where the Japanese
authorities employed modern techniques to measure the land and the populace
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in order to increase the state’s ability to control this island’s valuable resources.9
In Europe and Japan as well, the implementation of household registration sys-
tems accompanied the expansion of state power over local society.10
We begin by providing background information about colonial policies
enacted after the Japanese assumed control over Taiwan, particularly the creation
of a modern police force, the establishment of the community policing (hokō)
system, the imposition of new land taxes, the modernization of the sugar indus-
try, and intensive attempts to exploit resources like camphor found in Taiwan’s
mountain regions. This is followed by a history of the demographic sources list-
ed above. 
Establishment and consolidation of Japanese rule over Taiwan
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japan was engaged in
the process of making the transition from feudal bureaucracy to modern state
and burgeoning empire. On the domestic front, economic and technological
modernization was accompanied by intensive attempts at social control. Under
the rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603-1867), Japan was policed and con-
trolled in the cities, but social control in the countryside, where most people
lived, was exerted by unpaid and unranked elites who were held responsible for
forwarding taxes, keeping registers, etc. The central government had no idea
how much land was under the plow, and peasants evaded a great deal of taxes
owed to the state, being safe from government retribution as long as they deliv-
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ered their rice quotas and stayed out of trouble. In contrast, the Meiji (1868-1912)
and Taishō (1912-1926) eras featured increasing state interference in the form of
rural taxation, land surveys, and a new household registration system.11 The lat-
ter system was established soon after the Meiji emperor assumed the throne,
with the Meiji Registration Code (also known as the Household Registration Law
or kosekihō) being completed in 1871 and fully implemented in 1872.12 Serving as
a kind of census, with emphasis on residence rather than on social standing, the
household registration system allowed the Japanese imperial state to keep track
of the members of each household, particularly marriages and births. This sys-
tem was also used to determine whether an individual was a criminal or a
vagrant. In 1898, with the issuing of the first modern civil code in Japan, legal
status was given to the traditional Japanese conception of the family, in which
the head of the household assumed responsibility for of all family members.
Since then, the household register (koseki) has served as a document recording
the details of the personal status of an individual and his/her circle of relatives.13
At the same time that Japan was modernizing at home, it was also begin-
ning to extend its power overseas. Between 1895 and 1914, Japan acquired Tai-
wan, Karafuto (southern Sakhalin) (1905), the Kwantung Leased Territory on the
Liaoning peninsula (1905), Korea (1910), and former German possessions in
Micronesia. Such expansion proved critical to Japan’s modernization. As Robert
Eskildsen convincingly argues, “…selective appropriation of Western civilization
and the projection of military force abroad contributed to the formation of mod-
ern identity in Japan”.14 Other research clearly indicates the importance of colo-
nial expansion to modern Japan, especially in terms of gaining long-coveted sta-
tus as a sovereign nation equal in standing to the great powers of that era. For
example, Frederick R. Dickinson maintains that during the Meiji and Taishō eras
Japan largely followed the then conventional model of nation building, namely
the creation of an empire abroad and the enactment of constitutional monarchy
at home.15
When discussing the growth of Japanese colonialism in Asia, it is neces-
sary to remember that it was a diverse and complicated process. For example, the
work of Oguma Eiji points to the ambiguous positions of many Meiji thinkers,
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who, while supporting Japanese expansion, also remembered Western imperial-
ist threats to their own nation’s security and fully understood that Whites con-
sidered non-Whites to be inferior.16 Other scholars have noted that while the
Sino-Japanese War effectively ended China’s dominion over East Asia and led to
the establishment of Japanese colonialism in that region, it also forced the Japan-
ese state to grapple with the thorny issue of how to establish modern colonial
rule over the advanced societies of Korea and Taiwan.17 For example, Japan ini-
tially chose direct rule over Taiwan and Korea, but subsequently adjusted its poli-
cies in Korea to allow more Koreans into upper echelons of government. In con-
trast, only a few Taiwanese became administrative heads during the colonial
era.18 In terms of the social and economic aspects of Japanese colonial rule, Peter
Duus’ research has shown that Japan did everything in its power to pry open
Korean markets to Japanese goods, while also encouraging Korea to export rice
to Japan.19 This contrasts with Japanese rule over Taiwan, where the export of
products like sugar and camphor proved more important, and promoting
imports from Japan did not receive as much emphasis.20
Assessments of Japan’s early colonial policies and their impact on Tai-
wanese society vary greatly, but one undisputed fact is that Japan faced numerous
difficulties after assuming control over its first colonial territory. Harry J. Lamley
correctly points out that Japan was ill-prepared to become a colonial power, and
shortly after the invasion of Taiwan had been completed, a number of problems
quickly arose.21 After the Ch’ing had surrendered Taiwan to Japan, the Japanese
government established a Governor-General’s Office (Sōtokufu) and appointed
the first of seven military Governor-Generals, Kabayama Sukenori (served from
May 1895 to June 1896). From 1895-1897, Kabayama and his two successors22
attempted to enhance their authority by a combination of military and legal
means. The results of their efforts proved disappointing, and Japan’s woes were
compounded by having to deal with the ravages of endemic and epidemic dis-
eases. The early years of colonial rule were also marked by a widespread exodus
of local gentry between 1895 and May 8, 1897 (the second anniversary of the
Treaty of Shimonoseki), during which Taiwan’s residents had to choose between
returning to China as subjects of the Ch’ing dynasty or remaining in Taiwan and
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joining Japan’s colonial empire (albeit not as Japanese citizens). Taiwan’s fourth
Governor-General, Kodama Gentarō (served February 1898 – April 1906), and
his famed Chief of Civil Administration Gotō Shimpei (1857-1929; served Febru-
ary 1898 – November 1906), succeeded in putting down armed resistance, as
well as promoting Taiwan’s economic development. They also enacted reform
measures to improve sanitation and public health, while implementing a new
educational system and attempting to attract elite support by awarding gentry
medals (shinshō) and holding a conference (the “Uplifting Culture Conference”
or Yōbunkai) to solicit the opinions of Taiwan?s former and current ruling class-
es. These and other policies described below proved instrumental in consolidat-
ing Japan’s rule over its first colony.23
The legal system
Once the Japanese military had subdued initial outbreaks of armed resistance by
the end of 1895, the colonial government’s top priority became enhancing its
administrative authority over the island. In order to achieve this goal, the Japan-
ese imperial government granted the Governor- Generals who administered the
island a broad range of powers, particularly in terms of their military and legal
authority. Perhaps most importantly, in March 1896 Japan’s Diet responded to
continued outbreaks of armed resistance on Taiwan by giving the Governor-Gen-
eral extraordinary powers to issue and enforce laws (ritsurei) without having to
first obtain imperial approval. Kodama and Gotÿ quickly took advantage of this
law, known by its title of Law 63 (or roku-sanhō), to pass a number of ritsurei
which had immediate and drastic impacts on the lives of many Taiwanese. For
example, in 1898, the colonial government passed the so-called Bandit Punish-
ment Law (Hito keibarei; (emergency ritsurei No. 24), under which people
involved in any form of resistance to colonial rule could be labeled “bandits” and
sentenced to death. This law’s most important feature involved the stipulation of
a wide range of offenses that could be punishable by death, including simply
joining a “rebellious” organization. The Bandit Punishment Law was applied
with full force against men and women who opposed Japanese rule.24 During
Kodama’s tenure, the colonial authorities also enacted the Fine and Flogging
Law in 1904, whereby policemen in Taiwan were granted the authority to pass
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summary judgments on individuals who had been accused of offenses for which
floggings were to be authorized.25 The colonial government also tried to control
what is considered unsavory elements of the population who were not danger-
ous enough to be considered as “bandits” by passing the Taiwan Vagrant Disci-
pline Regulations in 1906. Based on these regulations, the authorities set up
vagrant camps (shūyōjo) in the eastern region of Taitung in 1908. Individuals
labeled as “vagrants” could be sent to a camp even if they had not committed a
crime, and the police were delegated authority to decide who actually had to go
there, although the Governor-General’s Office had to give final approval of all
such decisions.26
Apart from establishing a police force and enacting new laws and regula-
tions, the colonial state also enacted a system of criminal justice that in some
ways differed radically from that then in existence in Japan. For one thing, dur-
ing the first decades of Japanese colonial rule over Taiwan Governor-Generals
were granted complete power over the organization and function of Taiwan’s
judiciary, making the judicial branch of the colonial government effectively sub-
ordinate to the executive.27 Moreover, while trials in Taiwan were supposed to
conform to the Japanese Code of Criminal Procedure, the authorities enacted
special laws for the speedy trials of accused Taiwanese. For example, the Sum-
mary Judgment Law of 1904 allowed heads of local governments to immediately
adjudicate a broad range of criminal offenses, while the passage of the Special
Law for Criminal Litigation in 1905 broadened the powers of police, prosecutors,
and judges.28 In the case of individuals who attempted to resist state authority, a
particularly important development involved the establishment of temporary
courts (rinji hōin), which could be set up at any time to try men and women
accused of being bandits. Such courts, which were convened five times between
1895 and 1915, featured small numbers of prosecutors and judges who were giv-
en great leeway to administer justice to large numbers of suspects. While defen-
dants were granted legal representation, justice was swift and no appeals were
allowed.29
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The colonial police force
Following the failure of the so-called “Triple Guard System”, whereby the army,
military police, and police attempted to share responsibility for maintaining law
and order, Kodama and Gotō decided to delegate primary responsibility for
enforcing order to the police. An elaborate network of police stations was estab-
lished throughout the island, and Taiwanese were recruited to join the force at
the junior grade of assistant patrolman (junsaho).30 Policemen did far more than
simply enforce the law, however; they also assisted the civil administration in its
efforts to govern the populace, collecting taxes, conducting censuses and admin-
istering the household registration system (see below).31
Community policing
Kodama and Gotō also decided to reshape the late imperial Chinese community
policing (baojia) system to their purposes. Accordingly, just six months into his
rule (Agusut 1898) Kodama promulgated the “Community Policing (hokō) Law”
and relevant regulations to govern its implementation. In terms of its structure,
the community policing system was rather similar to the baojia: ten households
made up a kō, and ten kō formed a ho. Each kō had a headman (the kōchō), and
each ho a higher-ranking headman (the hosei), all of whom were required to be
household heads over 20 years of age who were chosen by local residents and
confirmed by the colonial authorities. The system was also intimately connected
to the colonial police force, with police officers in charge of ho headmen, who in
turn took responsibility for the actions of kō headmen. The community policing
system encompassed a broad range of responsibilities, which included tax col-
lection, public health, implementing agricultural policies, selecting able-bodied
residents to serve as porters, and administering the household registration sys-
tem.32
Land taxes
The colonial government’s economic policies were designed to increase rev-
enues from land taxes, modernize Taiwan’s sugar industry and open mountain
areas for intensive exploitation. Chang Han-yu and Ramon Myers have convinc-
ingly demonstrated that the Japanese viewed the possession of Taiwan as vital to
its own survival and self-protection, with the development of Taiwan’s resources
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being one of their top priorities.33 Accordingly, once the administrative systems
described above had begun to function according to plan, the Japanese turned
their attention to the local economy. The first stage of Taiwan’s economic mod-
ernization program involved taxation. In a clear example of the process of colo-
nial governmentality mentioned in the Introduction, a comprehensive land sur-
vey was carried out from 1898 to 1903, and resulted in large amounts of previ-
ously untaxed “hidden land” being registered and included on the tax rolls.34 The
fact that the colonial government effectively employed the community policing
system to collect taxes made tax evasion all the more difficult, and this caused the
local populace’s land tax burden began to increase significantly. The state also
raised significant amounts of revenue from new excise taxes after it had estab-
lished government-run monopolies in opium, salt, tobacco, and camphor. As a
result, by 1905 the Japanese government no longer had to subsidize the civil
administration of Taiwan.35
The sugar industry
Sugar had been an important component of Taiwan’s economy during the Qing
dynasty, but during the chaotic first five to six years of colonial rule local sugar
production fell 63%. In order to remedy the situation, the Japanese government
decided in 1901 to allow the colonial administration to keep revenues from sug-
ar taxes, thereby providing a great incentive to increase production. Thereafter,
Kodama and Gotō strove to attract Japanese capital and create an infrastructure
to support Japanese investment. The colonial authorities went so far as to guar-
antee profits for new Japanese investors, and also provided generous subsidies
and loans. Bank loans to the sugar industry (mostly by the Bank of Taiwan)
increased from 2.7 million yen in 1903 to 335 million yen by 1920. The colonial
government also created exclusive territories for modern sugar factories to con-
trol procurement of sugar cane. This meant that such factories enjoyed effective
monopoly power, with cane farmers unable to bargain or sell to lower bidders. By
1915, five monopolistic sugar companies accounted for 76.11% of Taiwan’s sugar
refiners and 74.81% of capital invested in the sugar industry. The government
prospered as well: by the 1910s, sugar constituted more than 70% of Taiwan’s
total industrial output, and over 50% of the colonial administration’s tax rev-
enues.36
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Forest products
Camphor differed from sugar in that the Ch’ing state had attempted to actively
exploit this natural resource as early as the 1880s, when camphor became a hot
commodity on the world market due to its use in the manufacture of smokeless
gunpowder.37 In the fall of 1895, the colonial state decreed that all mountain
forests and wastelands were to be considered state property if those occupying
the lands could not produce a certificate or other document issued by the Ch’ing
state verifying ownership rights. The colonial state then proceeded to set up the
Camphor Monopoly Bureau in 1899, and by the early 1900s Japanese capitalists
had begun to take over the management of much of Taiwan’s mountain land.
This process proved costly to all involved, as in each year between 1898 and 1901
(inclusive) colonial forces suffered over 500 deaths and 100 injuries; the number
of Aborigine casualties is unknown. Taiwan’s fifth Governor-General Sakuma
Samata (served April 1906 – April 1915) subsequently initiated a brutal subjuga-
tion campaign from 1909-1914, which featured the use of airplanes as well as
naval bombardments from warships stationed off the coast of eastern Taiwan.38
Censuses, surveys, and the household registration system
The demographic sources to be discussed here were created during the early
1900s, at the exact same time as the colonial state was trying to extend its control
over local society by means of the policies described above. In 1896, the colonial
government attempted to implement its first census, promulgating the “Regula-
tions for Conducting a Household Census of Taiwan’s Inhabitants” (Taiwan
jmin kokō chōsa kitei) in August of that year. According to these regulations, the
military police and police were to conduct censuses of the local population, who
were to register by household and provide information about each household
member’s name, date of birth, etc. The entire process of compiling this demo-
graphic data was supposed to last from September to the end of December, but
the census was apparently never completed.39 Seven years later, in 1903, Kodama
Gentarō and Gotō Shimpei ordered the issuance of Directive (kunrei) 104, named
the “Household Census Regulations” (Kokō chōsa kitei), which stipulated that
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Japanese patrolmen and Taiwanese assistant patrolmen were to undertake a new
effort at completing a thorough process of registering all of the island’s inhabi-
tants. According to these regulations, all individuals were to be divided into three
“social classes” based roughly on status, with members of the first class (mainly
members of the gentry and elite) needing to have their records updated every 6
months, members of the second (most inhabitants) every three months, and
members of the third (vagrants or people with criminal records) every month.
All births, deaths, and moves to new residences were to be strictly monitored.40
On October 1, 1905, the colonial authorities initiated the “First Provisional
Household Census on Taiwan” (Dai-ichi rinji Taiwan kokō chōsa) (see below), and
two months later issued a revised series of the “Household Census Regulations”,
also known as Directive 255. These regulations provided further detail on how
the registration process was to be undertaken, while also relaxing the require-
ments for updating the records of the first two social classes listed above. Accord-
ing to the new rules, members of the first class only needed to have their records
updated once a year, while for members of the second class the time was extend-
ed to every six months. Members of the third class were still required to have
their records updated on a monthly basis. The entire process of compiling the
household registers was completed by January 15, 1906.41
In implementing the household registration system, the Japanese endeav-
ored to compile data on birth and death dates of all household members,42 as well
as information about marriage, adoption, and migration. In addition, prior to the
simplification of registration procedures in 1935, the household registers also
contained information about each individual’s ethnic or sub-ethnic affiliation,43
occupation, foot binding, opium addiction, and vaccinations. In order to effec-
tively administer this system, the police delegated responsibility for registering
events like births, deaths, and marriages to the heads of local community policing
networks. Thus, household heads or literate members of a household were
required to report all such events to their headmen, who then recorded them on a
form provided by the police, which was then delivered to the police. In theory,
such record keeping was supposed to be completed within ten days after an event
such as a birth or death occurred. The colonial authorities kept particularly close
watch on population movements, and migrants were only allowed to cancel their
original registrations after presenting a receipt proving that they had registered in
29
40. Hung, Rizhi shiqi huji dengji falü ji yongyu bianyi, 205-206.
41. Hung, Rizhi shiqi huji dengji falü ji yongyu bianyi, 205-212.
42. All events were registered according to the Western calendar, not the traditional Chinese lunar calendar.
43. In cases of mixed marriages, the ethnic or sub-ethnic affiliation of each child was based on that of the father.
In the few cases when the father’s ethnic or sub-ethnic affiliation could not be determined, the child’s was then
based on that of the mother; see Hung, Rizhi shiqi huji dengji falü ji yongyu bianyi, 39, 199.
another district. It is important to note, however, that the household registration
system as implemented in 1906 did not cover all of Taiwan’s inhabitants, and it
took decades for the colonial authorities to compile household registers for all
Japanese, Han Chinese (mostly Hoklos and Hakkas), Plains Aborigines, and for-
eigners (including citizens of the Ch’ing dynasty and later the Republic of China).
Some Mountain Aborigine tribes were not included until as late as 1943.44
Each page of a household’s register consisted of three to six columns, with
each member of a household having a column devoted to recording the events of
his or her lifetime. As new events occurred, small slips of paper were pasted on
top of that individual’s column. New pages could be added to a household’s reg-
ister when the number of its members increased. When a member of the house-
hold died or departed due to marriage, adoption, or family division, the column
containing his or her name was struck out and the circumstances of his/her
departure duly recorded. In the event that the head of a household died or other-
wise ceased to be able to fulfill his or her duties, a new register was copied for
that household and the old register filed with other “dead registers” (literally “vol-
umes [recording] the removal of a household” or ch’u-hu pu) from that year.
When an individual or household moved to a new location for only a brief period
of time, but did not plan to settle in the new location permanently, their records
were included in “volumes [recording] temporary residence” (chi-liu pu) at that
new location.45 Despite the comprehensive nature of these sources, however,
there are occasional instances of erroneous reporting, particularly regarding
dates of birth and death deemed to be inauspicious. The registers also lack com-
plete data on the occupations of household members, only providing such infor-
mation on a reasonably consistent basis for household heads, and only for regis-
ters compiled prior to 1935. Finally, while the registers list the date of an individ-
ual’s demise, they provide no detail as to cause of death.
Because the colonial police force was in charge of compiling and updating
the household registers, most Household Registration Offices in Taiwan today
are located inside or next to police stations. Such offices contain three sets of vol-
umes: one set for permanent residents who still lived in the area by the end of
the colonial era, one set of “dead registers”, and one set of registers recording the
activities of sojourners. The contents of all volumes are usually arranged by
address, with each volume having an index listing the names of all household
heads. Today, one can also use computers in local Household Registration
Offices to search for individuals by name. 
While both Japan and Taiwan had household registration systems, there
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were some important differences between the two. Japan’s system was governed
by the Household Registration Law (see above), with household registration
being managed by civil bureaucrats. In contrast, the police and leaders of the
community policing system ran household registration in Taiwan. Moreover, the
Japanese refused to legally recognize the legitimacy of Han Chinese family heads
(chia-chang), requiring instead that the head of a family register according to the
Japanese concept of household head (koshū). Thus, the household or ko might
best be viewed as an administrative unit defined by the state for use in controlling
local society, while the family or chia was a locally defined socioeconomic unit. It
is also interesting to note that the colonial authorities’ insistence on registering
Taiwanese by household instead of family appears to be a striking exception to the
general trend of not interfering in local customs, particularly during the early
years of colonial rule. The fact that Japanese and Taiwanese were registered
according to different systems could pose difficulties for Japanese who wished to
marry a Taiwanese spouse or adopt a Taiwanese child; such relationships were
technically illegal until the relevant regulations were revised in 1935.46
In attempting to assert firm control over the people and resources of Tai-
wan, the colonial authorities wanted to do more than simply record the activities
of individuals and households. Therefore, apart from compiling the household
registers, the state endeavored to measure the demographic transformations of
local communities on a regular basis. In September 1905 the Governor-Gener-
al’s Office promulgated the “Regulations on Reports about Population Move-
ment” (Jinkō dōtai hōkoku kitei), which required the police to keep track of all
births, deaths, marriages, divorces, and population movements in their districts
on a monthly basis. Based on these records, the colonial authorities compiled
annual reports on demographic change in Taiwan entitled the Statistical Data on
the Population Currently Living in Taiwan. These reports were designed to meas-
ure total population, sex ratios, births, deaths, inward migration, and outward
migration. Compiled on an annual basis from 1905 to 1943, they contain aggre-
gate demographic data for Japanese, Taiwanese (including Han Chinese and
Plains Aborigines), and foreigners (including citizens of the Qing dynasty and
the Republic of China). Relevant demographic data was presented by prefecture,
county, township, and village, with that year’s data being listed alongside data
from the previous year.47 Thus, scholars can use the Statistical Data in order to
measure both short-term and long-term demographic changes in local commu-
nities, although one occasionally encounters difficulties resulting from the
redrawing of administrative districts.
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The colonial authorities also kept close track of socioeconomic changes
affecting local communities by conducting a total of seven detailed demographic
surveys every five or ten years. The first such survey, which was initiated by Gotÿ
Shimpei in the autumn of 1905, was known as the “First Provisional Household
Census on Taiwan” (Dai-ichi rinji Taiwan kokō chōsa).48 A second and even more
detailed survey was conducted in 1915, and subsequent surveys were undertaken
in 1920, 1925, 1930, 1935, and 1940 respectively (see Appendix 1). The first two
surveys did not contain data on Mountain Aborigines, who were not included in
until 1920. Beginning in that year, censuses in Taiwan began to be undertaken
as part of the National Census (Kokusei chōsa) conducted both in Japan and its
colonies. Under the National Census system, simple surveys were to be complet-
ed every five years, with more detailed surveys to be done every ten years.
Accordingly, the 1925 and 1935 surveys were done according to the simpler for-
mat, while the 1920 and 1930 surveys contain far more thorough records of Tai-
wan’s demographic structures, particularly occupational patterns. Because the
1940 survey was carried out during wartime, the colonial authorities were
unable to publish their results, although the Taiwan Provincial Government
eventually published much of this data in 1953.49
The seven censuses described above are far more detailed than the Statis-
tical Data. In addition to listing aggregate data on total population and sex ratios
for all Japanese, Taiwanese, and foreigners in each prefecture, county, township,
and village, they also provide invaluable information on ethnic or sub-ethnic
affiliation, occupation, foot binding, opium addiction, physical handicaps, wid-
ows and widowers, etc. Thus, they allow scholars to see a cumulative picture of a
given area that could only be otherwise obtained by painstakingly going through
the household registers on a case-by-case basis. Their only drawback is that they
do not show whether changes in total population were due to births, deaths,
inward migration, or outward migration; for such information, one must rely on
the Statistical Data.
Both the colonial authorities and the people of Taiwan were well aware of
the fact that population surveys were a key measure of state control. For example,
during an anti-Japanese uprising during the summer of 1915 known as the Ta-
pa-ni Incident,50 the police threatened uncooperative suspects with being exclud-
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article in The Journal of Asian Studies.
ed from that year’s census, which was to be concluded in October. The fear of
having one’s name removed from demographic records was quite real, and there
are reports of people throughout Taiwan who had nothing to do with this inci-
dent jamming into trains in order to make it home in time to be registered, and
worrying that those who were not counted would be labeled as co-conspirators.51
Concluding remarks
Based on the evidence presented above, it should by now be readily apparent that
the various demographic records compiled during the colonial era constitute
invaluable primary sources for scholars wishing to do research on Taiwanese
society. The household registers preserve detailed records the life courses of the
island’s inhabitants, including birth, adoption, marriage and death, meaning
that they are perhaps the single most important source for researching the histo-
ry of the Taiwanese family. They also provide key information about social class,
crime, the handicapped, vaccination campaigns etc. The registers allow us to
learn more about Taiwanese customs during the colonial era, including different
forms of marriage and adoption, but also concubinage, opium addiction, and
foot binding. One can also research how events such as typhoons, floods, epi-
demics, and armed uprisings shaped demographic patterns in local communi-
ties. Scholars interested in the history of urbanization and industrialization in
modern Taiwan can use the registers to find data on migration patterns and the
ways that family structures changed over time, while those researching Tai-
wanese local elites can also mine the registers for data on how elite families used
marriage as a strategy to cultivate networks of power. In terms of gender studies,
scholars working on the history of Taiwanese women can use the registers to
compile data on marriage, adoption, and fertility, as well as problems such as the
relationship between economic development and a woman’s age at marriage.
In-depth demographic or social historical research on Taiwanese society
during the colonial era need not rely solely on the household registers. Other
demographic records provide important information on local social and eco-
nomic structures, as well as the ways in which they could change over time. For
example, the Statistical Data allow scholars to measure demographic changes at
the prefectural, county, township, and even village levels due to factors such as
fertility, mortality, and migration, while the censuses conducted every five or ten
years provide detailed pictures of an area’s socioeconomic structures, including
gender, ethnicity, occupation, etc. Thus, by taking full advantage of the three
types of demographic sources discussed above, we can view snapshots of a par-
ticular community at a given point in time, as well as study that community’s
social history in both the short and long term.
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Regrettably, however, relatively few scholars have taken full advantage of this
invaluable body of primary source material. To date, the leaders in this field have
been Arthur P. Wolf, Chuang Ying-chang, and Hill Gates, who have used the
household registers to conduct in-depth research on the history of marriage and
adoption in colonial Taiwan.52 More recently, a growing number of scholars
researching Taiwan’s Plains Aborigines, particularly Hung Li-wan, John R. Shep-
herd, Pan Ing-hai, and Yeh Ch’un-jung, have begun to use demographic sources
to study Aboriginal social structures and their transformation over time.53 Schol-
ars like Lin Sheng-ch’in and Shih T’ien-fu are now using these records to study
Taiwan’s economic development during the colonial era, especially along the
island’s eastern coast54, while Chuang Pei-jou has relied on household registers
to explore the ways in which industrialization shaped demographic structures in
mining communities located in northern Taiwan.55 Hill Gates has been doing
path-breaking work on the Taiwanese women during the colonial era, especially
in urban areas of the island56, while I have used demographic records to study
elite marriage patterns and the links between occupation and age at marriage in
the southern fishing port of Tung-kang.57
In short, the existence of Taiwan’s colonial-era demographic sources pro-
vides us with a unique opportunity to use demographic data along with informa-
tion collected from other sources and during fieldwork in order to better under-
stand local social structures, customs, and the lives of the island’s men and
women. These sources are particularly important because in postcolonial Taiwan
the colonial past does not rest in peace. In particular, attempts to address events
that took place during the period of time when Taiwan was a colony of Japan fre-
quently spark controversies between scholars and politicians embracing vastly
different ideologies and historical perspectives. Postcolonial debates about the
significance of a nation’s colonial experience are hardly unique to Taiwan,58 but I
would argue that controversies and/or debates among intellectuals and politi-
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cians surrounding the nature of Taiwan’s colonial past, while constituting an
integral and significant aspect of postcolonial discourse, nonetheless tend to dis-
tort the past, with historical events and their impact on men and women fre-
quently being molded or manipulated to serve a wide range of agendas. The
result is that we often tend to overlook the real-life experiences of typical 20th-
century Taiwanese (rural wage earners, petty entrepreneurs and laborers) whose
voices rarely can compete with the hubbub raised by politicians and academics.
The demographic sources described above have the potential to give some voice
to these men and women. Furthermore, inasmuch as these sources constituted
part of Japan’s colonial governmentality over Taiwan, scholars using these texts
can also consider the ways in which research on Taiwan’s colonial experience can
contribute to our knowledge of colonialism as a historical phenomenon world-
wide. These two goals are interrelated, and achieving the first goal has the poten-
tial to help us rethink the second. The opportunities are available; the only ques-
tion is whether scholars will take advantage of them.
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Appendix 1 – The seven household censuses36
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In the past, as well as today, every system of population administration was
informed by preconceived notions of social reality, notions that are reflected in
the categories created to simplify and structure relations and behavior. For exam-
ple, individuals were supposed to belong to one specific household; each house-
hold had to have an official ‘head’ and members of households were ordered
administratively by their ‘relationship to the head’. Also, every individual needed
to have one official place of residence, even when he or she was an itinerant
worker or was living on a boat. The categories and definitions employed in
records and registers ensued from the purposes that the administrations served.
For what legal, political or scientific goal were they recording, counting and cate-
gorizing people? This question is relevant for those who seek to distil knowledge
on family life in the past from bureaucratic records. They must be aware of the
potential conflict between simple categories and complex realities as well as of
the biases inherent in any system. 
This chapter discusses the most important sources for family historians
and historical demographers in the Netherlands. These are the vital or civil reg-
isters (certificates of birth, death and marriage) that were initiated in 1811, the
population registers, initiated in 1850, and the ten-yearly censuses held from
1829 to 1971. For each source, I will discuss its origin and function, describe its
content as well as potential biases, and finally remark on its accessibility for
researchers.
The civil registers
As a consequence of the annexation of the Netherlands by the French Empire,
French civil law was introduced in 1810. The Code Napoléon provided for the
compulsory, standardized recording of vital events by means of certificates.
These certificates served a legal function by recording the changes in individual
status occurring through birth, marriage, divorce, and death. They were and are
crucial documents for settling disputes concerning inheritance. Also, vital regis-
ters played an important role in the control and regulation of marriage, as will be
discussed below.1
The certificates were drawn up in the municipality where the vital event
occurred. Persons who declared a birth or death, or couples who declared their
intention to marry, presented themselves to the registrar. The registrar then not-
ed the required information in a preformatted document, to be signed by the
declarant(s) as well as by witnesses. The witnesses did not make any declaration
themselves. They simply had to be present when the declaration was made
before the registrar and, afterwards, when the certificate was read aloud. In a
strict legal sense the witnesses did not bear testimony to the truth of the declara-
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tion itself. Obviously, in the case of a birth, they were not expected to have been
present at the delivery. Yet, to a certain extent they were supposed to affirm the
contents of a declaration. The registrars were therefore urged to take care that
witnesses were friends or relatives of the informants. They could refuse untrust-
worthy persons. In practice, however, and particularly in the case of birth certifi-
cates, the witnesses were frequently either clerks or other municipal officials, or
even persons who made a living by signing certificates for a small fee. 
The registrars had to note the names, ages, occupations and (actual) place
of residence of the informants and witnesses. This information served the cor-
rect identification of individuals. For other persons mentioned in the certificates,
the required information was less detailed. For instance, it was not necessary for
the registrar to state the age of parents in a birth certificate.
The birth certificates
Each birth was to be reported to the Registrar of the municipality in which it had
taken place. The birth had to be declared within three days, the day of the deliv-
ery itself not included. After this time limit, no notification could take place,
unless authorization was granted by the public prosecutor. In addition, a consid-
erable fine had to be paid.
The declaration ought to be made by the father, or, in his absence, by the
midwife or someone else who had been present at the delivery. In the certificates
the name, occupation, place of residence, and age of the declarant are usually
mentioned first. The Registrar asked the declarant for the day and hour of birth,
the place within the municipality in which the child was born, sex, and Christian
name of the child. For the parents, items to be recorded included surnames and
Christian names, occupation and municipality of residence. The names and
marital status of the parents had to be registered in such a way that the legal sta-
tus of the child was clear. Until 1935, a person who declared a newborn child to
the Registrar had to be accompanied by two witnesses, which meant that their
ages, addresses, and occupations were recorded as well. The witnesses and the
persons who declared the child were obliged to sign the certificate. In case they
could or would not sign, the reason had to be made explicit.
Illegitimate children were children born outside legal marriage. Their
mothers were generally unmarried or their former marriage had ended at least
300 days before. Children resulting from adultery by a married woman were reg-
istered as legitimate, unless her husband had refused the notification and had
started a complicated procedure to dispute the legitimacy of the child. The birth
certificates of illegitimate children differed in important respects from those of
legitimate children. The registrar was not entitled to state the name of the father,
unless the father officially recognized the child. He could only do so when he
could show a document proving that the mother consented to the recognition.
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Recognition was a voluntary act on the part of a begetter of an illegitimate child,
creating legal ties between him and the child. The father acknowledged his
paternity, thereby admitting his obligation to provide for the child. The child
received its father’s last name and could from then on inherit from him, albeit
only a third of what a child would have received if he had been legitimately born.
Only ‘natural’ children could be recognized, that is, children whose parents were
both unmarried. Children begotten in incestuous or adulterous relationships
could never be recognized. Until 1947 children could in principle be recognized
only by their biological father. Recognized children were automatically legitimat-
ed (that is, become equal to legitimate children) when their parents married.
Often, the recognition took place just prior to the marriage celebration and was
stated in the marriage certificate. The fact of recognition had to be noted in the
margin of the birth certificate. Because legitimization of recognized children
automatically ensued from the marriage of their parents, no specific mention of
this fact needed to be made on the birth certificate. This means that the infor-
mation on legitimatizations is less complete than on recognitions.2
The death certificates 
Deaths had to be reported to the Registrar of the municipality in which they
occurred. The notification could only be done by someone who had personal
knowledge of the death of the person concerned. In the nineteenth century, the
declarant was generally a relative or an acquaintance of the deceased. Later on,
most notifications were done by undertakers. For each deceased person, Christ-
ian names and surname, age, occupation, municipality of birth and residence,
and hour and day of death were recorded. Age was generally expressed in (com-
pleted) years; however, for persons younger than two at the time of death, ages
were expressed in months; for persons younger than two months, in weeks; for
those younger than two weeks, in days; and for children less than two days old,
in hours. Stillbirths were also recorded in the death certificates.
Place of residence was usually a detailed address, which was required by
the collector of death duties. In case the deceased was married or widowed, the
name of his husband or wife had to be mentioned. Until 1935, this concerned
only the present or last partner of the deceased. After 1935, all former partners
had to be mentioned in chronological order, without the reason of marriage dis-
solution. Christian names and surnames, occupation and place of residence of
the parents of the deceased had to be mentioned as well. If they were deceased,
only their names and the fact that they had died were noted. Before the introduc-
tion of the population register (see below), information on the parents of the
deceased was often incomplete.
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The law did not stipulate a time period within which notification had to
take place. But no burial could take place without written permission from the
registrar, who was not entitled to give this permission before 36 hours after the
death had occurred. Because it was most convenient to deliver the permission at
the time of notification, registrars were strongly advised not to register a death
before the 36 hours had passed.
The marriage certificates
To comply with Dutch family law, couples that intended to marry had to provide
detailed information on themselves and their relatives. This makes the marriage
certificates a rich source for family historians. The law fixed minimum ages of
marriage. From 1838 the minimum ages were 18 for boys and 16 for girls. Per-
sons were only allowed one marriage at a time and they were not allowed to mar-
ry relatives in the ascending or descending line, which applied to in-laws as well
as blood relatives. This means that, for instance, a man could not marry his
cousin (or even second cousin) and a widow could not marry her brother-in-law,
at least not without dispensation. Before 1922 one was not allowed to remarry a
partner one had been divorced from. After that, only one such “marriage of repa-
ration” was allowed. 
Perhaps more important than the legal minimum age, was the required
consent to the marriage, which had to be given by the parents and which was to
be noted on the certificate. A distinction has to be made between persons who
had come of age and those who had not. The Dutch Civil Law of 1838 stated that
persons who had come of age (23 years) had to ask permission to marry until
their thirtieth birthday. A refusal of (one or both of) the parents would lead to a
case before the cantonal judge. If the judge approved the marriage, the wedding
could take place even if the parents persisted in their refusal but not until three
months after the session. Persons younger than 23 always needed their parents’
consent. If both parents had died, the grandfather on the father’s side would be
consulted, in his absence the grandfather on the mother’s side and so on. An ille-
gitimate child needed the consent of its mother, and of its father as well if he had
recognized the child.
In order to be sure that no illegal marriages were contracted, intended mar-
riages had to be proclaimed publicly on two Sundays following the couple’s giving
notice of their marriage. This was done by reading aloud the proclamation in
front of the town hall. The proclamations had to be made in the place(s) of resi-
dence of bride and bridegroom, even if they had lived there less than six months.
Because of these regulations, the registers contain information on numer-
ous persons. The couple had to submit excerpts from their own birth certificates,
as well as of the death certificates of deceased parents, grandparents, or previous
partners. In the registers, we find the Christian names and surnames of bride
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and bridegroom, their ages, occupations and places of residence. It is also specif-
ically mentioned whether they had reached the age of majority or not. Further,
the names, ages, occupations and place of residence of living parents are given
or the names of already deceased parents. When both parents had died, consent
to the marriage had to be given by the grandparents. For the wedding ceremony,
at least four witnesses were required in the period 1811-1913. Their names, ages,
occupations and places of residence were given as well as the (family) relation-
ship between the witnesses and the bride or groom. Finally, when the marriage
ended in a divorce, this had to be noted in the margin of the marriage certificate.
Until the late nineteenth century, it was very difficult to get an official divorce in
the Netherlands.3
By and large, the civil registers are a very accurate record of vital events in the
Netherlands. Apparently, people were well aware of the troubles caused by not
reporting as required. Under-registration of births was significant only in the
early decades of the nineteenth century. Complying with administrative regula-
tions was difficult for itinerant workers and immigrants. Indeed, some couples
chose to live in consensual unions as a way of avoiding bureaucratic trouble, at
least temporarily.4 Nonetheless, civil records still pose problems to the unwary
researcher. For instance, the common method of estimating social mobility by
comparing the occupations of grooms and their fathers is problematic because
only living fathers can be identified.5
Almost every certificate of birth, marriage and death ever made in the
Netherlands is still available, because each was made in duplicate. The original
remained in the municipality and the copy was sent to the registry of the county
court after the closing of the register on December 31st. The duplicates have
been assembled in the provincial archives, at least for the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The certificates have been made accessible by alphabetical
indexes on births, deaths and marriages that occurred in each municipality per
ten-yearly period. Thus, family reconstitution is quite feasible, provided one is
satisfied with a local study.6 However, in particular in the western part of the
Netherlands, many municipalities were small in size, causing a great loss of per-
sons through out-migration. Even more serious, strong out-migration diminish-
es the quality of the calculations of demographic rates for the sedentary popula-
tion as well.7 Fortunately, the ongoing digitization of the indexes – stimulated by
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a surge of popular interest in genealogy – will allow researchers to expand the
search for out-migrants enormously. We expect that within a few years all Dutch
marriage certificates in the period 1811-1922 can be traced and even linked auto-
matically using the names of the parents. Very likely, the automatic indexation of
birth and death certificates will follow suit.
The civil records are an indispensable source for historical demography in
the Netherlands. The Dutch contributions in this volume are either based pri-
marily on the civil records (Engelen) or on combinations of population registers
and civil records (Kok). A number of recent studies have already experimented
with the automatic indexes of the marriage certificates.8
The population registers
The Dutch population registers are household registers in the sense that the unit
is the household. They record the same vital events as the civil registers, which
spares the researcher the trouble of linking certificates of birth, marriage and
death. Even more important for the family historian is that people are recorded
in their primary social surrounding, that is within their household or family.
And last but not least, the registers record migration as well. Thus, it is in prin-
ciple possible to trace persons to their subsequent domiciles and even to recon-
struct their entire life course. This type of administration is rare for historic pop-
ulations. Although the system has its shortcomings, it is one of the best sources
for historical (micro-)demography in the world.
In Europe, historical population registers exist only in Belgium (from
1846), the Netherlands (from 1850) and Italy (from 1864). In part, this occur-
rence can be explained by the personal influence of the famous Belgian
astronomer and statistician Adolphe Quetelet (1796-1874). In the Kingdom of
the Netherlands (which comprised Belgium as well during the period 1815-
1830), he laid the foundation for the ten-yearly censuses, which began in 1829.
The decrees actually suggested, but did not stipulate, that the censuses would
be kept up-to date by recording changes. Quetelet was also a key figure in the
International Statistical Conferences. The Italian representatives to these Con-
ferences adopted Quetelet’s ideas for the administration of their newly unified
state. Not accidentally, all three countries had been occupied by the French and
had chosen to retain French civil laws and bureaucratic principles of a central-
ized state. In these countries, the relations between local and central govern-
ment were organized along the same lines, allowing the population registers to
perform a double function as a local bureaucratic tool and a provider of aggre-
gate statistics. Ironically, the French themselves rejected the implementation
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of population registers, although they were prescribed in a revolutionary
decree of 1791.9
Quetelet was devoted to an accurate population administration because this
would allow social scientists to study the propensities of the average man (l’ homme
moyenne) and, eventually, to discover the laws regulating society. In his view, rec-
ognizing and acting upon these laws was essential for good government. In the
Netherlands, the system was introduced on the eve of municipal reform (1851).
The registers were to provide the population data needed to calculate the fran-
chise and the local shares of conscripted soldiers. In due course, the population
registers were to become indispensable in the implementation of social policies
at the individual level. For instance, they would be used to note disablement, pen-
sionability, etc. The accuracy of the government’s knowledge of individual citi-
zens was increased constantly. Although this did lead some to protest that indi-
vidual privacy was being violated, no one foresaw what a dangerous tool the reg-
isters could become in the hands of a totalitarian regime. During the Second
World War, the occupying German forces could locate the Dutch Jews with dead-
ly efficiency.
The administrative principles governing the population registers were
changed several times. At first, the system recorded people on the basis of their
legal place of residence. This meant to facilitate administration of poor relief,
which was based on legal domicile. However, recording people who were not
actually residing in a particular place soon proved impractical, and the system
was dropped in 1862. After that, people were registered in the municipalities
where they actually lived. The municipalities were free to choose how they
organized the registers: in alphabetical order by family name or by address. The
revision of 1862 also allowed for separate registers for the extremely mobile
domestic servants who were overburdening the main registers. However, resi-
dential mobility created a formidable administrative burden, requiring the con-
stant crossing–out of persons or whole families and entering them elsewhere.
Already in the late nineteenth century, officials began to propose a loose-leaf sys-
tem of cards for individual persons that could be ordered by families. Although
this proposal was rejected, many municipalities changed their registers around
1910 into a system of loose cards for (nuclear) families. In 1939, these cards were
replaced by a system of personal cards that lasted until 1994, when a fully auto-
matic administration system was introduced.
The population registers contain a wealth of information. For each individ-
ual the registers provide the surname and Christian name(s)s, sex, date and place
of birth, relation to the head of the household, date of entry in the register, civil
status (unmarried, married, widowed or divorced) and changes therein, church
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affiliation, occupation, date and municipality of provenance, date and destination
of out-migration, place of legal residence, and, finally, date of death.10
The quality of the registers was safeguarded in various ways. First of all,
the registers were crosschecked with the results of the census, which was held
every ten years. Generally, the census formed the starting point of the new regis-
ter. In quite a few instances, we find persons deleted because they were no
longer present at the census date or entered because they had apparently in-
migrated without registering. In the period between the censuses, the local
authorities were responsible for the upkeep of the registers. In Amsterdam, for
instance, this job was consigned initially to 263 unpaid wardens who kept regis-
ters for their own neighbourhoods. However, already in 1855 the wardens were
replaced by paid officials. After that, full-time clerks and inspectors were respon-
sible for the Amsterdam administration.11 In the countryside, checking and cor-
recting the registers was often assigned to the constables. Registering a residen-
tial move was obligatory and neglect could be fined. However, a legal basis for
the system was not provided until 1887 and people often shirked reporting their
new place of residence. In particular, heads of households neglected to report the
coming or going of their servants. Since the servants did not pay taxes, the offi-
cials were not very diligent in rectifying these omissions that were often only
noticed at the time of the census. Thus, estimates based on the registers tend to
underestimate the mobility of working adolescents. Also, their information on
occupations is of limited use, because changes in occupation were not (system-
atically) recorded. Generally, vital events were as accurate in the population reg-
isters as they were in the civil registers. However, in some areas this was not the
case. Particularly in the northern provinces births were added only when the
family was entered on a new page. Using the registers for family reconstitution
would result in an underestimation of both infant mortality and fertility. Finally,
researchers have to be aware of the changes in the administrative units. Until
1862, entire households were recorded, including servants. The household –
without the servants – remained the administrative unit until 1910, when it shift-
ed to (nuclear) families. Often, this was strictly limited to married couples and
their children. In the city of Rotterdam, for instance, co-residing relatives were
moved to their own cards. In fact, even unwed mothers and their children were
not considered a family and thus recorded on separate cards. Reconstituting
households is feasible, but very time-consuming.12
Notwithstanding these biases and problems, the population registers have
been used extensively for family and migration history.13 They are kept in the
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municipal archives and are freely accessible before 1940. In addition, for per-
sons deceased between 1939 and 1994, the personal cards can be retrieved from
the Central Bureau of Genealogy, albeit without information that might infringe
on privacy. Currently, the popularity of the registers is even increasing, due to
advances in computer technology. One the one hand, local archives are improv-
ing the accessibility of their population registers by publishing indexes on the
web and by scanning or even digitizing the entire registers. On the other hand,
researchers are avidly exploring new opportunities, for instance by creating pub-
lic-use sets of historical micro-data. The most important initiative in this respect
is the Historical Sample of the Netherlands. This database, under construction
since 1992, will contain the complete life courses of about 40.000 randomly
picked individuals. These individuals are traced from birth to death in all their
subsequent households across the country.14 Several Dutch contributions to this
volume make use of the first completed parts of the Historical Sample.
The censuses
The goals of the ten-yearly censuses were to check the information in the popu-
lation registers and to collect statistical information on the size and composition
of the population. Soon, they were combined with other censuses, on respective-
ly occupations (from 1849 onward) and housing (from 1899 onwards).
Although the original census forms were not preserved, most of the information
on individuals and families can be found in the population registers. 
The population censuses were primarily concerned with the demographic
structure of municipalities and provinces. That is, for (subdivisions of) munici-
palities, we find numbers of persons by sex, civil status and age. We also find a
division between households and single persons. Thus, we can calculate the
average size of households. The definition of household was based on the (eco-
nomic) criterion of house keeping unit. This means that the censuses were less
fixated than the population registers on kin or marital relations.15 From 1849
onwards, persons living in institutions such as convents or prison were counted
separately. Thus, in the censuses around 1900 we find the following categories:
heads of households, spouses, children, other relatives, employed persons, other
households members (boarders, lodgers), single living persons and persons in
institutions. The censuses also recorded and tabulated place of birth and nation-
ality, as well as religious affiliation.
In a number of censuses, additional information was requested that,
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unfortunately, can no longer be traced to the individuals involved. This includes
questions regarding physical handicaps (blindness, deaf-muteness, clubfoots),
level of education, and marital fertility. The latter implied that married women
were asked when they had married, how many children had been born in the
existing marriage, and how many children under six years had died. This infor-
mation has been used in a number of demographic studies, as well as in the con-
tribution of Engelen to this volume.16
Even for historical demographers primarily interested in micro-data, the
censuses contain indispensable information. They are needed to place individu-
als and families in their proper contexts. On the basis of the census, one can
answer questions such as: what is the population size and density of a particular
locality, what proportion of the population is native to the locality, what is the
dominant religion, what is the sex ratio of the unmarried etc. By using subse-
quent censuses, long-term trends can be determined as well. The occupational
census provide important information on the labour market of a given locality or
region.
Currently, scientific access to the data contained in the censuses is very
good. A public-use database with a selection of census data (such as church affil-
iations per municipality per census-year) is available.17 Also, all censuses are
being digitized, which means that the original tables can be downloaded in a for-
mat that allows the researcher to perform his combinations and calculations.18
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The problem: Antinatalist attitudes among pronatalist people
In the 1960s, sudden and unexpected drops in fertility occurred in both the
southern part of the Netherlands and Taiwan: in the Dutch province of Limburg,
from 217 births per 1000 women in the 1951-55 marriage cohort to 95 in 1971-75;
in Taiwan, from 211 births per 1000 women in 1951 to 99 by 1976.1 In the
Netherlands, Catholics living in Limburg and Noord-Brabant lagged several
decades behind other confessional groups in this important aspect of demo-
graphic modernization. In Taiwan, the fertility decline was relatively uniform
across population sectors. In neither group were people pushed by systematic,
state-mandated birth control programs such as the one that continental Chinese
were beginning to experience. In both, powerful local ideologies and institutions
were strongly pronatalist, and families appeared to accept and internalize prona-
talist goals. How, then, could the transitions in the Netherlands and Taiwan
come about so rapidly? 
In both societies, this socially-welcomed fertility decline has been thor-
oughly documented and analyzed.2 Scholars have suggested many causes rang-
ing from changes in labor force participation to urbanization to the greater
accessibility of reliable contraception to (in the Netherlands) secularization and
individualization of decisions concerning birth control. These and other factors
marked a global loosening of social controls that was dramatically visible in the
political turbulence that gripped Europe, East and Southeast Asia, Latin Ameri-
ca, and North America. Perhaps, then, we need no further explanation for the
remarkable changes in fertility that occurred in Taiwan and among Dutch
Catholics. Yet this global zeitgeist left other regions untouched: the Islamic world,
India, and Africa. There, fertility declines began much later. Some peoples were
ready for revolution and some were not. In this paper, we probe the period just
prior to the Dutch and Taiwanese transitions to look for evidence that women,
and occasionally their husbands, may have been less single-mindedly pronatalist
than is generally supposed. 
For both societies, antinatalist attitudes, customs, and secondary values
have been found in interviews with people who lived through their countries’
respective fertility transitions. They indicate the presence in the pre-transition
period of a strong unmet desire to reduce fertility and considerable unobtrusive
cultural support for such antinatalism in each case. Women especially were
eager to reduce the burden of bearing and caring for large families of children.
This evidence has the weakness of oral history, a necessarily retrospective
description of changed conditions, but it has the benefit of hindsight, the oppor-
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tunity to reassess and foreground experiences that were once culturally unac-
ceptable. It also gains strength from our effort to look both at factors that were
apparent to the participants and to background variables that they might have
perceived only dimly, if at all.
We also recognize that similar drops in fertility in Taiwan and the Nether-
lands can have been stimulated by different forces. John and Pat Caldwell offer
an example of such a contrast in intention in contexts where both indigenous
African and Islamic influences shape fertility behavior.3 African religion focuses
on the reproduction of the lineage, with living descendants ensuring the survival
of ancestral spirits and the persistence of the lineage. High fertility is both virtu-
ous and spiritually sanctioned, with intentional birth control viewed as malicious
and childlessness as a punishment from vengeful ancestors. Moral disapproval
of low fertility is heightened by pragmatic concern for disruption of the inter-
generational wealth flows that typify sub-Saharan African societies.
By contrast, the pronatalist influence of Islam is indirect. Theological
objections to birth control are absent, yet belief supports a strong code of ethics,
morality, and behavior subordinating women to men. Fertility is stimulated
because women are married early and discouraged from higher education and
employment. Women necessarily favor high fertility because the sons they bear
are their best insurance against poverty in the case of divorce or abandonment.
Religious motivations affecting African demography are inextricably intertwined
with social, economic, and cultural factors. Regions in which traditional beliefs
are strong and areas where most Africans are Muslim both have high fertility.4
In each region, however, its religious and cultural motivations differ greatly.
The dramatic differences between early 20th century Dutch and Tai-
wanese culture and society will be readily visible in this analysis. But so will
some perhaps unanticipated similarities. Some of the latter derive from the
effects in each society of their passage through comparable political-economic
transitions. In both, many families were moving from traditional but highly
commercialized agriculture to industrialization that, in world terms, came late.
Economic historians have documented the unusual slowness of the Dutch to
turn to industry when compared to such neighbors as the English and the Bel-
gians.5 We might also consider Dutch and Taiwanese culture from a longer per-
spective, one in which both had been formed from several centuries of state-
building and historically extraordinarily deep market penetration brought about
by early commoditization.6
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After sketching the fertility transition in Taiwan and among Dutch
Catholics, we explore three areas of experience where antinatalist attitudes may
have been especially salient: courtship patterns that conduce to a comfortable
and open sexual relationship between the couple; availability and use of preven-
tive methods of family limitation; and authoritative pronatalist influences com-
ing from outside the couple relationship. The most striking differences between
the two societies are those created by religious and customary worldviews. Chris-
tian denominations, and particularly Catholicism, formulated, propagated, and
sanctioned pronatalist reproductive belief and behavior in the Netherlands. Tai-
wanese popular religion was syncretic, mutable, lacking in authoritative head-
ship, and thus not a barrier to the adoption of antinatalism. As will be seen
below, Taiwan couples were culturally preadapted to shift smoothly from a quan-
tity-of-children to a quality-of-children approach. From comparison of the simi-
larities and differences that lie behind the sudden drop in fertility in our two
societies, we hope to prompt more attention to uncovering submerged and
repressed antinatalist attitudes and practices in ostensibly strongly pronatalist
societies.
The fertility decline among Taiwanese and Dutch Catholics 
In Taiwan, fertility remained high from the late imperial through the early Japan-
ese period, and during the first decades of Guomindang rule. In 1963, 38 percent
of wives 35 to 39 years old had borne more living children than they had wanted,
with only 24 percent having fewer.7 Between 1959 and 1962, pilot projects to
make birth control more acceptable and accessible were initiated, extended
island-wide in 1964. Across the occupational spectrum, the 1960s saw Taiwan
couples beginning to limit the size of their families. In 1952 the crude birth rate
was 46.62. By 1972, it was 24.15.8
An effective method of conveying social approbation of and assistance in
family limitation was built by the Kuomintang government on the network of local
health stations put in place by the Japanese. The registration of a new baby trig-
gered a visit from a public health nurse who brought information about birth pre-
vention and spacing to the mother at a psychologically powerful moment when
the child made its social debut, 30 days after the birth. The visitor came directly to
the mothers, bypassing mothers-in-law who might be unwilling to see contracep-
tion implemented. Women who had already borne four children were encouraged
to consider sterilization for themselves or their husbands. Billboards advertising
the benefits to couples (especially wives) and children were ubiquitous. Propagan-
da in many forms underlined the equal worth of daughters and sons. Household
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heads were bombarded with birth control literature. These official efforts were
effective, but not because they were heavy-handed or integrated with economic
life, as China’s program was to be. Families retained control over childbearing
decisions, and women’s agency may have been slightly strengthened. 
As among Taiwanese, during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, fertil-
ity was high among Dutch Catholics and then fell with unusual rapidity. After
1850, the Dutch birth rate first increased from 35.2‰ in 1851 to 37.3‰ in 1876.
After that year, the birth rate experienced a steady decline. At 33.1% in 1890, the
birth rate dropped to under 30% after 1900 and 20‰ after 1938. Only the end of
the Second World War interrupted the decline with a rise in fertility. The birth
rate leveled out at under 20‰ in the late 1960’s and 70’s. Although the Nether-
lands joined in with the European fertility decline, the Dutch birth rate
decreased later and slower than those of other European countries during the
late 19th and early 20th centuries.
The retardation in Dutch fertility decline was mainly caused by the south-
ern part of the Netherlands. In the northern and western provinces, fertility start-
ed to decline some decades before the decline reached the southern provinces
Noord-Brabant and Limburg. These provinces were predominantly Catholic: in
1930, 95% of the Limburg population and 87% of the Noord-Brabant inhabitants
were Catholic. In the nine other Dutch provinces at the time, the majority were
members of the Protestant Dutch Reformed Church or other Protestant denom-
inations and inhabitants with no religious denomination.9
While in these predominantly Protestant provinces marital fertility passed
its zenth in the last decades of the nineteenth century, fertility started to decline
in the two Catholic provinces only after 1900.10 The birth rate per 1000 women
(aged 15-45) married between 1901 and 1905 was more than 30% higher in Lim-
burg and Noord-Brabant than in the other Dutch provinces. For the marriage
cohort 1931-35, when Noord-Brabant and Limburg counted 256 births per 1000
women against an average of 159 in the other Dutch provinces, the difference
had increased to more than 61%. After 1960, however, Catholic birth rates sud-
denly tumbled below those of Protestants. By the mid 1970s, Catholic Limburg
had the lowest birth rates of the whole country. Between 1971 and 1975, married
Limburg women had only 95 births per 1000–19% less than in the Protestant
west and north.
Considerable research has shown how religion influenced Catholic demo-
graphic behavior.11 The pronatalist Catholic Church not only restricted birth con-
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trol and banned effective means of limiting family size. It also preached about
the purpose of sexuality and marriage and about the division of tasks between
man and woman. Nevertheless, Catholic women harbored antinatalist thoughts
and wishes that helped them to legitimate changing their fertility even before the
1960s. In a body of interviews to be explored below, we see evidence that Dutch
women’s attitudes toward unrestricted fertility were in fact mixed: as among the
Taiwanese, private uncertainty preceded public action. 
Infanticide, abortion, and contraception
At the start of the demographic transition when fertility was still high, children
still served a useful economic purpose in both the Netherlands and Taiwan. By
1870, roughly 10% of Dutch industrial employees were 13 years or younger; in
agriculture, these rates were much higher. In the last decades of the 19th and
20th centuries, child labor was checked and finally prohibited in the Nether-
lands. When a first effort to forbid child labor was made in 1874, opposition,
mainly by sectarian politicians, curtailed employment only of children younger
than twelve. The Labor Law of 1889 restricted the labor of children between 12
and 16 and imposed its observance. In 1901 the law on compulsory school atten-
dance was passed and the fight against child labor was completed with the Labor
Law of 1919. Parallel efforts were effective in Taiwan only by the 1960s. 
With these governmental regulations, the economic benefit of children
decreased rapidly. In fact, compulsory education made children expensive and
encouraged family limitation. But in spite of motivations for birth control,
means to limit the number of children were few. Antinatalist tendencies among
Dutch Catholics as well as among Taiwanese can be inferred only if infanticide
and/or usable methods of abortion and/or contraception were part of the cultur-
al repertory. While infanticide is technically possible in any population, safe,
effective abortion and contraception other than abstinence from intercourse are
much harder to achieve. What role did they play in fertility management in the
Netherlands and Taiwan? 
a. Infanticide
James Lee and his colleagues have recently argued that late imperial Chinese
society was uniquely successful in limiting births by cultural means. Among oth-
er things, Lee et al. claim that infanticide was common.12 We doubt this. For con-
tinental China, the evidence for infanticide is largely anecdotal, sharply regional,
or inferred from unbalanced sex ratios. Such evidence is inconclusive for a vari-
ety of reasons. Parts of China attracted disproportionate numbers of male
migrants who labored in brine wells, coalmines, or as porters and boat-pullers
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along major transport routes. Cities in Taiwan, and perhaps on the continent,
drew disproportionate numbers of young women as servants, sex workers, and
in handicraft.13 Apparent unbalanced sex ratios cannot be proven real without
factoring in gender-differentiated flows of labor and the cultural bias that made
for under-recording of girl children. 
In Taiwan, if infanticide occurred, it would surely have been sex-specific,
favoring males. Some evidence supports this. The sex ratios at birth of children
born to (officially registered) concubines are higher than those of children born to
wives: in 1930, the ratio of wives’ boys to girls was 105, while sons of concubines
outnumbered daughters 112 to 100. Concubinage, though culturally salient, was
statistically infrequent, however, and the contribution of such deaths to popula-
tion figures is insignificant.14 Illegitimacy was common, and illegitimate children
might have been at risk of infanticide at least in urban places.15 The sex ratio of all
Taiwan illegitimate children was normal, however.16 Taiwanese daughters had
only a slightly higher mortality rate than Taiwanese sons, with one significant
exception. Adopted girls died by age five at almost twice the rate as biological
daughters.17 The effects of son preference were visible mainly among adopted
girls who through adoption had already lost the protections normatively due to
daughters: to be reared at home, married at puberty, and provided with sufficient
dowry to assure her of dignity in her husband’s home. In north Taiwan, where
adoption of girls was so very prevalent, the neglect of some little girls did alter sex
ratios in a way not seen in the central and south regions. This cannot be “infanti-
cide,” because adopting families had made positive efforts to acquire these girls.
High rates of illegitimacy among Dutch stillbirths suggest that infanticide
did take place there. Low throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, by 1900 Dutch
rates of illegitimacy (extra- and premarital pregnancies) were among the lowest
in western Europe and continued to be so until the 1960s.18 Illegitimacy being
extremely rare in the Netherlands during our period, infanticide of legitimate
children was even more so and had no statistical influence on Dutch family size.
b. Abortion
The effectiveness of pre-scientific methods of family limitation has been the sub-
ject of considerable debate. It is an ethnographic truism that pre-industrial
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forms of abortion were usually either ineffective or killed the woman as often as
the fetus. A well-documented exception to this rule, ironically, was found among
Taiwan’s Aboriginal people during the period of Dutch rule in the south, prior to
extensive contact with Chinese.19
Of course, abortion may have been attempted in desperate cases in both
Taiwan and the Netherlands. Non-biomedical abortion was the subject of consid-
erable folklore in northwestern Europe. Drinking a pint of gin in a hot bath, or
jumping from a rooftop were probably more discussed than implemented, and
almost certainly ineffective. Surgical abortion was illegal in the Netherlands, but
did occur frequently, especially in large cities. In the first decades of the 20th
century, about 10% of miscarriages in hospitals were ascribed to criminal abor-
tion, about half performed on unwed mothers. Though evidence on abortion
rates prior to its legalization is scarce and unreliable, there is no cause to believe
that the Dutch numbers were higher than anywhere else in Europe.20 During the
second half of the twentieth century, however, Dutch abortion levels were strik-
ingly low: about 110 abortions per thousand live births per year, half the European
average.21 Distinctively, since 1971 when legal abortions were first available,
Dutch women aborted much earlier during their pregnancy than women
abroad.22 Differing 19th century levels of illegitimacy in Catholic and Protestant
provinces also suggest that abortion was more rare among Catholics.23 Since
abortion was both costly and risky, it was not available to most unwed mothers or
to poor married women anyway.24
Contra Lee et al., indigenous abortion seems unlikely to have played a
role in limiting family size in the Chinese world, including 19th century Tai-
wan. Chinese gynecological knowledge passed down orally and in writing was
especially strong on the use of emmenogogues – medicines to induce men-
struation in women whose menses were delayed or irregular.25 Early 20th cen-
tury Chinese women are known to have suffered disproportionately from very
early menopause – in their 30s – a condition that might have been treated the
same way.26 Some scholars have argued that emmenogogues could induce
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abortion as well,27 but no empirical evidence has been adduced for this claim.
That Chinese farm wives regularly purchased sophisticated herbal medicines
from elite practitioners seems unlikely. Effective abortifacients may have exist-
ed, known to specialists and used by wealthy women and prostitutes. If so,
they have been forgotten. Anthropological fieldwork has turned up no evi-
dence for indigenous methods that actually produced abortions in Taiwan or
elsewhere in the Chinese world. In the late 1950s as part of a movement to
make full use of local medicines, Chinese officials experimented with folk
abortifacients. None seemed to work, although research did uncover the anti-
spermatogenic properties of cottonseed oil, commonly used for cooking, of
which local people were quite unaware.28 Prior to the advent of surgical meth-
ods, abortion seems unlikely to have played any role in limiting family size in
the traditional Chinese sphere.
Surgical abortion was illegal in Taiwan once reasonable standards of legal-
ity were established under Japanese rule in 1895. The Japanese presence, howev-
er, brought increased abortion, often provided discreetly (although without anes-
thesia) in small, family-run clinics of a doctor/husband and nurse/wife. It
remained illegal and therefore undocumented, but widely accessible until its
legalization in 1985 – only a year after the law on the termination of pregnancies
had been effected in Netherlands. 
c. Contraception
Though variety in birth control methods expanded in the Netherlands after the
Second World War, Catholics initially respected their Church’s ban on most of
these and renounced barrier methods like condoms and diaphragms. Though
strictly forbidden by the Catholic Church as an ‘unnatural’ method of birth con-
trol, many of its Dutch members practiced withdrawal. Periodical abstention was
also widespread among Catholic couples, who often practiced it without the
required permission of their priest.29 A survey amongst 500 newlywed Catholic
couples in the western mining district of southern Limburg showed that more
than half of the respondents had practiced periodical abstention.30
In 1965 the Dutch magazine Margriet questioned its readers on love and
marriage and showed that differences in appreciation for certain contracep-
tives were still apparent between denominations. Though the majority of the
Catholic readers (65%) considered the pill acceptable, only 52% thought so
about the condom. Both proportions were much higher among Protestants.
Moreover, Catholic readers of the magazine still mostly used periodical absten-
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tion (44%) and withdrawal (41%); among liberal Protestants these percentages
were 37% and 69%.31
In 1961, interviews with 400 married women living in the province of
Utrecht in the centre of the Netherlands confirmed the results of the Margriet
survey.32 Periodical abstention appeared the most widely used form of birth con-
trol among Catholics (51%) compared to orthodox Protestants (44%) and liberal
Protestants (24%). Withdrawal however was more common among orthodox
Protestants (41%) than among Catholics and liberal Protestants (21% and 27%
respectively). Condoms were used by almost half of the liberal Protestants (48%)
and less by orthodox Protestants and Catholics (35% each). The pill was used by
slightly over a third of the Catholics and orthodox Protestants and by 42% of the
liberal Protestants. Respondents without a religious denomination mostly used
the condom and the pill (44% and 43% respectively).33 These surveys indicate
that only a small part of the fertility decline in the period under consideration
may have been caused by the spread of barrier methods of birth prevention;
instead, the practice of withdrawal and periodical abstention were significant.
Contraception in Taiwan, like infanticide and abortion, should be viewed
in relation to the debate over the significance of deliberate family planning in
traditional Chinese contexts. Lee et al. have argued that couples both wanted to
and could limit the number of their children through traditional means. The
most important of these was sexual abstinence. Marital restraint was a well-
known cultural norm, particularly among the educated, and widely known
texts, including almanacs proscribed sex on more than half of the days of the
year.34 Marital abstinence was supported by indigenous medical beliefs about
male health; too many ejaculations led to physical weakness and general
degeneration, indeed, precisely to the loss of virility. Sexual effort was to be
carefully paced in order to ensure continued fertility. We question the effective-
ness of this norm. It may have persuaded middle-aged parents, eager to main-
tain their own health and longevity. It seems less likely to have influenced
young husbands and wives who encountered one another primarily in the
highly sexualized marital bed. Among women with whom Gates has discussed
this topic, the consensus holds that only two folk methods of contraception are
effective. In younger couples, a reluctant wife brings a child to bed to deter her
husband’s advances; among couples that already have all the children they
want, a permanent separate sleeping arrangement is the best choice. The
implication is clear that marital restraint is difficult and unreliable. Even con-
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siderable restraint, when unguided by accurate knowledge of female reproduc-
tion, can lead to regular pregnancies.
We agree with Lee and his colleagues that traditional Chinese, and by impli-
cation, Taiwanese culture had antinatalist elements in place. Controlling family
size by infanticide, abortion, and folk contraception, however, was probably no
more effective in the 17th and subsequent centuries than it was in the late 19th
and early 20th. Ultimately, although an antinatalist attitude may have been cultur-
ally present among both Dutch Catholics and Taiwanese, unless effective birth
limitation mechanisms existed, we cannot infer its operation in either population.
d. Courtship
The generalities of the northwestern European marriage regime were displayed
particularly well in the Netherlands during our period. Its characteristics were:
spending six or seven years after puberty in wage labor, marriage in the late 20s,
rates of celibacy of 15 to 20 %, and frequent, rapid childbearing after marriage.
This schedule affected the sexual experience of both sexes, creating customs and
institutions that were unknown in any other pre-industrial agrarian society.35
Notably, unchaperoned premarital pairing for dancing, games, and limited sexu-
al play were valued and socially accepted. Premarital pregnancy was viewed less
positively, especially among Catholics, whose religion allowed sexual intercourse
only within marriage.
During the most sexually vigorous years of young adulthood, Dutch boys
and girls enjoyed mixed-sex sociability, even considerable couple privacy, and
engagement to marry gave them yet more behavioral latitude. The rate of bridal
pregnancy was substantial.36 Ideally, the girl came to her marriage still virgin
after several, perhaps many years of limited but still clearly sexual experience.
Though abstinence by the unmarried must have been difficult, particularly dur-
ing the long engagements, the social abhorrence of pregnant brides and unmar-
ried mothers kept many from sexual intercourse before marriage. In 1986, inter-
views held with 65 Catholic women from around the Limburg town of Roer-
mond showed how the Catholic milieu still regarded it as thoroughly shameful
in the 1950s – particularly for women, who were expected to be “chaste”. After
having become pregnant before her marriage, one respondent recalled:
“I was married in a different village, because of the disgrace. The pastor wanted to
marry me in his own parish [but only at] 6 o’clock in the morning, but my father did
not want that. That’s how it went those days. The girl was blamed and the boy was
innocent… If I had killed somebody, it would not have been worse… You thought you
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were the worst person in the world… It was as if our family fell back a step on the social
ladder. A nun told my mother: “throw her out on the streets with nothing, as you make
your bed, so must you lie on it” and the pastor called me a street girl.”37
Frustrated orgasm might have caused considerable distress during an engage-
ment. On the other hand, a period of happy courtship with a future marital part-
ner may have accustomed each to the other in other forms of communication
than sexually. At marriage, Dutch brides and grooms knew one other reasonably
well.
The contrast with Taiwan could hardly be sharper. Taiwanese parents not
only idealized virginity at marriage, most ensured it by keeping close watch on
growing daughters and marrying them as promptly as possible after puberty. A
future bride usually did not meet her groom before marriage (even at an engage-
ment ceremony held by the parents); dating was unthinkable. The right to con-
trol the marriages of their children was a foundational aspect of the state-man-
dated Chinese kinship system. Parents did not take risks with this right. The pre-
marital courtship that was “traditional” in northwest Europe became a daring
innovation in Taiwan only late in our period. Vulnerable to passion as any other
people as traditional arts and ethnographic research attest, courtship sometimes
bloomed within arranged marriages and in the glamorous world of high-status
sex workers, but its power was not left in the hands of the young.38
External pronatalist pressures: Dutch Catholic women and 
their priests 
In the Netherlands, religious belief was a powerful social force until the end of the
twentieth century. Whether multidenominational Protestant or unified Catholic,
each church represented an entire institution, engaged in politics, economy, and
society. Formally, the Dutch Reformed Church remained the state religion to
which until recently members of the Royal Family must belong. Churches, espe-
cially the Catholic Church, for centuries derived vast economic power from pos-
sessions in land, buildings and other material wealth. The ideologies of Christian
denominations as well as secular ideologies such as socialism vertically stratified
–“pillarized” – Dutch society until long after the Second World War. As most towns
were built around the church as a concrete edifice, so was a large part of the Dutch
social, economic, cultural and political life structured around religious belief. 
Protestant and Catholic theology differ considerably, finally resulting in
divergent attitudes towards family planning. Both denominations acknowledge
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that God knows and sees all and can punish sins with damnation in the afterlife.
As their churches have no authorities who can arrange for the absolution of sin,
Protestants have only God’s judgment to fear. A sinning Catholic on the other
hand can confess to a priest who has the authority to give absolution. While
Protestants believe in a more individual, unmediated relationship with the deity,
Catholics expected that their communication with God runs via the church and
its representatives. Both have spiritual authorities on earth to fear, but the
actions of Protestants, including decisions regarding family planning, are a mat-
ter of individual conscience. If a couple lacks financial resources to provide for
another child, or one of the spouses is physically or mentally unable to care for a
child, they are allowed to use contraceptives. In some cases even abortion is an
acceptable means to family planning. Moreover, in allowing contraceptives
Protestantism leaves room for purposes of sex other than procreation.
In 1987, the journalist Marga Kerklaan published a book on the female
experience of Catholic marital life, entitled Thus women were just supposed to be
child-bearing beings. Her material came from 300 letters written by Catholic
women in response to her radio and TV guide request for accounts of Catholic
life. The eldest respondent was 91; the youngest 50, which meant that they were
born between 1894 and 1934. The majority had attended only elementary
schools. While not fully representative of their denomination, they provide an
intimate glimpse into devout, conscious Catholic families that wanted to experi-
ence their marriage according to directives from the church. “Men made the
decisions about their duties and that’s why they [the respondents] were eager to
write down their experiences and particularly their emotions,” Kerklaan observes
in her introduction to her book, “resulting in long letters up to sixteen pages.”39
Kerklaan’s respondents were all raised ‘with with the sixth and ninth com-
mandments’, referring to the prohibitions learned as children on practicing and
even desiring forbidden sexual acts. Priests, aware of the temptations of married
life, drew out the exact duties of husband and wife, leaving no room for sinful
interpretations. They provided premarital instruction and marriage manuals
that included mandatory guidance of great specificity. 
“Shortly before our marriage we received ‘marital education’ [on sex] from the pastor
of our parish, both of us separately. The pastor read something, very fast, from a small
book. After doing so he handed me a small blue book that I had to read and had to
observe (...). The most important points were:
a. No male semen was allowed to be wasted;
b. During ejaculation the woman had to lie on her back;
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c. For women only three K’s existed, being: Kids, Kitchen and Cellar [Kelder in Dutch,
ms] (probably food provision, primarily preservation).”40
Sins existed in various kinds: venal sins, which do not prevent going to heaven,
and mortal sins, among which was the practice of prohibited means of birth con-
trol. Abortion was absolutely forbidden in the belief that all human life was
intrinsically holy. The regulation that no semen was to be wasted on non-coital
activities resulted in the prohibition of all barrier methods and of withdrawal.
Whether or not a married couple was obedient to such instruction was
easily checked. Confessing meant telling a priest about all sins, even the most
private ones. “When you went to confession”, a respondent recalled, “now I still
don’t understand that we put up with what we were told, you often had to tell that
pastor exactly how you did it in bed.”41 A priest could punish an engaged couple’s
sinful behavior or even intentions by refusing to marry them or by marrying
them in an inferior and shameful ceremony:
“I got married in 1936, we knew each other for three years. (...) Three weeks before the
marriage, it was announced in church from the pulpit. In such cases it rang: “Entering
into a Christian [underlining by respondent] marriage are announced... (and then the
name of the man and woman). That happened for three Sundays, and on the fourth
the marriage was performed. But woe betide you if you were pregnant before you got
married. Than you were proclaimed softly, [you were announced] to enter into a mar-
riage instead of a Christian one. And not in front of the big altar, oh no, in front of the
small altar. Nor [did you get] a Mass with songs or organ music, no, everyone had to
see and hear how inferior the bridal couple was.”42
Once she was married, a woman should be prepared for motherhood at any
time: “We had to pledge on the Bible to have as many children as God wanted to
give us.”43 Nurse-nuns making post-partum visits stressed a wife’s duty always to
be sexually available to her husband, and priests checked up on households
where children were not born at appropriate intervals.44
In this worldview, “holy matrimony” was the only mode of cohabitation in
which procreation is permitted and the only function of the physical act of love is
to reproduce. Any sinning against this standard should be confessed, and will be
punished. Small wonder, then, that Catholic women conformed to the doctrines
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husband’s wish for sexual intercourse at any time, to regard sex only as a means
of procreation and not for intimacy or passion, not to use any contraceptive
method, and to bear as many children as this lifestyle would give them. The fact
remains, however, that from 1900 onwards fertility among Catholic women
declined to drop suddenly in the 1960s. How do the Kerklaan letters voice anti-
natalist tendencies reflecting the decline in Catholic birth rates? 
Antinatalist tendencies in Dutch Catholic women
As many of the Kerklaan letters show, Catholic women and couples clearly strug-
gled to reconcile religiously and personally motivated desire for children with an
often urgent desire to limit their numbers.
“My mother had six children, absolutely not because she wanted to but because she
was supposed to. I have five children and that was an absolute obligation too. Having a
baby in every two years. (...) No, these strict morals did not chase me out of the church,
but still I found it very difficult.”45
In spite of the pronatalist pressure of the Catholic Church and the various means
it had to impose rules of behavior on believers, women managed to elude the
laws of their religion and limit their fertility. Sometimes doctors wanted to coop-
erate by offering information about periodical abstention or even offering a pro-
hibited contraceptive:
“During my marriage we lived with the parents of my husband. With two unmarried
sisters. (...) We were fighting huge financial problems. (...) When there were three chil-
dren, I asked the doctor for advice. He referred me to the pastor. “You are such a brave
woman, I hear that from all sides, you can easily have a few more”. After the fifth child
(we then had a very young doctor), he gave me one of the first ‘pills’. He understood
our situation, also because I visited him with the others with symptoms that resulted
from the stress of the cohabitation of two generations and the business.”46
If a doctor refused to help practising birth control, Catholics had no choice but to
turn to their priest and ask for permission to practise family planning. Members
of the clergy, however, differed in their attitudes towards family planning and
many respondents indicated to have looked for a liberal “father confessor”:
“Taking a different doctor back then was not very easy, but you could always choose a




fess at your own parish and you could look for someone who shared your ideas for as
long as you wanted. But you had to be somewhat adventurous and in a village it was a
little bit harder than in a city, where more parishes were situated.”47
Though many Catholics adopted a middle course between their Church’s regula-
tions concerning fertility behavior and their own wish to limit their family size, a
few of the Kerklaan respondents seemed not to have cared about the opinion of
the Catholic Church. Like Protestants, they considered their decision to practise
family planning to be a matter of their own conscience and a matter between
their God and them. “Oh no, we committed very many sins,” one respondent
wrote, “but we didn’t need an intermediary for that, we could take care of that
ourselves, with Our Lord.”48
Of course, the realization of family planning depended on the cooperation
of a husband. For some respondents, their “chaste” engagement offered the pos-
sibility to discuss ideas about family size: 
“My husband as well as I came from a very traditional Roman-Catholic family. (…) Yet this
from my perspective rather cramped attitude to life did not appeal to me. (…) Luckily I
could discuss that with my husband, then my fiancée. He had a more liberal attitude than
his parents. Very pious though, but thinking that his brains were given him to use them
(...) Prior to our marriage we agreed how to arrange it when we would get married.”49
Catholic principles concerning sexuality and marriage were not only a matter of
the Church: they were merged with the general norms and values of Catholic
communities. Priests were not the only people who interfered with he moral
behavior of believers and who obstructed the practice of family planning. Social
pressure from the all-Catholic environment discouraged many women from
deviating from behavioral rules. In that respect, the most important role was
reserved for the upbringing. Parents watched their childres, and particularly
their daughters, and prevented them from forbidden sexual acts: 
“I’m of devout Catholic descent, a family of eight children with a good upbringing,
very conscientious. (...) My parents were very pious and we got married in that atmos-
phere. Often in our family it sounded: “If any of my children had to get married... [i.e.






Though several women acknowledged having refrained from practising birth
control because of the way they were brought up, others remembered having
been advised by their mothers to take matters into their own hands and to limit
family size:
“When we visited the presbytery to give notice of the intended marriage and the pastor
elaborated on the marital life, I was completely stressed out: such a task. But I had a
mother who looked ahead and who said: “God told us to be fruitful, but didn’t add a
specific number. One [child] is nothing, two [children] is something, three is plenty.”
But she also said that that was a secret between man and woman.”51
Though the economic benefit of children ceased when child labor was prohibit-
ed and compulsory education increased their costs, fertility among Catholics
dropped below the level of Protestants only in the 1960s. The demographic tran-
sition in the Netherlands witnessed not only the convergence of Catholic and
Protestant fertility rates but also their inversion. During the 1960s, the increas-
ing economic stimulus to practise family planning coincided with anti-authori-
tarian movements in the Dutch Catholic Church as well as in the broader socie-
ty. Characteristically, in 1963 the Dutch bishop Bekkers declared on television
that the use of the pill was not a Church matter, but one of personal conscience.52
Tendencies to limit Catholic family size could then be combined with efficient
means to do so.
External pronatalist pressures: Taiwanese family authority
In Taiwan, new couples remained embedded in larger households where
parental authority over even married children has remained strong until the
present. Because traditionally parents expected to command the work and wages
of children and grown sons (and their wives), loosely enforced prohibitions on
child labor and compulsory elementary education during the 1950s did not elim-
inate parental reliance on future economic benefit from their children. Non-kin,
even state officials, had no authoritative role in intimate family matters. Supervi-
sion of a couple’s sex life by ritual specialists of the sort that existed in the
Catholic Netherlands was particularly unthinkable. 
For readers unfamiliar with religion in Taiwan, a brief sketch may con-
vince the skeptical. The scope of religious activity in the two societies is almost
non-comparable, and the totalizing practices of Christianity influenced only a
few percent of Taiwanese during our period. In popular religious life, authorita-
tive clergy were unknown, and religion was largely focused on worldly well-being
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and almost entirely open to local interpretation. Buddhism, Daoism, and Confu-
cian philosophy do not parallel Christian sects, and do not form distinct congre-
gations. According to anthropologist C. K. Yang,
“In popular religious life it was the moral and magical functions of the cults, and not
the delineation of the boundary of religious faiths, that dominated people’s conscious-
ness. (....) Centuries of mixing gods from different faiths into a common pantheon had
produced a functionally-oriented religious view that relegated the question of religious
identity to a secondary place.” 
Buddhist and Daoist ritual specialist make sharp and text-based distinctions
between their traditions,53 but during our period these were very blurred in pop-
ular practice. Religion played a pronatalist but limited role in daily life. 
Birth goddesses were ubiquitous, often worshipped at an altar standing in a
side chapel of another god’s temple. They were approached by women (mothers-
in-law as well as young wives) for the gift of sons and grandsons. Persistent failure
to conceive might be rectified by a spirit medium who visited the underworld to
inspect a woman’s “fertility fate,” represented as a flowering shrub. The number
and colors of the flowers might reassure the woman that the future would bring
children, or the medium might water, fertilize, and prop up a failing plant in hope
of better results. In general, people assumed that deities had no opinions about
their sexual conduct save one. Sexual relations (along with menstruation and
childbirth) polluted people, making them unfit to approach the gods in temples or
on domestic altars. A room with a family altar – a “hall” – should not be used as a
bedroom for a sexually active couple. Paradoxically, women did not request help in
bearing children from ancestors, perhaps because it would involve a woman in a
sexualized transaction with her husband’s male kin.
Although Taiwanese reproductive behavior was under no authoritative
religious governance, the society had an abundant body of pronatalist ritual and
folklore. Marriage was haloed with fertility symbolism: lavish wedding foods,
peanuts or dates that punned “sons” in the bridal bed, the exaggerated feminini-
ty of a heavily-made-up bride. Perhaps unique to Taiwan was the lovely custom of
laying a bouquet of scarlet canna lilies under the bridal bed, for joy. When a
woman’s fertility was not being promoted, it was being protected. Young fertile
women should be especially cautious around coffins and at funerals. Food and
drink that might impede reproductive health were elaborately specified, and
careless girls were sharply reminded of their dangers. Any traditional study of
Chinese marriage customs turns up an archive of evidence for the importance of
a pronatalist worldview of great cultural power. While culture applauded and
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approved of families with numerous children, however, neither gods nor non-
kin had authority over fertility choices.
In Taiwan, the closest analogue to Dutch Catholic clerical power over a
couple’s sexual life was parental power, especially that of the husband’s par-
ents. Most couples lived patrivirilocally at least in the first years of marriage,
economically dependent and subject to considerable behavioral monitoring.
Parents were deeply interested in the fertility of their sons and daughters-in-
law; mothers-in-law were outspoken and even punitive toward brides who were
slow to conceive, or whose birth intervals were unusually long. Overbearing
parents bullied unwilling couples into initiating sexual relations when they
were reluctant partners.54 Kindly mothers-in-law might criticize overly eager
sons who, by sexually approaching their wives too soon after childbirth, could
interfere with nursing and hence with the health of the newborn. In reality,
however, their authority stopped at the bedroom door. A couple’s bedroom was
the receptacle of the bride’s dowry goods, home of the fertility-assisting Bed
God, and ideally completely private to the budding nuclear family. Couples
wishing to limit their childbearing, and who had the will power or material
means, were alone in bed. The choice to prevent or begin a pregnancy could
boil down to whether mother-in-law or daughter-in-law was more determined
and could muster better arguments. A Taiwanese woman with a profitable
snack business held off her mother-in-law’s constant requests for more grand-
children, saying “If a woman had 5 girls but no boy, her mother-in-law might
force her to have another child.” Having born two boys, the snack-seller held
good cards in this game, and seemed to be winning. As we will see below,
daughters-in-law can also lose.
Couples themselves were strongly motivated to bear at least some chil-
dren, even after the fertility decline. As a Taiwanese market vendor told Gates in
1988, “If I didn’t want to have children, why would I have got married?”55 Only
one woman in a sample of 100 planned to have none. A large literature attests to
the importance to a Taiwan woman of forming a “uterine family” of children
who will support her emotionally and financially even, if necessary, against her
husband.56 Between motivation and conception, however, stand both knowledge
and desire. Arranged marriages do not always succeed in promoting sexual
attraction, and Taiwan’s youths were raised with strongly negative feelings about
female sexual organs, potent sources of physical and spiritual pollution.57 This
distaste, shared by men and women, inhibits the use of some barrier methods of
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contraception, limits sexual activity other than intercourse, and may have less-
ened coital frequency. Couples married in the sexually unattractive minor form
(where husband and wife were reared together as brother and sister) bore 25 to
30% fewer children than couples who met as young adults.58 Taiwan’s high fer-
tility rates early in our period prove, however, that most couples, whether moti-
vated by filial piety, youthful hormone levels, or longing for one’s very own baby
to cuddle successfully surmounted all barriers to pregnancy.
Cultural support for birth limitation in Taiwan 
Traditionally, Taiwan couples rarely limited their fertility. Did they want to? If
they did, and had the means, could they have found any cultural support for
birth limitation in their apparently pronatalist world? Some evidence suggests
they did. In 1988, Gates interviewed 100 women59 who were currently owner-
operators of small business, or had previously had such businesses. They were
almost all of north Taiwan extraction, educated to lower-middle and upper-mid-
dle levels, and aged between 25 and 75. Their adult experiences thus were
informative about both the high-fertility late Japanese and early Kuomintang
periods and the declining-fertility years after 1970.
Their enmeshment in hierarchical and authoritative households created
many openings for arguments against unending childbearing. The complex
behavioral codes of Taiwan kinship contain many contradictions and logical loop-
holes that can be drawn on to support different positions. Arguing against further
pregnancies with her mother-in-law, the snack seller quoted above emphasized
her success in meeting a valued family gender norm by having borne two boys.
The gentle husband of an entrepreneurial restaurant-owner thought two children
(both girls) was enough because “I have ten brothers and sisters. It was very hard
for my mother bringing us up.” He wanted to spare his wife, whom he obvious
adored, such a life.60 Using respect for his wife as mother as a means to block his
own mother’s wishes is a neat trick, beautifully consistent with the honor due to
mothers. The customary exchanges of services between women in the same
household could also be leveraged to deny parental demands for more grandchil-
dren. A fish seller’s mother-in-law did not even press for more than a few children
because she felt unable to help with the increased child care that would custom-
arily fall to her lot. The most common argument adduced for limiting births,
however, was that, for the good of all, families should consider their economic sit-
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uation before having a child.61 A particular aspect of such careful calculation
emerged as a key theme in these women’s lives. 
Once reliable contraception was available, women who had opportunities
to contribute to their families in ways other than by bearing children could
sometimes negotiate culturally acceptable tradeoffs between having numerous
children and adding to household wealth. These opportunities increased
through the decades of industrialization that began in the 1960s, and were espe-
cially abundant for women who became entrepreneurs rather than wageworkers.
Each of the 100 women in Gates’ Taipei sample had founded or helped found a
small family business such as restaurants, beauty parlors, day-care centers, an
automotive repair garage, a false teeth manufactory, and a couple of florist shops.
Most ran their businesses themselves, some in partnership with their husband
(usually in name only), or with a woman relative. Capital in all cases was got
from the informal sector; banks were neither trusted nor accessible at this small
scale. Savings from previous work, cash and gold gifts to women at engagement,
marriage, and childbirth, interest on investment in tiny rotating-credit associa-
tions, and, occasionally, loans from kin gave the women their initial capital. It
was best to take on debts only from consistent supporters.
Domestic power flowed from these enterprises. Co-resident daughters-in-
law with returns from their own invested capital had much stronger claims to
that money than did wageworkers. The latter were expected to turn over earnings
to mother-in-law, and ask for money when they or their children needed it. The
profits of a business were easier to claim, and, should the claim fail, easier to
conceal. Whenever possible, a woman used her initial profits to subsidize the
division of her marital nuclear family from that of her parents-in-law. Separate
residence and finances enhanced, though it did not entirely insure, her (and her
husband’s) independence of parental supervision. Capital-based profits also
allowed a young mother to strengthen ties with her children by using her own
money for their needs and pleasures. Evidence from the interviews suggests that
these petty capitalists also used their economic power to constrain the number of
children they bore. 
The businesswomen consistently wanted fewer children than they had,
and fewer than their husbands had wanted. Clearly, then, they were not totally in
charge. However, those who had contributed more than 50 per cent of the found-
ing capital of their businesses had fewer children than women who had con-
tributed less than half. This was true for both the older group, whose business
and reproductive careers had been lived prior to the changes of the 1960s, and
for the younger, who benefited from Taiwan’s expanding economy and newly
available contraceptives. Twenty-four younger majority owners had an average
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total marital fertility rate of 4.3; 21 younger minority owners averaged 5.07; 21
older majority owners had a higher fertility than either of the younger groups, at
6.5; the highest average, 8.3, was achieved by older minority owners.62
To legitimize their efforts to limit children to “two or three,” many women
argued that earning incomes and building capital to help the family’s and their
children’s futures met their marital obligations as well as bearing additional chil-
dren would have done. Independent earnings allowed them to support (and to
insist on) more education and advantages for their children than hard-pressed
husbands or parents-in-law might have agreed to. Until well into the 1960, many
older people saw little need for schooling beyond the elementary level, especially
for girls. But by the last years of Japanese rule, educational accreditation was
becoming a necessity. This trend stagnated during World War II and during the
early Kuomintang period, when the economy fell back to pre-1930s levels. In Tai-
wan’s1960s development both state and factory jobs required a minimum of
junior middle school graduation. That children were increasingly expensive to
rear for successful futures made the businesswomen-mothers’ trade-off of fami-
ly “quality” for “quantity” a rational one.
Ms. Hsieh: A Taiwanese woman and her family
Family interactions over marriage, marital economic exchanges, and expecta-
tions about a woman’s duty to bear children provide a complex context for demo-
graphic trends in 20th century Taiwan. Many of these are visible in the experi-
ences of Ms. Hsieh, her husband, her mother-in-law, and her mother, all inter-
viewed in 1988.63 Multiple descriptions of the same events show dialectical
processes well, and are especially helpful in interpreting small samples. These
four people’s stories illustrate many of the conflicts of interest, negotiations to
resolve them, the factors that create power in Taiwan family fertility negotiations.
Hsieh, born in 1956, was married while a conservative family tradition
remained dominant. Unusual in the sample of 100 Taibei City businesswomen,
Hsieh and her husband, Wang, were both college graduates. Her family was a
prosperous Tainan City household doing business with Japan, his were farmers
from the surrounding county, comfortable but not rich enough to exempt his
mother from agricultural work. As a student, Hsieh studied Japanese, worked
full-time in the family business for three years after graduation, and continued
to help her brothers with client contacts after marriage. Tainan people give
daughters large dowries, and ideally refuse the return gift of brideprice that is
formally offered in the marriage agreement. Marrying a daughter, they say, is
“like having your house robbed.” When she married in 1981, Hsieh’s unusual
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contributions to her natal family were rewarded with a lavish dowry. From her
mother she received 150,000 NT$ (US$ 5,000), “several ounces” of gold jewelry,
a motor bike for her husband, and a rental house worth 3,500 NT$ (US$ 117)
each month. Hsieh’s attribution of this gift to her mother, rather than to her par-
ents, is a hint of the separation of finances between husband and wife character-
istic of better-off Taiwan families. Other relatives gave Hsieh 10,000 NT$ (US$
333) worth of gold jewelry. She retained all this for herself and her husband
rather than pooling it with his parents’ funds.
After the marriage, to meet the symbolic requirement of patrilocality, Hsieh
and her husband lived with his parents for a week, then returned to Taipei where
Wang worked as a civil engineer. Their home there was a well-built apartment in a
quiet street (though in an unfashionable neighborhood) paid for entirely from the
bride’s personal money, leaving her with little financial independence. This both-
ered her. “A woman has to have her own business lest she be looked down upon; a
woman should be independent in economic matters so she will be respected by
her husband’s family,” she said. This statement can be legitimately interpreted as
meaning “so her choices, her decisions, will not be opposed” by them.
After a year, Hsieh and Wang had a little boy, although she would have
preferred to wait a few years. But “my mother-in-law cried and cried,” so she gave
in. When the boy was a year old, Hsieh borrowed 100,000 NT$ (US$ 3,333) from
a private money lender, bought the necessary equipment, and set up a hair dress-
ing business in her living room. Thereafter, she remained adamant: no more
pregnancies “until my business is stable.”
Hsieh would have preferred an outside job more in keeping with the
expertise she had developed in her family firm, but her husband’s face was at
stake. Working almost invisibly at home and with women clients was their com-
promise, one that also eased the problem of child care. Three or four hours a day
brought her enough income to deposit 5,000 NT$ (US$ 167) each month in a
rotating credit club paying about five percent a month; and she had 50,000 NT$
(US$ 1,666) lent out privately at a somewhat higher rate. The rent payments for
her Tainan house remained in her mother’s hands, and one assumes that her
mother too was assiduously building capital for Hsieh to draw on without paying
interest and without attracting the attention of her husband or parents-in-law.
Hsieh’s relationship with her husband, Wang, appears to be the medium-
cool seen in many marriages that have been entered for reasons of practicality
rather than passion. Wang had borrowed money from relatives and set up in the
construction business after graduating as a civil engineer. He had promptly gone
broke. Thereafter, he worked on salary in others’ companies. His penchant for
business ownership, unrealized in his own life, was revealed when he talked
about the future: “No matter what my children’s sexes are, I would like them to
have their own business.” We estimated his monthly salary at about 25,000 NT$
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(US$ 833). His income, not likely to increase greatly in future, was not much
more than hers. The possibility for wifely challenges to husbandly power was
plainly present, although tactfully elided by all. Each mother made the fault line
clear. Hsieh’s mother complained gently that her daughter “followed her hus-
band’s family tradition as best she can. Our house and her parents-in-law are
near each other, but their tradition is that she can’t stay in her parents’ house
overnight. So every New Year she can come home only for lunch or dinner. I
don’t want to oppose them, so I just let my daughter go.” Hsieh’s mother-in-law
wanted more grandchildren, and tried to induce obedience in her daughter-in-
law through insistence on ritual subordination.
This couple’s family backgrounds exemplify a contradiction at the heart of
Chinese political economy. On Wang’s side stood the authority of the patriline,
land and farming, rural life, and mobility through education; on Hsieh’s were a
woman’s maternal resources, money capital and business, urban life, and prag-
matic investment in daughters. Each version of the good life had value for Tai-
wan people, but their logics often ran at cross-purposes. From one point of view,
kinship and gender status were fixed and rewards for contributions inherently
unequal. From the other, the accumulation of family property could outweigh
kinship/gender position as a basis for domestic power. This is especially evident
in the choices families made about how a married woman employed her time
and talents. 
In conventional view, a marriage was a contractual arrangement between
two families in which the bride, in return for life-long support, bore enough chil-
dren to continue the groom’s patriline. Implicitly, too, she was to contribute to
the limits of her ability to the prosperity of her husband’s branch of the line. In
practical terms, all she had at marriage became theirs: every dowry dollar, any
productive property, and her labor, to be allocated entirely as her husband and
his parents saw fit. In this idealized structure that can be called tributary kinship,
women had sexual power and strength of will for leverage, but lacked economic
and legal power almost entirely.
Another view of Chinese kinship was widespread, too. “From each accord-
ing to her accumulation” epitomizes an emphasis on the immense value of cap-
ital goods in highly commercialized parts of China. This view was more obvious
in south than in north, in city than in countryside, in the economic activities of
women (proverbially accused of having mean, grasping natures, incapable of
understanding the philosophical soundness of hierarchy) than of men (sup-
posed to care more for the status of face, and the face of status, than for niggling
profit). If a woman could bring not only labor, but capital into her married life,
she brought “respect” as well. Her independent funds obliged her husband’s
people to treat her well, enabled her to give her children extras, and supplied bar-
gaining points with her husband. Where the power of liquid assets was well indi-
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genized through regional culture, and when a woman could keep assets under
her own control, she was positioned very differently from the tributary daughter-
in-law who bore children in exchange for a frugal living. And this was particular-
ly true for a woman with a smart and loving mother. 
This two-facedness of the Chinese kinship/gender system is an immense
subject. Here, we need only note that it is the context within which Taiwan’s
women have made their childbearing choices. Women who have nothing but
children to offer their marital families see more of the tributary face than women
who bring additional resources. Ms. Hsieh and Mr. Wang both wanted another
child, a girl this time. Her mother thought this would be fine; his mother would
like more grandchildren, although “not too many.” Hsieh has met, minimally,
her tributary duty to patriline continuity and then insisted (for six years!) on
improving her business before she tried for a daughter. In hair dressing, money-
lending, rent income, backing from the brother for whom she still works, and
heaven knows what other cabals and conspiracies with her mother (and two sis-
ters? and elementary, high school, and college girlfriends?) she is fully invested
the petty capitalism that has made Taiwan a world economic player. While
unusual, this couple is not uncommon in its tradeoffs for women between child-
bearing and financial accumulation.
Conclusions
During the first half of the 20th century, Dutch Catholic and Taiwanese lives
were spent in different cultural, institutional, and political-economic contexts.
Inevitably, they moved through their respective fertility transitions very differ-
ently. In the Netherlands, the Catholic Church’s regulation of fertility within
marriage, expressed by preparations for a gendered division of tasks during the
upbringing and a long and chaste courtship, emphasized the overwhelming sig-
nificance of a couple’s sexual relationship while creating considerable anxiety
about pregnancy. By contrast, Taiwanese couples married young and promptly
after an arranged and distant engagement. In the west as well as the east, most
men and women began their sexual lives within marriage. In Taiwan though,
marriage began with a heady mixture of hope for early conception, shyness and
perfect sexual freedom. That mixture may often have precipitated ardent marital
courtship, but it was courtship that had no public expression or cultural support.
Social and family interest in the couple was mainly for fertility, not jouissance.
Modern mechanisms of family limitation were in place in the Netherlands,
but until the 1960s Dutch Catholics opted to eschew them. In Taiwan, such mech-
anisms became available, cheap, and convenient only when government policy
encouraged them. The Dutch Catholics had had time to observe the advantages of
family planning among their Protestant fellow citizens; Taiwanese leaped with lit-
tle concrete knowledge but great enthusiasm into a new kind of family life.
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Another difference of considerable importance was the locus of authority
over fertility that lay beyond the couple relationship. Traditionally, Dutch
Catholics founded new nuclear households at marriage, and married only after
the couple had the means to support themselves and their future children. Kin
took an interest in new families, but had neither authority nor economic power
to influence childbearing decisions. The church, however, claimed a God-given
power to depute parish priests to monitor childbearing and punish couples who
appeared to be limiting their own fertility. While many couples internalized
church teachings and struggled to conform to them, others conformed mainly
for fear of being shamed, or to maintain their membership in a culturally dom-
inant institution. Cooperative and loving couples sometimes had more faith in
their own moral standards than those of the church, a stance that called clerical
authority into question and supported private antinatalism. When regional
church leaders shifted ground, it found their followers ready implement that
attitude.
In Taiwan, pronatalist pressure came from parental authority and the
internalization of a deep sense of obligation to contribute to the welfare of the
extended family. When what was good for the family changed, and when the
state gave a general benediction to family planning, Taiwanese quickly reinter-
preted kinship ideology and lowered their fertility.
Although structured differently, these transitions also depended on simi-
larities between the two cases. If the Dutch emphasized the opportunity for a
more expressive marital life and the Taiwanese stressed sound domestic econo-
my, these emphases owed much to the cultural acceptability of the reasoning.
Taiwanese are intensely private about sexuality; the Dutch may be equally private
about money matters. They are probably more alike than they would have
observers think. The greatest similarity, however, almost certainly stems from a
fundamental human commonality. Pregnancy, lactation, and childcare are
exhausting. In whatever cultural context, some rates of childbearing will result
in maternal depletion and high rates of infant mortality. As a close Taiwan friend
told Gates, “I had six children, four girls and then finally two boys, but my moth-
er-in-law wouldn’t let me get my tubes tied. So when I had the last two girls, I
didn’t even have the strength to push them out.” A Dutch Catholic woman put
the point with a sharper gender analysis: 
“It would have been good if every Catholic male or pastor, even during an inconvenient
time, would have had to deliver every year: than he would have known what worrying
means, and hunger, and pain.”64
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The sudden drop in birth rates among Taiwanese and Dutch Catholic
women did not imply a mental revolution regarding family planning. In both,
antinatal tendencies, long submerged, were developed and intensified during
the 20th century to meet and merge with changed ideological, social, and eco-
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Because people are passionate, and because contraception, abortion, and infanti-
cide played little role in Taiwan and the Netherlands until well into the 20th cen-
tury, illegitimacy occurred there, although at strikingly different levels of propen-
sity during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. We compare the rates,
changes, and probable motivations for bearing and rearing illegitimates in these
two societies at the poles of the Hajnalian dichotomy.
In the literature dealing with interregional comparisons of illegitimacy,
four factors stand out: kinship systems, courtship patterns, female employment
and religion. How important are they for an understanding of Dutch-Taiwanese
differentials? Before exploring these factors, we discuss our sources and com-
pare the definitions of illegitimacy in the two countries. Because the status of
marriage was not similar, illegitimate births are not perfectly comparable. Next,
we examine general levels of illegitimacy and its development over time, trying
to explain why Taiwanese unmarried women were so much more likely to give
birth out of wedlock than Dutch women. In conclusion, we attribute these dif-
ferences to family formation and courtship, to the value attached to children and
to the economic position of single mothers.
The guidance of previous research
Previous research, much of it in continental Europe and Britain, shows that the
spatial distribution of illegitimacy is not susceptible to easy explanation. Region-
al differences are important in ratios of illegitimates to total births and to the
rates of births per 1000 unmarried women. In 1892, Albert Leffingwell found
geographic patterns of considerable significance in 19th century Great Britain as
the statistician Jacques Bertillon had seen for France.1 These differences were
not related to urbanization, which was less influential in promoting illegitimacy
than might have been expected, urban rates being sometimes the same or lower
than rural ones.2 Differences between regions continue to be more important.3
Michael Mitterauer’s impressive effort to understand regional variation of Euro-
pean illegitimacy shows that high or low regional levels can only occur when sev-
eral independent variables reinforce one another.4 The most important explana-
tory variables are religion, systems of kinship and family formation, courtship
customs, and the availability and character of women’s work.
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Popular culture in the northwestern part of the continent was often
remarkably tolerant of prenuptial sexuality. In various parts of 19th century west-
ern Europe, a minority of first-born children was conceived after the wedding. In
many areas of central and northern Europe, adolescents had sexual rights even
before official engagement. Scottish bundling, Dutch kweesten, Swiss kiltgang,
and German fensterln were all customs that allowed village boys access to nubile
girls’ bedrooms. Girls could have a succession of these visitors before finally set-
tling on a marriage partner. These customs were strictly controlled by the village
boys who did not allow strangers to visit the girls and who checked up on couples
during the night. The excitement of customs like these might have compensated
for the long period before marriage was possible. In periods of stable social rela-
tions, these youth cultures did not necessarily engender high levels of illegitima-
cy. Disruptions of communities traditionally tolerant towards prenuptial rela-
tions may be one of the reasons behind the 19th century increases witnessed in
various areas in Europe. In other areas of western Europe (southern France, Ire-
land) parents exerted a much stricter control on their daughters.5 In such cul-
tures, the balance was less easily broken.
An important subset of illegitimacy studies has explored the possibility of
“a series of bastard-producing women, living in the same locality, whose activi-
ties persisted over several generations, and who tended to be related by kinship
or marriage.” Some had repeated illegitimate births. Yet “the concept of a bas-
tardy-prone sub-society becomes complicated when pursued”.6 In some places,
these groupings contribute heavily to peaks in illegitimacy rates,7 and they may
cluster tightly within urban settings. This appears to be the case for the Nether-
lands8 and for Taiwan, where Taipei City and perhaps Penghu’s capital of
Makung include localized populations with high illegitimacy. In recent studies,
objections have been raised against the suggestion that repeaters passively suf-
fered their fate, being ‘prone’ to illegitimacy. Several authors point to the
‘functionality’ of illegitimacy. In the absence of social welfare arrangements, ille-
gitimate children may have been an old-age insurance for their mothers.9 With-
out some sort of arrangement for child care and employment options for women
and thus a basic tolerance towards bastardy, repeatership would be impossible.
The existence of self-reproducing “sub-societies” suggests the importance
of structural and institutional causes for illegitimacy. In a broad-ranging concep-
tual inquiry, Jenny Teichman summarized the problem by observing that “its for-
mal causes are the institutions which generate the legitimate/illegitimate dis-
tinction, and its immediate causes are almost as multifarious as human motives
and loves and hates”.10 The birth of an illegitimate child created problems in
both the Netherlands and Taiwan, but their different institutions and values may
have given unmarried Taiwanese parents more reason than Dutch ones to toler-
ate and even value such children. Unlike the Dutch, the Taiwanese did not need
to view illegitimacy as Leffingwell put it, with fine Edwardian flair: an “annual
harvest of sorrow and shame” requiring “the extreme penalty of ostracism...mer-
cilessly inflicted”.11
For our comparison of the Netherlands and Taiwan, we begin with the fac-
tors distinguished by Mitterauer: kinship systems, courtship patterns, labor rela-
tions and religion. The differences between the kinship systems in our respec-
tive countries are huge. In the Netherlands the risks associated with the nuclear
household formation are compensated for by an elaborate system of communal
supports that strongly discouraged extramarital reproduction. Taiwan families,
with strong kin but no social supports, were much more tolerant towards addi-
tional children, however acquired. Similarly, strong differences existed in
courtship as a potential background of illegitimacy. The predominance of early
and arranged marriage makes this a much less important factor in the Taiwan
case. Where labor relations are concerned, we concentrate on the ‘risky’ female
occupations and on options for unmarried mothers to sustain themselves. Final-
ly we treat religion as a background variable here. In the Netherlands, the Chris-
tian churches, in particular the Roman Catholic and orthodox Protestant ones,
were fairly effective in enforcing their moral codes.12 In Taiwan, the spectrum of
folk religious practice offered no boundaries of belief or behavior that might
affect illegitimacy rates. (See Chapter 4 of this volume).
In addition, we want to know to what extent repeatership accounts for
overall levels (and differences) in illegitimacy. How can we explain repeatership?
Can it be ascribed to a family building strategy of women? 
The data
In this paper, a variety of data have been used. Because in the Netherlands, indi-
vidual sites yielded too little information, we have used censuses and published
statistics to present the general levels and trends. For our detailed analysis we
use an analysis of illegitimacy in the coastal province of North-Holland, based in
particular on civil records13 although its format does not allow for direct compar-
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isons with the Taiwanese household registers. We also employ the Historical
Sample of the Netherlands (hsn), a large database under construction that will
eventually contain the reconstructed life courses of 77.000 individuals with
known background, literacy, occupations, eventual marriage(s) and migratory
moves. The database is built from a random sample of a half percent all persons
born in the Netherlands between 1812 and 1922.14 Here, we use the birth certifi-
cates (N=42.695) for the period 1860-1919. Finally, we incorporate a legal study
of paternity suits in the eastern, rural province of Drenthe between 1909 and
1940.15 This study has never been used in historical demography, yet it contains
many important findings on the backgrounds of illegitimate births.
For Taiwan, we use census data, secondary evidence and the household
registry database of 14 field sites from the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sini-
ca.16 The household registry data reveal the life course of individuals and house-
holds, allowing researchers to follow life events such as household formation,
birth, marriage, migration, recognition, etc. The household registry database
currently consists of data from two urban (Taipei) districts, townships of inter-
mediate size, and rural townships, approximately 250,000 individuals.
Situating our evidence in the respective local contexts is not our goal here.
Illegitimacy ratios for the Netherlands were much lower than those in most oth-
er European countries17; Leffingwell noted long ago that the Dutch levels of ille-
gitimacy ranked at the low end of the general northwest European profile.18 That
Taiwan has a higher-than-typical rate for Chinese regions has been both asserted
and refuted.19 In this paper, we are not comparing regions that are convincingly
representative of larger areas. They represent only themselves.
The general levels and trends of illegitimacy in the Dutch and Taiwanese
populations are presented using illegitimate birth ratio and age-specific fertility
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rates for never-married and widowed/divorced women. Coale’s index of non-
marital fertility (Ih) in Taiwan and the Netherlands was also used for contrast.20
Definitions of marriage and illegitimacy
The Netherlands
Compared to the Chinese institution, European marriage was elegant in its
monogamous and legal simplicity: only an officially married couple could pro-
duce legitimate offspring. In the legal definition of illegitimacy in the Nether-
lands the civil status of the mother was crucial. Mothers of illegitimates were
either unmarried or their former marriage had ended at least 300 days before
the birth. Thus, children resulting from the adultery of a married woman were
registered as legitimate, unless her husband had refused the notification and
had started a complicated procedure to dispute the legitimacy of the child.
Under certain conditions, an illegitimate child could be recognized. Only
‘natural’ children – those of parents who were both unmarried – could be recog-
nized – an official status between legitimate and illegitimate. Children begotten
in incestuous or adulterous relationships could never be recognized. The regis-
trar was not entitled to record the name of the biological father unless he offi-
cially recognized the child. An unmarried father could only recognize his child
by producing a document attesting to the mother’s consent to the recognition.
Recognition was a voluntary act by the begetter of an illegitimate child that legal-
ly acknowledged paternity and admitted his obligation to provide for the child.
The child received its father’s last name and a right to inherit one-third of what
he might have been given as a legitimate child. Until 1947, children could in
principle be recognized only by their biological father. However, it was likely that
illegitimate children were often recognized by a new partner of their mother,
who in this way adopted the child.
Recognized children were automatically legitimated (they became equal to
legitimate children in inheritance rights) when their parents married. Finally,
parents who had missed the opportunity to legitimize their children on the mar-
riage certificate could apply for so-called ‘Royal letters of legitimization,’ which
were granted by the King after an inquest by the Supreme Court of the Nether-
lands. These letters could also be granted when one of the parents had died
before their (already) recognized children could be legitimated by marriage.
In the early 19th century, when French civil law was adopted in the
Netherlands (1809) the traditional paternity suits were abolished. In these suits,
the authorities made the begetters of bastards liable for the consequences, at
least to the degree of paying child support. In them, single mothers could try to
regain their lost respectability by demonstrating how their lovers had betrayed
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their marriage promises. The restoration of a woman’s honor was very impor-
tant in subsequent attempts at finding a marriage partner. For the single moth-
ers, therefore, the abolition of paternity suits increased their vulnerability. In
1911, however, paternity suits were reintroduced. Unwed mothers could not sue
a putative father themselves; a special representative (e.g. the village constable)
had to act on their behalf. The request for child support implied a lengthy proce-
dure, in which finally a court could judge a man to be responsible for the procre-
ation and sustenance until the age of majority of an illegitimate child. For one
Dutch province, it has been calculated that between 1911 and 1940, in 47% of rel-
evant cases of illegitimacy an unwed mother took legal proceedings against the
father. About a third of these suits (35.7%) resulted in conviction.21
During our period, the Dutch state not only enabled marriages. It could
also prohibit them, not only in the obvious cases of bigamy or incest, but also
when a prospective groom was serving in the military, when he wanted to marry
his sister-in-law, when he could not procure the necessary documents or when
he met with the disapproval of his parents.
Taiwan
Chinese marriage when defined most strictly was simple, and produced legiti-
mate offspring. When “marriage” is glossed more expansively to include concu-
bines, the simplicity of the concept begins to blur (Freedman 1950). The accept-
ed sexual liberty especially of rich Chinese men produced many offspring who
were not necessarily illegitimate in the Chinese continuum of negotiable mar-
riage practices. Once a frontier region with few elites, Taiwan became a Japanese
colony where late imperial Chinese family law was implemented with little mod-
ification. Historically, the Chinese state controlled many aspects of kinship22, but
rarely intervened in marriage except to prohibit as incest all marriages between
people of the same surname. During the last three hundred years, imperial
edicts enjoining ever more rigid chastity for women of all classes made their sex-
ual conduct a matter “of highest import, as if the state were enlisting them as
guardians of the fragile boundaries of normative family order”.23 The outcome of
a non-marital birth could have wide-ranging consequences for the mother: pro-
motion from bedmate to concubine, even to wife, was possible. But so was being
prostituted as a state slave.24 The statuses of attachment of a woman and her
children to a man were multiple.
A Chinese marriage was formed through a civil contract between the heads
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of two households, usually on behalf of their children. A woman who entered her
husband’s household as a bride, a hsin niang, gained the status of wife, fu. The
boys she bore were ti-tzu, automatically heirs to their father’s property, and to hers,
if she had any. The girls she bore, nu-tzu, ideally were owed a future marriage, to
be arranged by her parents. If a wife engaged in adultery that gave scandal, the
most likely outcome would be divorce. Her husband’s children would remain
behind; fruits of an adulterous union would be registered as szu-sheng-tzu in her
official household, with her registered as mother, and no father’s name given.
Some women entered households as concubines, chieh. Unlike in the
Netherlands, where concubinage was socially and legally unacceptable, in Taiwan
concubines had recognized civil status. A concubine’s husband need not yet have
a formal wife; she might be added later, or the concubine promoted to this status.
The north China proverb, “A bedroom is not a (formal reception) hall; and a con-
cubine is not a wife” underlines the inequality between the two. Nor was concubi-
nage a single status with precisely defined rights and duties, as Sheieh Bau Hwa
has so richly documented for Ming China.25 A woman’s social background, the rit-
ual style of her entry into the husband’s household, her skill at negotiating both
power and authority, and whether and in what time frame she bore male children
made for more or less powerful concubines who could more or less effectively
assure their children of their rights as heirs or marriageable daughters. Struggles
among women in complex households to gain favor for their children from the
children’s common father are the very stuff of Chinese drama and fiction. In Tai-
wan, a concubine’s children were registered as shu-tzu, but would be promoted to
ti-tzu should the husband promote his concubine to wife.
A man might (and should) regularize a sexual relationship with a resi-
dent maid should she bear him a son by promoting her from bedmate to con-
cubine (perhaps one of lowly status) and the child from szu-sheng-tzu to shu-
tzu, perhaps later to ti-tzu. The status of irregularly born daughters depended
on the whim of the household head.
Szu-sheng-tzu, not registered as sons of their father, were not his heirs.
Ti-tzu were automatic (and legally mandated) heirs, while shu-tzu might find
their claims to their father’s property contested on various grounds by their
half-brothers or by the full wife. Another aspect of heirship, responsibility for
ancestral tablets, was typically passed to a main heir, usually the first son of a
man’s wife. In Taiwan, he customarily received an extra portion of property to
cover the expenses of worship that he and his wife performed on behalf of his
siblings. A concubine’s son was only chosen for this responsibility when the
wife had born no son, and then was promoted from shu-tzu to ti-tzu.
A woman’s civil status affected her role in ancestor worship whether she
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bore children or not. Unlike a wife, a concubine could not worship her hus-
band’s ancestors, nor did she become a family ancestor after death. “Only her
own son offered sacrifices for her,” and never in an ancestral temple.26 A concu-
bine’s son was the legal descendant of his father’s full wife, whose spirit he paid
reverence to after her death.
The cultural chasm between Dutch and Taiwanese practice is not as great
as the previous materials may suggest. In Taiwan, concubines and their off-
spring represent cultural categories against which the more normative statuses
were defined, but they were statistically trivial. Only 1-2% of all Taiwan births
were shu-tzu, compared with 2-4% as szu-sheng-tzu; and only 2.0% were promot-
ed from szu-sheng-tzu to ti-tzu and 13.3% from szu-sheng-tzu to shu-tzu. Paternal
recognition cut down sharply on the number of formal illegitimates in both pop-
ulations, and adoptions increased the effect. The percentage of recognized was
15.3% and adopted was 16.9%. In the Taipei subsample, of 1,053 illegitimates
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Figure 1. Illegitimate births as a percentage of all births, Taiwan and the Netherlands, 
1900-1940
Sources: Barrett, “Short-term trends in Bastardy in Taiwan”, 295, Historical Ecological Database and Centraal
Bureau voor de Statistiek, Buitenenechtelijke geboorte 1840-1973 (‘s-Gravenhage 1973)
who were born, 13.5% were recognized and 13.2% were legitimated by being
adopted out. In the second half of the 19th century, it can be estimated that 30 to
40 percent of all Dutch illegitimately-born children were recognized and subse-
quently legitimated by marriage. As mentioned above, official adoption was
ruled out. However, we estimate that about half of all recognitions were done by
stepfathers, which amounts to adoption.27
Levels and trends
Figure 1 shows the ratio of illegitimate births to all (live) births, the simplest
measure of the incidence of illegitimacy, for both societies. For Taiwan, the first
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Figure 2. Age-specific fertility rates for never-married and widowed/divorced women, Taiwan
and for unmarried women, the Netherlands (births per 1000 woman years)
Sources: For Taiwan Household Registry Database of 14 field sites in 1906-1940, for the Netherlands Centraal
Bureau voor de Statistiek, Buitenenechtelijke geboorte 1840-1973 (‘s-Gravenhage 1973) data pertaining to 1936.











ratio counts the children of concubines (shu-tzu) among the illegitimates and the
second counts them among the legitimate children. Netherlands and Taiwan
trends in illegitimacy clearly diverge, continually declining in the former and ris-
ing steadily in the latter. Levels were not very different, however. In both coun-
tries, only a small minority of children (2-5%) were born out of wedlock. They
only differed in the propensity of unmarried women to bear children. With the
relative proportion of unmarried women in Taiwan so much lower than in the
Netherlands, their non-marital fertility was much higher (Figure 2). 
Taiwanese not-married women can be further classified into the never-
married (before bearing the child) and the widowed/divorced. The divorce rate
was relatively high. For all age groups non-marital fertility was higher for Tai-
wanese than for Dutch women: 1.5 to 3.9 per 1,000 women for the Netherlands
but 14.2 to 80.9 for the never-married women and 18.2 to 102.8 for the wid-
owed/divorced (age groups 45/49 excluded). For the 20-34 age groups, the risk
of an illegitimate birth is 17 to 30 times higher for the Taiwanese than for the
Dutch women. Figure 2 also shows that the non-marital fertility of young wid-
ows/divorcees was markedly higher than that of young, unmarried women. This
is consistent with the argument on the comparative value of children below. The
low fertility of unmarried teenagers testifies to the strict sexual segregation of
adolescents in Chinese society, at least those not married in the minor fashion.28
Did levels of illegitimacy change over time in the Netherlands and Taiwan?
According to Barrett using Coale’s Index of Non-marital Fertility (Ih), there has
been a decline in non-marital fertility for the Netherlands and a continued rise for
Taiwan, a pattern consistent with patterns seen in Figure 1 based on illegitimate
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Figure 3. Age specific fertility of never-married women and widowed and divorced women,
Taiwan, by Birth Cohort
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birth ratios.29 Nevertheless, in the birth cohort analysis of age-specific non-mari-
tal fertility using household registry data, the increase in illegitimacy is not
found. As shown in Figure 3, women from the younger cohorts do not necessari-
ly have higher non-marital fertility than women from the older cohorts. Only 16-
24 year-old widows and the divorced from the later birth cohorts had slightly
higher non-marital fertility than the counterparts from the younger cohort. 
Courtship and control
Western European and Chinese family systems sought marriage partners differ-
ently. In Chinese societies, practically all marriages were arranged. Even when
the future spouses were known to one another, they spent little unsupervised
time together except in minor marriages. In Europe, only marriages in the elite
were more or less arranged and meetings between the fiancees were chaper-
oned. In other social groups, adolescent children found their own partners with-
in the range set by their social or religious group, workplace, and customary local
public gatherings such as church and local festivals. European illegitimacy may
have increased during the nineteenth centuries because couples willingly took
more risks during their courtship. However, many authors have pointed to the
corrosion of the mechanisms surrounding premarital courting by the mobility
associated with the agrarian and industrial revolutions.30
The Netherlands
Premarital courtship that includes sexual intercourse contains the risk of illegit-
imacy. When a child was on the way, a frustration or delay of marriage plans
could then lead to the child being born illegitimate before the parents married. It
could then be legitimated by the marriage of the parents and carried little stigma.
If, before he could marry the mother, the father died, became unemployed,
absconded, or was still in military service, the child remained illegitimate.
How much illegitimacy resulted from couples who were planning to mar-
ry, but began sexual intercourse before the wedding? We can look at the relation-
ship between illegitimacy and ‘ordinary,’ sexually permissive, premarital
courtship by comparing the ages at which first children were born both within
and outside marriage. At the time of their first birth, single mothers in the
province of North-Holland (western Netherlands) were roughly of the same age
(around 24 years) as married mothers whose first child was prenuptially con-
ceived.31 Thus, their (first) pregnancies may have occurred during ‘normal’
courtship. In the 19th century, about a third of North-Holland illegitimates were
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legitimated by the marriage of the parents, about two-third of them below age
two. It seems likely that a number of planned marriages had been postponed.
Prenuptial pregnancies were very common. In particular in Protestant
areas, they often involved the majority of first-born children. However, illegiti-
macy was a rare phenomenon. Clearly, premarital license did not result in high
levels of illegitimacy. We only find such a link between courtship behavior and
illegitimacy when pregnant couples were not subject to social pressures to mar-
ry. Social control ensuring marriage was particularly effective when exerted by
peers, neighbors and employers. Thus, geographical mobility or secrecy of lovers
led to an increased chance of an illegitimate birth among itinerant workers or
soldiers who could easily abscond, or among living-in servants, including agri-
cultural workers, who tended to hide their affairs from their employers from fear
of being dismissed. When women became pregnant in such circumstances,
there were no witnesses to put pressure on a hesitant lover. Illegitimacy in the
Netherlands typically occurred when large groups of unmarried male and female
workers were employed and housed together, without supervision from the
farmers or factory owners. Even these instances were quite rare due to the small-
scale nature of Dutch economy.32
An analysis of all paternity suits for one Dutch province enables us to
probe somewhat deeper.33 In the sparsely populated province of Drenthe, in the
eastern part of the Netherlands, 2,721 illegitimate children were born between
1910 and 1940. Of these children, 223 died within a fortnight, 375 children were
legitimated shortly, 367 children were born in a consensual union (see below),
and 4 children were recognized by the father without a subsequent marriage.
Thus, in principle, a paternity suit could be started on behalf of the 1,752 remain-
ing children. The mother did so in only 818 cases. The files of these cases dis-
close that only 141 out of 72134 relationships can be characterized as a stable
union with a clear prospect of marriage. In other words, on the basis of the files
we can calculate the share of stable unions as 19.6%. Another calculation is pos-
sible. We have seen that 375 children were legitimated soon after their birth.
Mothers who did not file paternity suits probably were aware that they would fail.
Perhaps they could not even name a father. Those who did not litigate (N=934)
had probably not formed stable courtships. Another calculation of the stable
courtships reads: [legitimations(375)+ recognitions(4)+ stable courtships accord-
ing to files(141)]/[total(2721)- infant deaths(223)- unknown relationships in
files(97)]=21.7%. Both methods suggest that only about a fifth of illegitimate
children were born to couples that had intended to marry.
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The province of Drenthe is not representative of the rest of the Nether-
lands. Until the late 19th century remote, underpopulated and agrarian, recla-
mations and peat digging attracted itinerant workers and fomented grave social
problems and high levels of illegitimacy. Perhaps frustrated marriage was a less
important background of illegitimacy there than elsewhere. The majority of the
paternity suits were associated with ‘unstable’ relationships that had already bro-
ken up before the pregnancy was discovered. In a secret affair, it was difficult for
the girl to have her ex-lover sentenced.
Taiwan
In Taiwan, prospective spouses in major marriages met rarely, if ever before mar-
riage. Youngsters engaged in the minor fashion, living together as brother and
sister, had easy sexual access. Parents often waited to register a minor marriage
until couples had accepted the match; a clear sign of this was pregnancy.35 Thus,
between a fifth and a quarter of all brides in minor marriages were pregnant.36
Daughters in families that lacked male labor often remained with their
parents, and husbands joined them there. Uxorilocal marriages were some-
times preceded by courtship, for brides who married uxorilocally were often
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Table 1. Premarital births and prenuptial pregnancy by type of marriage. 
All field sites Taiwan.
1891-1900 1901-1910 1911-1920 1921-1930
major marriages
% prenuptially pregnant 8.1 9.6 11.6 10.1
% premarital births 5.5 4.9 5.0 4.8
minor marriages
% prenuptially pregnant 20.8 24.5 24.8 24.1
% premarital births 7.8 3.8 2.2 2.3
uxorilocal marriages
% prenuptially pregnant 13.9 16.3 26.0 26.0
% premarital births 7.2 7.7 9.1 13.2
pregnant, and single mothers who married tended to do so uxorilocally. This is
especially apparent in the birth cohorts of 1901-1920 (see Table 1). Some
daughters from families without sons worked in prostitution to help sustain
the family. On becoming pregnant, the woman might return home, making an
uxorilocal marriage of her own or her parents’ choice. When the marriage was
not arranged in time, the child would be born illegitimate. Alternatively, she
might bear an illegitimate child (or two or three), returning to sex work until
her price dropped, and then marry. By this time, she could make an independ-
ent marriage choice, having fulfilled her duty to her parents by sending them
her earnings. Depending on the couple’s financial options, they might choose
uxorilocal or neolocal marriage.
Value of children: Taiwanese pronatalism
In Taiwan as everywhere, children and grandchildren brought liveliness,
warmth, and joy. Chinese people value children, and especially sons, for the part
they have in continuing descent lines and maintaining aging parents. Where
inter-village feuding was common, sons made for a strong family that others
would fear to bully. Daughters, too, were wanted, though their status ranked
below that of their brothers; when necessary they could partially substitute for
sons. The economic utility of children for their parents was openly recognized in
a way that their emotional significance was not. Elite ideology and popular prac-
tice required parents and especially fathers to limit demonstrations of affection
to only their very young children. Emotional closeness was expressed in more
practical fashion, in gifts and in work.37 Parents were obliged to sacrifice and
exert themselves on behalf of their children, and could expect exertion and sacri-
fice in return when the children reached adulthood. Although most children
were born to the parents who reared and later depended on them, adoption was
extremely common, as were other forms of fosterage and dependency. Even
women who never married, such as nuns, and divorcees and young widows rec-
ognized the importance of children to their present and future lives. Many adopt-
ed children or bore them out of wedlock.
Taiwan’s household registers cannot tell us the intentions of the women
who bore illegitimate children. Were their babies the unintended consequence
of love affairs, rape, or of bartering their sexuality to bring a man’s help to their
domestic economy?38 Or were they part of their mother’s own family-building
strategy? Considerable evidence exists for south China that substantial numbers
of women were attracted by the possibility of creating a family of own or adopted
children independently of the controls that were imposed by marriage.
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To gain better understanding of whether women simply found ways to
survive having born illegitimate children or whether they considered single
mother-headed households a positive career move, we may begin with the unex-
pectedly high fertility of widows. In Taiwan, lineages were comparatively smaller
and weaker than those in mainland China, poorly positioned to monitor the
behavior of audacious widows. But widows incurred disesteem by threatening
the normal father-to-son inheritance of her legitimate children. By marrying
again, she lost rights to her husband’s children and to any property usufruct she
held through them. Widows had significant incentives to expand their families
without remarrying.
Widows and divorcees bore almost 36% of Taiwan’s illegitimates, as
shown in Table 2. A divorced or widowed woman who bore one illegitimate child
may simply have had bad luck, but those who bore more than one illegitimate
may have found that having a fatherless family was not harshly sanctioned.
Ethnographic evidence suggests that for many ordinary, non-elite Taiwanese,
this was true, particularly for daughters in families lacking in sons.39 A stronger
hypothesis is that the women themselves were building families to what they
considered an appropriate size. That younger widows and divorcees were high in
illegitimacy suggests that they were following the same family-building strategy
as married women.40
Repeatership among widows and divorcees was common in our Taiwan
field sites: 35.9% of widows and divorcees who had illegitimate children had
more than one. One ambitious divorcee in Taipei had twelve.41 Following the
same logic, the 43.3 % of never-married mothers of one or more illegitimates
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Table 2. Percentage of widowed or divorced mothers as a percentage of all unwed mothers,
by period in which their children were born.
% widowed or % illegitimacy N illegitimate
divorced mothers children
Netherlands 1860-1879 10.8 4.8 810
Netherlands 1880-1899 9.4 3.6 552
Netherlands 1900-1919 8.4 2.7 285
Taiwan, 1906-1940 35.8 5.6 4322
Sources: Taiwanese Household Registry Database of 14 field sites and Historical Sample of the Netherlands. 
may be suspected of pursuing a family-building strategy. If so, the never-married
mothers were at a disadvantage compared to widows and divorcees who quite
probably already had children. 
Value of children: The Netherlands versus Taiwan
Children were valued differently in Taiwan and the Netherlands. Part of this dif-
ference can be accounted for by the much longer period of childhood and pre-
marital adulthood characteristic of the Dutch. This extended the period of post-
puberty sexual abstinence expected of young people to as much as a decade,
while Taiwanese girls were typically married shortly after their first menses, at
about 16. The consequences for this difference of exposure to non-marital preg-
nancy are complex. Supervision over the sexual behavior of unmarried Dutch
youths was a major cultural problem; in Taiwan, girls and boys were normative-
ly married almost as soon as they were capable of conception. The value of chil-
dren may have been somewhat undercut for Dutch parents by the enormous
concern and effort to inhibit their children’s sexual experience throughout the
teens and early twenties.
The right to benefit from children’s labor and earnings also may have
affected the value of children as understood by Dutch and Taiwanese. By the
late 19th century, schooling was common for Dutch boys and girls, adding
actual and opportunity costs to the parental burden. In Taiwan, schooling was
not general for children until two decades into the Japanese period. While
many Dutch youths left home for paid employment in their late teens, many
did not become economically independent until marriage – indeed, marriage
was normatively delayed until such independence was assured. Working “chil-
dren” remitted their wages to their parents and saved for marriage. Unmar-
ried, wage-earning Taiwanese youths (and these were few, island-wide) also
remitted wages, but they did not achieve economic independence through or at
marriage. Independence in career choice, use of earned wages, and marital
decisions was greater in the Netherlands than in Taiwan. Although they mar-
ried late, Dutch sons and daughters left the parental economy when marriage
occurred. In purely economic terms, it might even be said of Dutch sons and
daughters what Chinese say only about daughters: that they are p’ei ch’ien huo –
“goods on which one loses money.”
Dutch illegitimate children were likely to carry yet more direct econom-
ic, social, and religious costs than legitimate ones. Dutch widows and divorced
women, many of whom may already have had children, formed only a small
minority among mothers of illegitimate children (see Table 2). The lower
propensity of Dutch women testifies to the limited economic value in its strict-
ly nuclear-family regime. The structural anomalousness of children born out-
side a nuclear family lowered their value still further.
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Social attitudes toward illegitimates and their mothers also affected
behavior, and Dutch and Taiwanese attitudes varied considerably. Given the
higher propensity to bear illegitimates among Taiwanese women, we must
assume that society more readily made a place for both mother and child. For
Taiwanese, patrilineally-anomalous children were problems for the kinship
system alone. The social safety net for Chinese who lacked kin did not differ as
much from that of Europe as is often supposed. Chinese governments sup-
plied charity in crises such as famine, and permitted private (often Buddhist)
organizations to do the same.42 Official policy also supported “poorhouses,
foundling homes, lepers’ asylums, old age homes, and public cemeteries,
[varying] from period to period and...administered at the local county
level...unevenly carried out”43, but do not seem to have discriminated system-
atically against illegitimates and their mothers. Chinese charity was universal,
but too intermittent to provide for the predictable stream of unmarried moth-
ers. Kin who had played a role in a girl’s sexual vulnerability did not disown her
when it resulted in pregnancy. But her fatherless children had no patrilineal
claim to either property or standing. Ethnographic evidence suggests that their
status per se was not a serious problem for them or for their mothers, espe-
cially among the working classes. Outcomes for mothers and children from
Taipei sites are examined in another paper.44
In the Netherlands, illegitimates complicated the operation of social
institutions that assumed supra-kin responsibility for economic unfortunates.
Church, state, and occupational associations wove a safety net that caught
propertyless widows, orphans, the childless elderly, veterans of the region’s
incessant wars, the ill, and many paupers. Netherlandish charity, however, was
typically reserved for the “deserving poor,” and the sexual standard for this was
high. Dutch widows, if chaste and thus “deserving,” were prominent receivers
of religious and municipal charity and social benefits. Giving birth to a bastard
child endangered that privilege.45 Illicitly pregnant girls could make no claim
on public assistance, and might even be driven from home by her kin. They
risked lowered marriage expectations, loss of employment, and social rejection
that might result in dire poverty or even prostitution.
A more quantitative approach to answering the question of whether ille-
gitimates were valued or seen as unwelcome burdens is to examine their rates
of survival. These figures tell us something, too, about the relative evaluation
of boys and girls born under these circumstances. Table 3 shows that illegiti-
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mate infants in the Netherlands had much higher mortality rates than legiti-
mate children. Part of this difference has been ascribed to infanticide.46 Clear-
ly, the mothers did not favor boys over girls. Illegitimate male infants died
more often than the legitimate, but this corresponded with the excess mortali-
ty of legitimate boys. By contrast, illegitimate infants in Taiwan overall had
about the same mortality rates as the legitimate ones. Illegitimates were seen
less as as unwelcome burdens in Taiwan as they were in the Netherlands.
Female economic independence
Taiwan
The desire to build a family, even if outside marriage, was no guarantee that the
goal could be achieved, for an adequate economic context for female economic
independence remained the limiting condition. Most Taiwan mothers whose
children had no social father relied on paid work. Niches for unmarried mothers
have always existed in Taiwan; unfortunately, the household registers are usually
mute on women’s occupations. Seamstresses could survive on their earnings;
some households allowed servants to keep their children with them; handicraft
production sustained some single mothers; and the entertainment services,
including prostitution, hired many more. During the last third of the 19th centu-
ry, Taiwan’s economy expanded on a trajectory that only slowed in the 1930s, cre-
ating many new occupations for women. Female niches grew disproportionately
in two notable sectors: sex work and the tea industry, both concentrated in Taipei.
Most recruits for sex work were eldest daughters contracted by their par-
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Table 3. Infant mortality (percentage of death within the first year) by legitimacy status and
sex, Netherlands and Taiwan
Illegitimates Legitimates
male female male female
Netherlands 1905 23.8 23.4 15.4 12.7
Netherlands 1920 15.5 12.9 8.3 7.2
Netherlands 1935 8.0 4.9 4.5 3.4
Taiwan 1906 24.1 17.8 17.4 18.0
Taiwan 1920 21.0 14.2 18.0 13.3
Taiwan 1935 16.1 12.5 16.0 13.2
Sources: For Taiwan, Vital Statistics of the Population, Taihoku, Government-General of Taiwan, Bureau of Offi-
cial Statistics. For the Netherlands: Bijdragen tot de Statistiek van Nederland. Loop der bevolking.
ents for a few years until later-born children could provide the help needed at
home. Parents were necessarily responsible for putting girls into prostitution;
they had the right and the responsibility to allocate their daughters’ labor. Girls
working away from home might retain their registration in their parents’ house-
hold, making use of the “temporary outregistration” (chi liu) category to account
for their absence there and their presence in that of their employer (where they
would be temporarily registered in); or they might be permanently transferred
from their parents’ to another household when they worked for a brothel-keeper
or as a live-in servant. Before the Japanese period, transfers as cabokana (bond-
servants) were legal and not uncommon; under Japanese rule, with bondser-
vanthood made illegal, girls were registered into households that depended on
sex work as adopted daughters or adopted daughters-in-law. A young woman
who had found a niche that could sustained a family of her own sometimes
divided herself from the parental household and lived an independent life of
family-building.
Comparisons with other parts of the Chinese world shed some light on
the problem of connecting prostitution with illegitimacy. In Shanghai in the
1920s and 1930s, prostitution was an extremely important ‘industry’. It has been
calculated that about 1 in 42 female residents of appropriate age were prostitutes.
However, they were certainly not all unmarried. In 1948, at least 9% of Shanghai
prostitutes were married. Also, their fertility was very low due to frequent mis-
carriages and sterility caused by venereal diseases.47 Although research on this
subject for Taiwan is still very incomplete, scattered evidence suggests that
Taipei, during its boom years from the expansion of the tea trade in the 1860s
through its prosperity under Japan until the war began in the 1930s, had an
entertainment business roughly parallel to that of Shanghai.
In Taiwan, prostitutes worked alongside women and girls who poured tea
and drinks, danced and flirted with customers, sang, and performed, enhancing
the sexually-stimulating ambience of bars, coffee shops, dancehalls, and the out-
er rooms of brothels. Courtesans famous for artistic skills became local stars
whose exploits were followed in gossip and tabloid publications. Around these
clustered hairdressers, maids, seamstresses, ornament-makers, music and
dance teachers, drivers, madams, and pimps. Both famous and lowly were noto-
riously vulnerable to slipping into illicit sexual relations and to bearing illegiti-
mate children.
Taiwan’s towns and cities had extensive entertainment quarters, many of
which persisted openly until the 21st century. Cheap hotels functioned as broth-
els, creating circumstances in which travelers with modest budgets readily
observed even if they did not engage in all the available entertainments. “Enter-
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tainment,” however coarse and commodified, could be found in virtually every
large vegetable market in every town and city during our period. As in most sim-
ilar societies, Taiwan’s sex workers sometimes earned enough in their early years
to support children and accumulate the capital for a small business, perhaps in
the same sector, for their middle years.
The late 19th century tea boom also expanded the work opportunities for
women in the Taipei basin. Girls and women picked and sorted tea before it was
processed by male specialists, elaborately tested and wrapped, and transported to
the docks of Ta-tao-ch’eng. A few of the region’s large plantations hired women
pickers, but most of the leaf was plucked by family members from their own
bushes. The market for women’s waged work in tea was the sorting sheds. Dur-
ing the three seasonal pickings, thousands of girls and women came each day
from the villages to sort leaf, as did many from Taipei neighborhoods.48 Tea
sorters are described as well-turned-out, lively, and confident, doing honorable
work at decent wages. Other girls and women, invisible in the record but neces-
sary to the smooth functioning of capitalist extraction cooked, did laundry, enter-
tained, and kept boarding houses for the flood of seasonal men workers.
Temporary and permanent migrants into Taipei made for a radical expan-
sion of the city’s population. Between 1920 and 1930, the population increased
from 114,140 to 147,620, with an increase of 27% for men and 31% for women,
an expansion that opened many opportunities for female independence. To sex
work, tea sorting, services for migrants without families, the production of tradi-
tional goods (such as spirit money) now in even greater demand were added jobs
as teachers, nurses, telephone operators, and, very slowly, clerical workers. With
Japanese development, women (and men) found jobs in tobacco, soysauce, and
liquor factories. Kaohsiung City was also booming, with growing trade and port
facilities that must have created a similar market for women’s paid work met
largely by migration from the island’s villages. This female labor force left only
slight traces in the statistical records.49 We assume that they gave birth to a very
substantial proportion of Taiwan’s illegitimates, and that they clustered in parts
of Taipei City where cheap rentals were available.
Insight into the conditions that produced many illegitimates comes from
the work of Arthur Wolf and Huang Chieh-shan for the Haishan area (1980: 258-
259). Of all women who had no brothers, almost 40% gave birth to an illegiti-
mate child, while only 7% of those with at least one older brother did so. Further,
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among women remaining unmarried at age twenty-five, 70% of the 1891-1895
birth cohort bore an illegitimate, and 43% of the 1916-1920 cohort did so. Wolf
and Huang’s interpretations of these findings are that parents without sons
sometimes delayed arranging marriages for their daughters, putting them into
the most lucrative lines of work open to them, including sex work. Analyses of
larger bodies of data support the logic of this argument. When a girl could earn
in a night what her father earned from several days of heavy labor, and when that
father faced rearing a growing family with no sons to help him, one can better
understand how such decisions were taken.50
The Netherlands
Opportunities for women to support themselves and their children were signifi-
cantly fewer for Dutch than for Taiwanese women. In fact, Dutch female labor
force participation rates were very low within western Europe at large, especially
in industry. This fact has been attributed to the early demise of cottage industry
in the (western) parts of the country as well as to the equally early dominance of
the bourgeois cult of the nuclear family in which the wife and mother performed
her duties at home.51 Women workers were concentrated in agriculture and
domestic services. However, these jobs could hardly be combined with mother-
hood. Social rejection of unmarried women and their children was so strong that
even those employed as house servants and farm laborers were fired when dis-
covered to be pregnant. Social policy reflected this opprobrium of single moth-
ers. Typically, the Netherlands were the only western European country not to
ratify the 1919 International Labor Organisation’s Maternity Protection Conven-
tion because it allowed unmarried mothers paid maternal leave.52 Dutch custom
did not tolerate babies being taken along and breast-fed when the mother was
working outdoors. Single mothers could not afford wet-nurses. Together, artifi-
cial feeding and (willful) neglect resulted in high mortality rates.53 Finally, work-
ing women earned about 60% of what men earned in a comparable position; the
costs of living were not lower for them than for men. It must have been difficult
for them to raise their own family in these circumstances.
In the Netherlands, prostitution was not an important background of ille-
gitimacy. In the countryside it appeared to have been quite rare. In his detailed
study of illegitimacy in Drenthe, Overdiep only encountered one instance of
prostitution by an unmarried woman resulting in a child. In this area, prostitu-
tion was limited to a small number of mostly married women, who sometimes
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joined forces to form an illicit brothel.54 Rural prostitution was rare because of a
lack of demand for paid sex. Men who wanted sex could simply approach a girl
known for her loose morals. Because girls were not supervised by the parents in
the evenings, casual sexual encounters occurred quite often. Only men who
lacked the network on information on ‘willing’ girls, such as mobilized soldiers
or immigrants to large cities, had to resort to paid sex. Therefore, prostitution
was concentrated in the large cities. However, the frequent sexual contacts of
urban prostitutes led relatively seldom to illegitimate births. It has been calculat-
ed that only about 10-30% of prostitutes in the cities of Rotterdam and Leyden
(18th and 19th centuries) had a child at least once in their lives.55 Many prosti-
tutes used contraceptive devices or resorted to abortion. Also, they often suffered
from venereal diseases.
Toward an explanation
The Netherlands had many single women who rarely became single mothers,
but in Taiwan the reverse was true: single women were few in number, and often
were mothers as well. The distinctive local family systems account for much of
this difference. The nuclearity and neolocality of the Dutch required late mar-
riage. While waiting, adolescents chose their own partners and amassed the
resources necessary to founding new households. Because premarital birth
could endanger these plans, socialization and social control combined to inspire
youths with prudence. Single mothers were not cared for as ‘deserving poor,’ but
faced lives of misery. Courtship and social control are central to the history of
Dutch illegitimacy.
In Taiwan, by contrast, marriages were generally arranged at so early an
age that sex between unmarried adolescents caused little illegitimacy. However,
girls who did not marry young because their earnings were needed at home were
remarkably prone to have out-of-wedlock children and then to marry uxorilocal-
ly. When daughters were put into prostitution, their illegitimate children were
seen as evidence of, and even a reward for the sacrifices of filiality; such grand-
children could not be rejected. In general, Chinese families welcomed addition-
al children, whatever their status. Even when daughters worked at less risky and
more reputable jobs, if they lived away from parental supervision, their sexual
vulnerability increased along with a likelihood of having an illegitimate child.
Young widows and divorcees were even more prone to have children than
single women. Did they also work in ‘hazardous’ occupations associated with the
sex and entertainment industry? Basing his conclusions on census data, Richard
Barrett argues that the numerical importance of widows implies that prostitu-
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tion was a less important background for illegitimate children than Arthur Wolf
has suggested.56 Because we do not know their occupation, we cannot at this
stage confirm or reject this hypothesis. Perhaps they were simply not interested
in remarriage but instead extending their own uterine families. In particular in
Taipei, the urban economy offered plenty of opportunities of women to sustain
themselves and their children.
In both countries, illegitimacy was a fairly rare phenomenon that did not
pose a threat to the available resources; general fertility levels were hardly affect-
ed by illegitimacy. However, this outcome was reached through completely dif-
ferent mechanisms. In Taiwan, near universal marriage for women ensured that
illegitimacy was concentrated among widows, unmarried women without broth-
ers and women in cities that offered female employment opportunities.
In the Netherlands, illegitimate fertility was held in check in spite of late
and non-universal marriage. All kinds of social control mechanisms backed up
the sexual restraint of adolescents and ensured that couples married when a
pregnancy occurred. The cultural and social penalties for a single mother were
harsh and her opportunities for employment limited. Until 1911, she had no way
of putting (legal) pressure on her absconding boyfriend. The threat of losing
esteem, work and social benefits kept most single women from entering sexual
relationships.
Finally, however, we are left with a paradox. Taiwan girls were not free to
begin their sexual careers at will because the right to dispose of their sexual capac-
ities belonged to their parents. Dutch girls were expected to dispose of them-
selves, but only after a prolonged period of chaste courtship. Female agency oper-
ated very differently, giving greater control over her life to a Dutch than to a Tai-
wanese woman, but also putting her more at risk for illegitimacy. Contradictorily,
Taiwan’s strong market for women’s labor compatible with unmarried mother-
hood combined with its family system to generate high propensities to illegitima-
cy. The Dutch, with few such niches available, were less prone to unmarried
motherhood despite their immensely greater courtship opportunities.
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China and Northwestern Europe have long been regarded as prototypical exem-
plars of two fundamentally different demographic regimes – what are common-
ly called high and low pressure regimes. In high pressure regimes, exemplified
by China, women all married and married at an early age, the short-term result
being high fertility and the long-term result being overpopulation, poverty, and
high mortality. In low pressure regimes, exemplified by Northwestern Europe,
women married late and often not at all, the short-term result being low fertility
and the long-term result being slow population growth, a relatively high stan-
dard of living, and relatively low mortality.
Our goal in this paper is to reinvigorate this hoary contrast by imposing
on it another even older contrast – urban life and rural life. Because of the pauci-
ty of data from Chinese cities, the China that is commonly taken to exemplify
high pressure regimes is in fact rural China, as known, for example, from John
Lossing Buck’s famous farm surveys.1 What, then, of the cities? Where they also
high pressure zones? Would the contrast between China and Northwestern
Europe appear as sharp if we compared rural China with rural Europe and urban
China with urban Europe? The answer is both surprising and revealing.
Europe is represented in our comparison by women born in two munici-
palities in the Eastern Netherlands, Nijmegen (between 1840 and 1864) and
Borne (between 1800 and 1860). Located on the south bank of the river Waal
near the German border, Nijmegen has a long history as a garrison town and
commercial center, serving as the northern-most outpost of the Roman Empire
and later as an important junction in trade between Germany and the Nether-
lands. In 1810, however, the French occupation cut Nijmegen off from much of
Europe, the result being that during the period covered by our data the popula-
tion was largely employed in the traditional way – agriculture, marketing activi-
ties, domestic service, or in the garrison. Industrialization did not get underway
until the 1870’s after the city walls were torn down and rail lines opened to Arn-
hem, Venlo and Den Bosch. The city is best characterized as a medium-sized
provincial town with market and administrative functions.2
Borne is located in the Twente countryside thirty miles north of Nijmegen.
Textile production emerged as a cottage industry in Borne as early as the 17th
century and developed as a centralized industry in the 19th century. Many land-
less and land-poor peasants were forced to supplement their income as laborers
in the new industry, but agriculture remained the most the important activity
until only recently. Families who lacked the land needed to farm full time con-
tinued farming as a sideline.3
108
1. See Barclay et al., “A reassessment of the demography of traditional rural China.”
2. See Engelen, “Leven en dood onder controle”.
3. See Hendrickx, In order not to fall into poverty.
China is represented in our study by women born in the years 1860-
1930 in Taipei City and three clusters of Taiwanese villages. Like Nijmegen,
Taipei emerged in history as a river port, but centuries later. It began life as a
trading post in 1700’s but only came of age with the founding of the famous
Lung-shan temple in 1741. Taipei remained a small town until the 1860’s when
it began to grow so spectacularly that by the time Taiwan was ceded to Japan in
1895 it was the largest, wealthiest city in Taiwan. The stimulus was tea. It was
Taiwan’s most important export and all of it was processed and packed in
Taipei. The tea industry gradually declined after the Japanese occupation but
by then Taipei was well-established as Taiwan’s largest urban center. It was des-
ignated the provincial capital in 1894 and served as the seat of the Japanese
colonial government until 1945.
Two of three clusters of villages representing rural Taiwan are located in
northern Taiwan (one close to Hsin-chu City and the other on the hills overlook-
ing the city), and the third, in central Taiwan at the foot of the central mountain
range. The primary activity in all three was agriculture, but not subsistence agri-
culture. Even if they had to eat sweet potatoes at home, everyone produced for
the market. The major crops were rice, tea, tobacco, sugarcane, bananas, bam-
boo, and an enormous variety of fruits and vegetables. There was some cottage
industry but nothing as important as Borne’s textile production.
We will start by comparing our four populations in terms of age-specific
total fertility. Figure 1 (based on Table 1) shows that the fertility of Dutch women
rose slowly, peaked at ages 30-39, and then fell sharply. There was no significant
difference between rural and urban women. The fertility of Taiwanese women,
in sharp contrast, peaked at ages 20-24, remained high at age ages 25-29, and
then gradually declined. There was, however, a striking difference between the
rural and urban women. At all ages after 19 the fertility of the rural women was
markedly higher than that of the urban women. The surprising result is that
while they presented very different age profiles, the fertility of urban Taiwanese
women fell below that of both samples of Dutch women. The total fertility rates
for the three samples were 4.08 for the urban Taiwanese, 4.25 for the rural
Dutch, and 4.87 for the urban Dutch. The only one of the four populations with
high fertility was the rural Taiwanese. Their total rate was 6.10.4
Figure 2 (based on Table 2) compares the probability that the women in
each of our four populations married by ages 15 through 45. Not surprisingly, the
overall pattern resembles that displayed in Figure 2. The figure shows that Dutch
women did not begin marrying until age 17 and did not reach the .500 mark
until age 25. The urban women married earlier than the rural women, but again
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the rural/urban difference was not large. Taiwanese women, in contrast to the
Dutch women, began marrying at age 12 and had already passed the .500 mark
by age 21. But again there was a striking difference between rural Taiwanese and
urban Taiwanese. Where the probability of marriage among the rural women
was .963 by age 25 and .983 by age 45, the probability among urban women was
only .644 by age 25 and only .761 by age 45. The surprising result is that urban
Taiwanese were less likely to marry than urban Dutch or rural Dutch.
Thus we appear to have a high pressure system in rural Taiwan and a low
pressure system in the Netherlands and urban Taiwan. This is not, however, the
only surprise our data has to offer. Figure 3 (based on Table 3) compares our four
populations in terms of age-specific marital fertility. The first surprise is that
while general fertility was higher in Taiwan than in the Netherlands, marital fer-
tility was substantially higher in the Netherlands than in Taiwan. The second is
that while marital fertility was much the same in the rural and urban Dutch pop-
ulations, it was markedly higher in the rural Taiwanese population than in the
urban Taiwanese population. The total marital fertility rates for our four popula-
110 Figure 1: Age-specific general fertility in Taiwan and the Netherlands













tions were 9.78 for the rural Dutch, 9.77 for the urban Dutch, 7.57 for the rural
Taiwanese, and 6.38 for the urban Taiwanese.5
The low pressure/high pressure contrast – implicit in Thomas Malthus’
famous distinction between “positive” and “preventative” checks – rests on two
claims. One, made explicit by John Hajnal, is that the only part of the world in
which low pressure regimes ruled was Northwestern Europe. In this respect,
Europe was “unique or almost unique in the world.”6 The other claim is that the
critical difference between historical demographic regimes was age at marriage
and proportions marrying. They were what made a regime low pressure or high
pressure. As Tony Wrigley put in commending John Hajnal’s construction of the
European marriage pattern, “marriage is at the center.”7
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therefore set aside all these marriages and recalculated our results to show that the rural/urban difference was not
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involving early association removed, there is an even larger difference between our rural and urban populations.
The total marital fertility rate for the rural women was 7.94 as compared with only 6.48 for the urban women.
6. Hajnal, “European marriage patterns in perspective”.













In 1920 only 10.5 percent of all Taiwanese lived in the island’s nine major
cities and only 4.9 percent in the two cities with populations of 50,000 or more.8
Thus the evidence comparing rural Taiwan and the Netherlands confirms the
first of the two claims underlying the low pressure/high pressure contrast. The
Taiwanese and Dutch demographic regimes were – taken as wholes – very dif-
ferent regimes. One was characterized by high general fertility and a high mar-
riage rate, and the other, by low general fertility and a low marriage rate. What
makes our evidence interesting is that it also shows that Taiwanese cities did not
conform to the low pressure/high pressure paradigm. Their general fertility and
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Figure 3: Age-specific marital fertility in Taiwan and the Netherlands
















marriage rates were low compared to the Dutch figures. They began marrying
early but twenty-five percent never married. 
Our evidence also confirms the claim that their marriage rate is the critical
distinguishing feature of historical demographic regimes. All of the differences
in general fertility between our four sites are largely explained by differences in
their marriage rates. This is even true of the difference between rural and urban
Taiwan. But again our comparisons argue that while the low pressure/high pres-
sure is sound, it is not alone sufficient to account for all the observed differences.
There are at least two that cannot be explained by age at marriage and propor-
tions marrying.
The first is the fact that Dutch marital fertility was so very much higher
than Taiwanese marital fertility. Because Dutch women married late and often
not at all, their general fertility was low, producing a demographic regime that is
correctly characterized as low pressure. But in the Netherlands the fertility-
depressing effect of a low marriage rate was partly offset by high marital fertility.
Dutch women married late but when they married they bore children at a pace
that is extraordinary compared to the Taiwanese pace. Had this not been the
case, what is a low pressure regime would have been a nearly pressure-less
regime.
113Figure 4: Proportion of Taiwanese women unmarried at age thirty by number of brothers at
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The second fact that the low pressure/high pressure contrast fails to
account for is the very low marital fertility of the urban Taiwanese. Urban Tai-
wanese women were far less likely to marry than rural Taiwanese women and
when they married bore far fewer children. The result was that demographic
pressure was weaker in urban Taiwan than in any of our other study sites. This is
striking because the pressure was strongest in rural Taiwan.
We are faced, then, with four questions: 1) Why was it that urban Tai-
wanese were less likely to marry than rural Taiwanese? 2) Why was it that Dutch
marital fertility was so much higher than Taiwanese marital fertility? 3) Why was
it that marital fertility was lower in urban Taiwan than in rural Taiwan? And,
most importantly, 4) Why was it that rural Taiwanese women (and Chinese
women generally) married so much earlier and in so much greater numbers
than Dutch women (and European women generally)? 
Our tentative answer to the first question is that it was because urban set-
tings offered more opportunities for female employment than rural settings.
This was critical because when their daughters could be gainfully employed, Tai-
wanese parents kept their daughters at home rather than marrying them out at
an early age. Daughters were only allowed to marry when their parents had sons
old enough to provide for their support. Strong support for this argument is pre-
sented in Figure 4 (based on Table 4). It shows that the likelihood of a woman’s
marrying by age thirty depended on how many older brothers she had at age fif-
teen.
James Lee and Wang Feng have argued that Chinese women deliberately
controlled their fertility by what they call “late starting, long spacing, and early
stopping.”9 This suggests that the answer to our second question is that marital
fertility was higher in the Netherlands than in Taiwan because the Taiwanese
practiced birth control and the Dutch did not. We reject that argument in favor of
the view that marital fertility was lower in Taiwan than in Netherlands because
Taiwanese women breastfed their children far longer than Dutch women and
were poorer, less well nourished, and carried a heavier burden of disease.10 There
is now good evidence that the length of postpartum amenorrhea depends on the
metabolic load the mother is carrying rather than on how frequently she nurses
her child.11 Thus it is likely that being less well-nourished, Taiwanese women
were slower to resume ovarian function than Dutch women. The result was that
Taiwanese birth intervals were half again as long as Dutch birth intervals.
Our third question raises again – in even more acute form – the possibili-
114
9. Lee and Wang, One Quarter of Humanity. 
10.Our reasons for rejecting the argument are detailed in Wolf, “Is there evidence of birth control in Late Impe-
rial China?”.
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ty of deliberate birth control. The total fertility rate of rural Taiwanese women
was nearly a fourth again that of urban Taiwanese women. A difference of this
magnitude when the women with lower fertility are urban argues for deliberate
control, but this is not the only possibility. Despite the presence in the cities of
wealthy officials, landlords, and merchants, the great majority of the urban pop-
ulation was impoverished and miserably so. Twenty-eight percent of the male
household heads in our Taipei sample were registered as cart-pullers, day labor-
ers, and coolies. Thus one possibility is that, on average, urban Taiwanese were
even poorer than rural Taiwanese. Another is that because of the prostitution
that is part of urban life in most societies, venereal diseases were more wide-
spread in the cities than in the country. Table 5 (see Appendix) shows that the
proportion of all children who were illegitimate was 29.9 percent among moth-
ers aged 15-19 and 17.4 percent among those aged 20-24. This was four times the
rate found in the countryside.
Our fourth question takes us back to Thomas Malthus, John Hajnal and
the first volume in this series. The question is so large and so contentious that
the best we can do here is to refer the reader to the papers in that volume. Suffice
it to note that they largely reject the answers offered by Malthus and Hajnal and
offer in their place answers ranging from the importance of female labor in the
European dairy industry to a difference in the bases of European and Chinese
patriarchy.12
The low pressure/high pressure contrast posits a causal chain that runs
from marriage to mortality by way of fertility and poverty. The model accounts
for the fact that general fertility was higher in rural Taiwan than in urban Taiwan
and the Netherlands, but it does not account for the fact that marital fertility was
higher in the Netherlands than rural Taiwan and higher in rural Taiwan than
urban Taiwan. What is missing is a feedback loop running from poverty to mar-
ital fertility. Thus amended the model would say that low marital fertility is the
result of high general fertility occasioned by a high marriage rate. All that would
then be needed for a complete account of our data is an explanation of why mar-
riage rates varied.
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Appendix
Table 1: Age-specific general fertility in Taiwan and the Netherlands
Age of wife 
Locality 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
Number of 
woman-years lived
Rural Taiwan 29,838 25,627 22,790 20,290 17,398 14,507
Urban Taiwan 15,467 14,128 12,706 11,774 9,617 8,135
Rural Netherlands 184 135 150 160 136 136
Urban Netherlands 1,286 1,090 976 837 860 677
Births per 1,000 
woman-years lived
Rural Taiwan 111 301 286 249 189 84
Urban Taiwan 99 210 187 158 114 48
Rural Netherlands 1 82 188 280 261 115
Urban Netherlands 3 71 201 306 278 114
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Table 2: Probability of marriage by age in Taiwan and the Netherlands
Rural Urban Rural Urban
Taiwan Taiwan Netherlands Netherlands
Age Women Mar. Women Mar. Women Mar. Women Mar.
years prob. years prob. years prob. years prob.
10 10,557 .000 3,520 .000 376 .000 132 .000
11 10,247 .000 3,440 .000 376 .000 132 .000
12 9,909 .001 3,405 .000 373 .000 130 .000
13 9,560 .007 3,325 .000 369 .000 129 .000
14 9,062 .039 3,233 .018 368 .000 129 .000
15 8,176 .119 3,033 .055 360 .000 128 .000
16 6,973 .248 2,767 .125 354 .000 127 .000
17 5,453 .421 2,433 .205 348 .006 126 .008
18 4,122 .572 2,083 .304 342 .009 121 .016
19 2,813 .743 1,601 .395 337 .018 115 .059
20 1,840 .846 1,350 .467 330 .045 109 .129
21 1,239 .905 1,157 .522 319 .075 100 .164
22 849 .938 1,024 .570 304 .117 93 .263
23 611 .953 966 .597 289 .179 82 .317
24 485 .963 883 .624 264 .251 76 .461
25 388 .969 806 .645 240 .301 60 .533
26 325 .973 727 .662 220 .355 52 .605
27 281 .975 658 .678 200 .427 44 .632
28 252 .977 604 .690 174 .497 41 .704
29 215 .979 563 .698 150 .551 32 .741
30 190 .980 518 .702 131 .627 28 .760
31 180 .981 487 .706 107 .655 25 .770
32 171 .981 447 .716 97 .670 23 .770
33 164 .982 412 .722 89 .703 23 .780
34 153 .983 374 .728 78 .738 22 .810
35 138 .983 336 .735 67 .770 19 .820
36 128 .984 310 .740 58 .786 18 .830
37 118 .984 284 .742 53 .806 16 .830
38 104 .985 273 .747 46 .806 15 .830
39 96 .985 251 .752 46 .811 14 .842
40 93 .986 224 .755 43 .811 13 .842
41 87 .986 203 .755 42 .815 13 .842
42 83 .986 187 .758 40 .825 13 .854
43 79 .986 168 .759 36 .825 12 .854
44 76 .986 147 .759 33 .835 11 .854
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Table 3: Age-specific marital fertility in Taiwan and the Netherlands
Age of wife 
Locality 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
Number of woman-years lived
Rural Taiwan 10,412 21,558 20,566 18,091 15,010 11,617
Urban Taiwan 3,335 7,968 8,557 7,950 6,660 5,284
Rural Netherlands 5 132 346 503 591 575
Urban Netherlands 8 130 420 658 780 736
Births per 1,000 woman-years lived
Rural Taiwan 295 342 304 267 208 99
Urban Taiwan 323 306 244 198 141 64
Rural Netherlands 211 462 449 354 330 150
Urban Netherlands 300 429 421 374 300 130
Table 4: Proportion of Taiwanese women unmarried at age thirty by location and number of
younger and older brothers
Number of brothers
Location No Younger 1 older 2 older 3 older
brothers brothers brother brothers brothers
only
Number of women
Urban Taiwan 501 549 465 198 111
Rural Taiwan 629 1,503 1,107 740 647 
Proportion unmarried at age thirty
Urban Taiwan 26.8 22.0 14.0 10.1 8.1
Rural Taiwan 12.9 5.1 4.3 3.8 1.9
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Table 5: Proportion of  Taiwanese children born to never married and currently unmarried
women by locality and age of mother
Age of mother
Locality 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
Number of children born
Rural Taiwan 3,276 7,632 6,641 4,985 3,241 1,195
Urban Taiwan 1,536 2,957 2,343 1,755 1,052 379
Proportion of children born to unmarried women
Rural Taiwan 6.9 3.5 3.1 3.0 4.0 3.8
Urban Taiwan 29.9 17.4 10.9 10.4 10.7 11.1

7
Group identity and 
fertility: An evaluation
of the role of religion
and ethnicity in the 
Netherlands and Taiwan
John Shepherd, 
Pan Inghai, Jan Kok,
Claudia Engel, 
Theo Engelen & 
Melissa Brown
121
Modern scholarly discussion of differences in fertility among and within human
populations was originally guided by the conviction that economic characteris-
tics were the leading factor determining fertility levels and patterns. Demo-
graphic transition theory, which provided the theoretical framework for both his-
torical and contemporary demographic research in the post-war West empha-
sized the impact of economic modernization in explaining fertility decline.1 This
scholarly consensus was challenged when members of the Princeton-based
European Fertility Project concluded that cultural influences were often more
important than economic characteristics in determining regional and temporal
variations in fertility within European countries.2 Studies of Belgium and Spain
in particular revealed that structural differences in fertility coincided with lin-
guistic barriers and thus with cultural boundaries, rather than levels of econom-
ic development. The significance of these conclusions was not restricted to coun-
tries undergoing industrialization. Societies, historical and contemporary, that
had not yet undergone fertility decline were found to exhibit fertility differences
that pointed to cultural as well as economic influences.3
The notion of non-economic determinants of fertility stems from the
observation that the populations of nation states are rarely homogeneous. The
compromises and conquests by which nations were created left within their
boundaries populations exhibiting differences in behaviour and belief that social
scientists categorize with such loose-fitting labels as “culture” and “ethnicity”.
The most frequently remarked are language, religion, and the assorted oddities
that serve to announce political loyalty.
There is no iron-clad rule that differences of this kind must affect demo-
graphic behaviour. Our purpose in this paper is to compare two very different
societies – the Netherlands in the years 1830 to 1920, and Taiwan in the years
1905-1945 – to determine whether or not the internal differences found affected
fertility. Our goal is to discover when cultural heterogeneity of the kind found in
modern nation states has demographic consequences. In other words, under
what circumstances do differences make a difference? 
The authors acknowledge that “culture” is one of the most used and least
understood concepts in historical studies. Our experience in studying these two
populations leads us to choose a pragmatic approach, rather than to engage in a
methodological and semantic discussion on the definition of “culture”. 
This pragmatic approach finds parallels in approaches to the study of eth-
nic identity, for the kinds of economic, linguistic and cultural boundaries that
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demarcate fertility differences may also define identity groups. Fredrik Barth’s
seminal work emphasizes that ethnic identity serves as a primary means of
social differentiation.4 Subsequent debate between “circumstantialists” and “pri-
mordialists” arose over whether, and to what degree, culture was the basis for
such social differentiation.5 More recently, even authors who recognize the
importance of political economic circumstances to the development of ethnic
identity have suggested that cultural meanings and practices are also relevant.6
Here, then, is another debate over the relative influences of social (including
political economic) factors compared to cultural factors. 
Rather than assume a priori that culture is the determining factor, we com-
pare marital fertility across three pairs of socially differentiating identities:
Catholics and Protestants in the 18th-19th century Netherlands, Hoklo and Hak-
ka (two Han Chinese groups) in early 20th century Taiwan, and Hoklo and plains
Aborigines (a Han and a non-Han group) in early 20th century Taiwan. Catholic
and Protestant are religious identities, not ethnic identities. However, historians
agree that they constitute clearly bounded social identities in the Netherlands
during the 19th and 20th centuries. Marriage, for example, was rare across this
social boundary. Hoklo and Hakka are sometimes called “sub-ethnic”, regional, or
speech group differences because both groups have long been considered Han
(or ethnic) Chinese. Within the category of Han, however, they also constituted
clearly bounded social identities in Taiwan in the 19th and 20th centuries. Again,
marriage was rare across the boundary. The difference between Hakka and Hok-
lo, on the one hand, and the descendants of Taiwan’s indigenous people, on the
other, were ethnic, not religious, differences. Indeed, before 1930, the indigenous
people constituted clearly bounded social identities. Intermarriage did occur, but
primarily of a stigmatized sort. After 1930 or so, however, the social boundary
between these identities disappears, and marriages occur freely across the previ-
ous boundary.7 For scholars writing on Taiwanese society, ethnicity has the same
central position in social differentiation as religion in the Netherlands.
In this paper we try to establish what differences in fertility existed
between religious and ethnic subpopulations in Taiwan and the Netherlands.
Whenever we find situations where competition between groups is strong, we
expect group identity to effect behavior significantly. McQuillan applied this
idea to the relationship between religion and demography.8 In his view three
preconditions have to be met before this relationship becomes visible. First of
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all, religious doctrines have to explicitly address (the morality of) demographic
behaviors. Furthermore, the religious organizations need to have methods at
their disposal to influence their members directly or indirectly, via, for
instance, education, print media, etc. And, lastly, the adherents must feel a
strong identification with their denomination. The last two preconditions
enable religiously defined differences to influence demographic behaviors.
Whenever denominations conflict with political authorities (as in N. Ireland)
or when denominations try to strengthen their own position versus other
denominations, group identity and the influence of religion on demographic
behavior may be reinforced. The Netherlands is an ideal country to test these
propositions, given the number of mutually demarcated religious groups. In
the Taiwanese case we asked ourselves whether McQuillan’s hypotheses
regarding “confessionalization” are applicable to fertility differences among
ethnic groups.9 Whenever possible we controlled for social and regional influ-
ences, and historical developments in our examination of differences between
the Taiwanese subpopulations. No process affecting fertility behavior analo-
gous to confessionalization occurred in the competition among ethnic groups
in Taiwan. Our findings that differences in marital fertility do correspond to
religious differences in the Netherlands but do not correspond to ethnic differ-
ences in Taiwan raise interesting questions for future research on the relation
of fertility and identity to culture and whether there are more fundamental dif-
ferences in social process between Asia and Europe than have previously been
recognized.
The origins of group identity
Religion in Dutch society
The dominant axis of social differentiation in the Netherlands until well into the
20th century was religious denomination.10 Even regional and social differences
were influenced heavily by religious affiliation. The division of the country into
distinct religious groups started in the 16th and 17th centuries, when the Dutch
fought a war of independence against the Spanish emperor, Philip II. Although
there is an ongoing discussion on whether the revolt was caused by political
(haec libertatis ergo) or religious (haec religionis ergo) motivations, it is safe to say
that Dutch Protestants rebelled against a Catholic monarch. From the end of the
revolution, with the treaty of Münster in 1648, the new Dutch Republic of the
United Provinces emphasized its Protestant character.
Even in the 19th and 20th centuries, regional variations in religious affili-
ation can be traced to this history. A line drawn from the south-west to the north-
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Table 1: Proportion of denominations in Dutch society (in percentages)
Roman Protestants Other No 
Catholics denominations denomination
Period Total Dutch Reformed Calvinists
1849 38 56 55 1 6 0
1899 35 56 48 8 6 2
1947 38 40 31 9 5 17
1960 40 37 28 9 4 18
2000 32 21 14 7 8 40
Source: Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics
east, places the majority of Catholics in the eastern and southern parts of the
country, and the majority of the Protestants in the northern and western
provinces. This line came into being during the so-called Twelve Year Truce
(1609-1621) when it separated the Protestant and Catholic forces. From 1648 the
Dutch Republic established the Reformed Church as its official denomination,
reducing the Roman-Catholics to a second-class subpopulation. The Protestant
rulers practiced a tolerance that later became an important feature of the Nether-
lands. Officially, only Dutch Reformed were allowed to worship publicly, but in
daily life the state turned a blind eye to the activities of other denominations.
Nevertheless for centuries important political and social functions were reserved
for Protestants.
The official rehabilitation of Catholic citizens started with the Dutch ver-
sion of the French Revolution in 1795, after which the preferential treatment of
Protestants was abandoned. This process gained momentum in 1853 when
Dutch Catholics restored their dioceses. During the second half of the 19th cen-
tury, a new development in Dutch society became visible. More and more, the
competition between Protestants and Catholics, and to a lesser degree Liberals
and Socialists, created a new situation that dominated all societal relations. This
process is called Verzuiling and can be translated as pillarization. Basically, this
development amounted to a strict segregation of society according to the reli-
gious or social vision of the inhabitants. Pillarization reached its peak in the first
decades of the 20th century. The result of this process was that within one coun-
try one could find several subpopulations living separate lives. When born a
Catholic, for instance, one attended a Catholic school, married a Catholic partner,
joined a Catholic labor union, and voted for the Catholic party. Even leisure activ-
ities were organized along denominational lines.
The distribution of the denominations remained almost unchanged until
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1850. The majority of the Dutch population adhered to Protestantism, but
Catholics formed a substantial minority. Other denominations were quantita-
tively negligible until the 20th century. From Table 1 we learn that around 1950
the number of Roman Catholics overtook the number of Protestants. This quan-
titative development is significant for the changing social position of the
Catholics. Pillarization resulted in a so-called emancipation process, involving
investments in better education, including the foundation of a Catholic Univer-
sity in 1923. By 1950, the social differences between Protestants and Catholics
had vanished. The second half of the 20th century witnessed also the seculariza-
tion of society. In 2000, 40% of the Dutch population was officially registered as
not belonging to a denomination. In actual practice, however, 60% of the Dutch
declared themselves to have no denominational affiliation. 
Up to this point we have treated Protestantism as a single denomination.
Protestantism in the Netherlands, however, cannot simply be brought together
under one label. The Dutch Reformed Church harbors various streams, ranging
from the very liberal to the very fundamentalist. In 1843, and again in 1886, two
major divisions took place. In both cases large numbers of Orthodox Calvinists left
the Dutch Reformed Church, which had become – in their eyes – too “modern”. In
1849, this group consisted of only 1% of the Protestant population, but by 1899
8% of all Protestants were members of one of the secessionist churches. However,
a large group of Orthodox Protestants remained within the broad Reformed
Church. Because of the democratic character of this church, the separate commu-
nities are relatively independent. The process of secularization in the 20th century
affected Orthodox Calvinists both within and outside the Reformed Church to a
lesser degree than Catholics and the liberal segments of the Dutch Reformed.
As already mentioned these three major denominations in the Nether-
lands constituted clearly segregated subpopulations with their own way of life.
This social segregation becomes evident, among other things, when we study
their demographic behavior. Time and again, research into the demography of
the Dutch has concluded that Roman Catholics adhered to a traditional interpre-
tation of marriage and reproduction. Restrictions on marriage to non-Catholics
remained strong until 1960. Also, the prohibition of all forms of contraception
kept Catholic marital fertility at a very high level, even when compared to
Catholics in neighboring countries. Dutch Reformed couples, on the other hand,
adopted “modern” reproductive behavior to a much greater degree and at an ear-
lier date. Calvinists took an intermediate position, although closer to the
Catholics.11 Most of the studies referred to, however, were conducted on the basis
of aggregated data. This paper will use individual level data to demonstrate the
influence of denomination on reproductive behavior.
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Ethnic variation in Taiwan
In the Taiwanese case, ethnic groups were not distinguished by differences of
religion; popular Confucianism uniformly emphasized the value of children,
especially sons. We, therefore, turn to another possibly “cultural” influence. The
late imperial Chinese empire encompassed great ethnic diversity. The Han
majority – called “ethnic Chinese” by most Westerners – with seven mutually
unintelligible Chinese “dialects”12 as well as documented regional variation in
marriage practices13 and political economy14 displayed at least as much ethnic
and linguistic diversity as western Europe. Non-Han ethnic groups, speaking
languages distantly (if at all) related to Chinese and practicing their own cus-
toms, constituted the local majority in many parts of the Chinese empire, espe-
cially in border regions. In early 20th-century Taiwan, membership in two Han
and two non-Han ethnic groups was still a salient determiner of social status and
group membership. 
Southern-Min-speaking Han migrants and their descendants dominated
Taiwanese society, demographically and politically. Most came from Changchou
and Ch’uanchou, two southeastern prefectures of Fukien province. In Taiwan,
Min-speaking Han called themselves “Hoklo”, the term we use here, and most
were entered into the household registers as “Fukienese”. (Min-speaking Han in
other parts of southeast Asia called themselves “Hokkien,” a term also used to
refer to Taiwanese Hoklo. ) K’e-chia-speaking Han migrants and their descen-
dants, known as “Hakka”, constituted a significant Han minority in Taiwan.
Most came from Chiayingchou, and Huichou, prefectures in northern Kwang-
tung province, and were entered into the registers as “Kwangtungese”. 
The Han classifications that appear in the Taiwan household registers as
“race” or provenance (tsung-tsu) – fu (for Fukien province) and kuang (for Kwang-
tung province) – can serve as approximate ethnic indicators. However, because
they actually indicate the province of ancestral origin of an individual’s pre-
sumed biological father (or birth mother, if the father was unknown), there are
two important qualifications to bear in mind. First, two small groups of Han
cross-cut the correspondence between provincial origin and ethno-linguistic
group (see table 2). Most significant was a small group of Min-speakers who
came from the lowland, coastal areas of Kwangtung provinces’ Chaochou prefec-
ture; they appear in the registers as “Kwangtungese”. A much smaller group of
K’e-chia speakers, who came from Tingchou prefecture in Fukien, appear in the
registers as “Fukienese”. It is not possible from the registers to distinguish indi-
vidual members of these crosscutting groups, though local histories preserve the
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presence or absence of such populations. None of the household register sites is
included among those townships where significant numbers of Tingchou and
Chaochou residents are located. A second qualification about these approximate
ethnic categories is that they do not indicate the ethno-linguistic classification
individuals experienced in social interaction. Rather registered provenance was
assigned at birth on the basis of father’s provenance. Adoptions across these cat-
egories, especially of girls, were common and readily identifiable in the registers.
The many Austronesian-speaking indigenous peoples or Aborigines of
Taiwan have long been categorized into two broad groups which reflect their
relationship with Han peoples. (“Aborigine” is the preferred English appellation
of the Alliance of Taiwan Aborigines.) The Japanese-period household registers,
following late imperial Chinese practice, use the pejorative labels of “civilized
barbarians” (shu-fan) and “wild barbarians” (sheng-fan); the same groups are now
politely referred to as “plains Aborigines” (ping-p’u tsu, or “Pepo”, lit. “plains
tribes”) and “mountain Aborigines” (kao-shan tsu, lit. “mountain tribes”). The
mountain peoples include at least nine ethno-linguistic groups with several
thousand years’ occupation of Taiwan’s high central mountains, narrow eastern
plains, and islands off the southeastern coast. Many of these peoples defended
their political independence into the Japanese-period and consequently are not
well represented in the registers. The many plains peoples, divided among more
than ten distinct ethno-linguistic groups, came early under Chinese political
authority and cultural influence.15 The 17th-century Dutch ranked their primary
allies of the southwestern plains, called the Siraya, as the most important of the
Aborigines. Han colonization from the 17th through late 19th centuries made
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Table 2: The population of Taiwan by language in daily use and provenance, 1915
Language in Provenance
daily use* Fukien Kwangtung Plains Aborigine
Hoklo (S. Min) 2,744,566 99.7% 70,543 14.7% 41,281 86.6%
Hakka (Ke-chia) 6,806 0.2% 407,542 85.2% 766 1.6%
Bango (aborigine) 657 0 % 272 0.1% 5,612 11.8%
Census of 1915, shukei gempyo, zento no bu; Table 10, p.1158-59. A few speakers of Japanese and other Chinese
languages are not shown in this table. 
* The language classification is clarified in SPCF, p. 95; see also Hashimoto, The Itakka Dialect, 24 on the use of
“Kwangtungese” for Hakka dialect in Japanese publications in Taiwan. 
Table reprinted from Shepherd, ”Demographic Studies of Plains Aborigines ”.
the Aborigines a minority demographically and politically. By 1905, though
many if not most had adopted Han language (Southern Min) and many customs,
plains Aborigines were still referred to as “savages” (fan-tsu, T. hoan-a) by their
Han neighbors and distinguished in the registers as “civilized” (shu).16
During the frontier era, the various Han and non-Han ethnic distinctions
had political-economic significance. Han colonists’ reliance on hometown ties as
important elements of networks for mutual aid and defense resulted in communi-
ties largely residentially segregated by speech group and provenance. Such ties
were often cemented in worship groups and networks of temples devoted to
patron deities identified with particular hometowns on the mainland.17 These wor-
ship groups, however, did not develop sectarian ideologies, clerical hierarchies, or
a role as exclusive “denominations” in the way Protestant and Catholic groups did
in Europe. Rivalry and mutual suspicion among these settler groups frequently
led to violent conflicts between communities.18 Weak imperial government con-
trol on the frontier meant these conflicts often escalated out of control (anti-dynas-
tic rebel groups occasionally fanned the flames), and had to be suppressed by mil-
itary campaigns and reinforcements of government troops from the mainland.19
Hakka and plains Aborigine militia often joined government troops to put down
rebellious Hoklo, though occasionally some plains Aborigines joined the rebels.
(When the rebels were Changchou Hoklo, then Ch’uanchou Hoklo communities
often joined the government side as well.) Repeated conflicts reinforced the inter-
nal solidarity and residential segregation of the settler groups, so that ethnic
enclaves came to dominate large swaths of territory. 
By the late 19th century, such communal strife had largely ended, though
the geographic distribution of ethnic groups through the mid-20th century still
reflected the earlier hostilities. The Hakka population was concentrated in two
main areas of Taiwan: the northwestern plains and foothills in Hsin-chu and in
southwestern Taiwan along the eastern edge of the Pingtung plain. At the begin-
ning of the 20th century, pockets of plains Aborigine concentration occurred in
several locations (south, central and north) on the western plains, in the Puli
basin of the central mountains, and on the northeastern plain near Yilan. 
These ethno-linguistic distinctions are widely assumed to correspond to
crucial cultural differences, continuing from the imperial period into the pres-
ent. In the early 20th century, Hoklo and Hakka spoke mutually unintelligible
languages.20 However, they shared fundamental Han practices and beliefs,
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including patrilineal ancestor worship, Confucian-justified parental authority,
equal property inheritance among brothers, and folk religion.21 Beyond lan-
guage, Hakka were reputed to be different from Hoklo – and from most Han
groups – in granting women a higher position in family life, with women pur-
portedly contributing as much or possibly more labor than Hakka men to the
family.22 Such conclusions primarily derive from the easily observable difference
that – before the Japanese colonial government suppressed footbinding through-
out Taiwan in 1915 – Hakka, unlike Hoklo, did not bind their daughters’ feet. 
Shepherd demonstrates from census reports that by the time they were
adults, more than 90 percent of all women registered as Fukienese (mostly Hoklo
women) had bound feet and that the 1.64 percent of Kwangtungese women with
bound feet were most likely Min-speakers from Chaochou.23 Although the lack of
footbinding surely led to higher expectations of field and heavy manual labor con-
tributions from girls and women among Hakka than among Hoklo, it does not
necessarily follow that the Hakka gender system was any less patriarchal. Hakka,
like Hoklo, did not raise a surplus of daughters, giving  girls out in adoptions for
minor marriages and reportedly practicing female infanticide.24 Evidence from
the household registers shows that Hakka and Hoklo marriage and adoption pat-
terns were very similar, suggesting that Hakka women had no more control over
their fertility than Hoklo women, an implication we explore further here.25
Did ethnic distinctions between Hoklo and plains Aborigines correspond
to crucial cultural differences in the early 20th century? In the 17th century,
plains Aborigine ethno-linguistic groups showed dramatic cultural differences
from Han – including matrilineal inheritance and gender systems with related
“casual” attitudes about sexual relations, and other differences in courtship, mar-
riage, divorce, and remarriage as well as language, religion, and subsistence;
some of these differences, diminished in degree, were still noted by late nine-
teenth century missionaries.26 By 1900, most remaining cultural differences
were not readily observable.27 Plains Aborigines were native speakers of South-
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ern Min and practiced commercial Hoklo-style agriculture, including sugarcane
and wet paddy rice (where conditions allowed). They used Han forms of mar-
riage – Shepherd argues in largely the same frequencies (excepting minor mar-
riage) as neighboring Hoklo; Brown argues in ethnically differentiated frequen-
cies prior to the 1920s.28 Funerary practices, linkage of inheritance of property to
surnames, and patterns of adoption followed Hoklo patterns. Though differ-
ences in burial practices and women’s use of betel and alcohol existed, the most
visible difference between Hoklo and plains Aborigines was that Hoklo bound
their daughters’ feet and plains Aborigines did not. In 1905, only 0.5 percent of
females registered as plains Aborigines had bound feet. As with the Hakka, lack
of footbinding among plains Aborigines – especially when combined with evi-
dence for 17th-century matrilineal inheritance – might lead to the assumption
that plains Aborigine women in the 20th century had more status and power in
the family than Hoklo women did. Such assumptions are problematic.29
Elderly people interviewed in the study sites of T’ou-she (in Ta-nei) and
Chi-pei reported that, in the early 20th century, footbinding served as the mark-
er distinguishing Hoklo from plains Aborigines.30 (There were no Hakka in this
area.) Brown argues that the colonial government’s suppression of footbinding
created a context which allowed plains Aborigines in T’ou-she and Chi-pei to
acquire Hoklo identity around 1930, an identity she argues they maintained
until the mid-1990s.31 Except for religious worship of one or more Aborigine
deities32, which have been maintained through the present, remaining differ-
ences in customs between these and neighboring Hoklo communities disap-
peared over the course of the 20th century.33 In sum, ethnic distinctions between
Hoklo, Hakka, and plains Aborigines were politically important in the 17th
through 19th centuries, and these distinctions are often assumed to correspond
to important cultural differences throughout the 20th century.
Data
For the Dutch case, we combine six datasets in this paper. The first one is drawn
from the Historical Sample of the Netherlands, a large database still under con-
struction that will eventually contain more than 70.000 life courses. The data-
base is built from a random sample (0.5%) in the Dutch birth certificates of 1812-
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1922, linking and entering all information in both the civil registers (birth, mar-
riage and death certificates) and the continuous population registers which start-
ed in 1850. Their complete life courses were reconstructed by following them in
all their successive places of residence.34 We use the first, more or less complet-
ed, part of this database that covers the province of Utrecht. We limit the analysis
to married persons in their first marriage (N=785). Their birthplaces were evenly
spread over the urban and rural parts of the province. 
The second dataset is built from a marriage cohort in one North-Holland
village (1830-1879). All first-marrying couples (N=280) in Akersloot, an agricul-
tural community about thirty kilometres to the northwest of Amsterdam, were
traced in their migration trajectories. Akersloot was an ordinary North-Holland
village, except for the fact that its continuous population registers started in
1830. The third dataset is drawn from a small – but extremely labor-intensive –
family reconstruction in the city of Amsterdam (1820-1850). This database, orig-
inally intended as a three-generation study of poor relief recipients, consists of
84 families. The fourth dataset consists of married women born in the city of
Rotterdam between 1872 and 1902 (N=599). Their life courses have been traced
in the context of an epidemiological study. The women were originally selected
by taking a sample from Rotterdam birth certificates. A number of them are part
of the Historical Sample of the Netherlands.35 Their fertility histories were recon-
structed even after they had left the city. Finally, we make use of two datasets col-
lected in the provincial town of Nijmegen and the proto-industrial village of
Borne. Both datasets contain marriages contracted in the 19th century, 332 for
Nijmegen and 285 for Borne.
Previous research on Dutch fertility has demonstrated convincingly that
Roman Catholics and – to a slightly lesser extent – Orthodox Protestants rejected
modern forms of birth control. Thus, at least from the late nineteenth-century
onwards, Roman Catholics and those Orthodox Protestants that could be easily
identified as such (Gereformeerden) displayed higher levels of marital fertility than
people without a religion or people belonging to the Dutch Reformed Church. The
“modern” behavior of the aggregated Dutch Reformed has been ascribed to the
dominance of liberal groups within the Reformed Church. The province of
Utrecht, especially its southeastern part, is one of the heartlands of fundamental-
ism within the Reformed Church. Surprisingly, this fact has been ignored in an
earlier analysis of the relationship between religion and fertility in this province.36 
How can we distinguish between liberal and Orthodox Protestant individu-
als? The censuses and populations registers simply count individual Reformed
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fundamentalists as Dutch Reformed. However, the religious orientation of the
church ministers is known. In 1920, all ministers in 33 Utrecht municipalities
belonged to the Orthodox “confessionelen” or to the “Gereformeerde Bonders”.37 Since
communities chose their own ministers, it can be assumed that these communi-
ties were Orthodox in the nineteenth century. We hypothesize that Dutch
Reformed individuals who were born in such a predominantly Orthodox commu-
nity were likely to be Orthodox themselves. In the category “Orthodox Protestants”
we have combined them with members of the various Calvinist secessionist
churches. In addition, individuals belonging to evangelical movements (e.g. Salva-
tion Army, Baptists etcetera) were assigned to this category. Finally, couples were
put in this category when at least one of the partners was Orthodox. 
We have combined various liberal denominations into one category. This
“liberal Protestant” group consists of the Dutch Reformed, except for those likely
to be Orthodox. In addition, we include the Mennonites, the Lutherans and the
Remonstrants. In our view, a mixed marriage, in particular one between a Protes-
tant and a Catholic can be interpreted as a sign of moderate religiousness. Thus,
our fourth category consists of mixed couples. Persons belonging to other groups
(such as Jews, and Catholic secessionists), persons without a denomination and
persons whose religion was unknown were not included in our analysis.
Household registers from four Taiwanese localities have been selected for use in
this paper. Two sites come from southwestern Taiwan, Ta-nei, which has a
majority Hoklo population but also a significant plains Aborigine minority, and
Chi-pei which has a plains Aborigine majority population. Many people classify
the plains Aborigines of Ta-nei and Chi-pei as related to the Siraya ethno-linguis-
tic group identified by the Dutch in the 17th century.38 Our third site, Chu-pei,
located in the northwestern county of Hsiu-chu, had a population evenly divided
between a Hoklo area (Ch’iu-k’ang) and a Hakka area (Liu-chia). The fourth site,
Lu-kang, a small town on the central western coast of Taiwan, is predominantly
Hoklo. These four sites thus contain representatives of three of the four main
ethnic groups of Taiwanese society, and provide a total of six locality/ethnic
groups for comparison (Ta-nei Hoklo, Ta-nei plains Aborigines, Chi-pei plains
Aborigines, Chu-pei Hoklo, Chu-pei Hakka, and Lu-kang Hoklo). We will also
draw on previous studies of household registers from the communities of Lung-
tu, a Hakka area in southern Taiwan, Chung-she, a Hoklo village located not far
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from Ta-nei and Chi-pei in southwestern Taiwan, and Haishan, a Hoklo area in
the T’ai-pei basin, in northern Taiwan.39
Hypotheses
In the Netherlands the study of the influence of religion on fertility has been
concentrated heavily on the period during and after the onset of the fertility
decline. According to these studies the differences between a “traditional” men-
tality ascribed to the Roman Catholics and Orthodox Protestants and a “modern”
or “liberal” mentality ascribed to the Dutch Reformed led to a difference in the
pace in which modern forms of birth control were accepted.40 For a long time,
“traditional” groups rejected modern forms of birth control and continued to rely
on the Malthusian methods of late marriage and celibacy. On the other hand, lib-
eral Protestants and persons without a religion were more prone to accept the
innovation of parity specific birth control. Why should we also expect differential
fertility behavior before the transition?
Three reasons lead us to expect that differences between religious groups
affected fertility. First, the prudential restraint demanded from pretransitional
couples (no premarital sex and waiting with marriage until economic independ-
ence had been achieved) may have varied among religious communities. Both
Catholics and Calvinists secured high levels of conformity to the required level of
“morality” with mechanisms of social control, such as public shaming of pregnant
brides. On the other hand, in the Dutch Reformed Church these mechanisms had
become obsolete by the first half of the 19th century. Indeed, there were conspicu-
ous differences in the levels of bridal pregnancy and illegitimacy between
Catholics and Calvinists (Gereformeerden) on the one hand, and Dutch Reformed
on the other.41 Couples that had their first child earlier than other couples, either
because of a premarital conception or not, were likely to have a larger family size. 
Secondly, religious groups differed in breastfeeding practices. For in-
stance, an individual-level enquiry in The Hague in 1908 showed that Catholics
practiced less breastfeeding than Protestants (and both groups less than Jews).42
The reluctance of Catholic mothers to breastfeed their infants has been associat-
ed with the relatively high infant mortality among Catholic children in the sec-
ond half of the 19th century.43 Shorter birth intervals in Catholic families were
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another effect, even apart from the death of the previous infant.44 The rejection
of breastfeeding among the Catholics has been ascribed to the extraordinary
prudishness the priests insisted upon. In fact, after 1850 the clergy started a cam-
paign against breastfeeding on the ground that exposing the breasts was some-
thing shameful. 
Thirdly, differences in (religious) mentality may result in differential
behavior of couples with respect to discussing and applying conscious means of
regulating fertility. Before 1900, the most important means of limiting the pace
of childbearing were withdrawal and abstinence.45 For some couples, the appli-
cation of these means may have resulted in earlier stopping with childbearing.
The Reformation has often been associated with rationalist and pragmatic atti-
tudes. According to McQuillan, “(...) Protestantism encouraged individuals to
accept responsibility for handling the problems of everyday life”.46 This Weber-
ian view has found occasional support in historical demography.47 However,
Dutch Calvinists tended to submit themselves to God’s will to the same extent as
the Roman Catholics. For instance, in the early 19th century, both Catholic and
Orthodox Protestant villages were very reluctant to adopt vaccination against
smallpox. On the other hand, liberal Protestant denominations like the Mennon-
ites took the lead in this respect.48 The official doctrines of the Reformed Church
were much less uniform in their rejection of individual control of fertility than
Calvinist and Catholic ones.49 This may have given liberal Protestants even more
leeway to experiment with forms of fertility control.
There is no established literature documenting a consistent pattern of ethnic dif-
ference in fertility among the Taiwanese ethnic groups. Rather, there are isolated
speculations in the literature that assert or by their logic imply fertility differ-
ences for these ethnic groups. We grouped these speculations into three
hypotheses. 
The first is what we term the footbinding hypothesis. It is premised on the
well-known fact that unlike other Han women, Hakka women did not bind their
feet and worked in the fields and sometimes on construction jobs. The hypothe-
sis envisions two possibilities, both of which predict lower fertility among the
Hakka than among the Hoklo. The first is that heavy labor depleted Hakka
women’s child-bearing capacity. The second is that the contribution they made to
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the family economy enhanced Hakka’ women’s status vis à vis their husbands
and parents-in-law. Compared then with Hoklo women who bound their feet and
were limited to domestic tasks, Hakka women were in a better position to limit
their fertility when they desired doing so. The same hypothesis applies to plains
Aborigine women who also did not bind their feet, in contrast to Hoklo women. 
Our second hypothesis is the natural fertility hypothesis. It stems from the
assumption that because of cultural preferences and concern for old age securi-
ty, none of the groups we are comparing wanted to limit their fertility. Fertility
was “natural” in the sense that there was no deliberate fertility control. The
hypothesis predicts that the fertility of the three groups followed Louis Henry’s
natural fertility pattern at roughly the same level. Differences in level will be
attributable to differences in premarital sexual relations, age at marriage, breast-
feeding, and infant mortality. They will not be attributable to cultural prefer-
ences, the position of women, or differences in the economic value of children. 
Our third hypothesis we term the standard of living hypothesis. It stems
from the fact that the Siraya plains Aborigines in Ta-nei were demonstrably poor-
er than both their Hoklo neighbors in Ta-nei and their fellow plains Aborigines
in Chi-pei. What the hypothesis predicts depends on what one assumes about
the relative effects of infant mortality and poor nutrition on fertility. While pover-
ty may raise fertility by raising infant mortality and thus shortening birth inter-
vals, it can also lower fertility by reducing fecundability and lowering the propor-
tion of all conceptions that result in a live birth. 
Findings for the Netherlands
For reasons mentioned above we divided the analysis of the Dutch data into two
parts: one dealing with the period before the fertility decline, (women born
before 1860), and the period of the decline itself as found in the fertility of
women born after 1860. In Table 3 we first look at the onset of procreation of
women born before 1860. To what extent did religious groups differ in “start-
ing”? Village reconstitutions have shown that the age at marriage of both men
and women of religious minorities was higher than those of the majority groups.
In these villages the Orthodox Protestants, the practicing members of the
Reformed Church and the Roman Catholics married at higher ages than the
non-practicing members of the Dutch Reformed Church. This was explained by
the difficulty members of minority groups encountered in finding a spouse
resulting in a longer period of waiting.50 However, we can also assume that
mechanisms of social control were more effective in Orthodox and Catholic com-
munities, both with respect to delaying marriage and preventing premarital sex-
uality that could bring forward the wedding. Table 3, however, does not yield
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unambiguous conclusions. Women from both Protestant groups (Liberals and
Orthodox) married earlier than the Catholics – a difference of roughly two years,
which can probably be ascribed to their much higher levels of premarital preg-
nancies. Overall, pregnant brides married 2,7 years younger than non-pregnant
brides. The compliance of Orthodox Protestant couples to their churches’ insis-
tence on sexual purity seems oddly at variance with premarital “licence”. Indeed,
a high incidence of premarital pregnancies was conspicuous among certain
pietist sections within Dutch Orthodoxy.51 Interestingly, the religiously mixed
couples displayed a combination of both late marriage and high levels of pre-
marital pregnancies.
Obviously, premarital pregnancies effect marital fertility. The concentra-
tion of such “forced marriages” in particular age groups biases the calculation of
the Age Specific Marital Fertility Rates (asmfr) because the period “at risk” of
conception after the wedding is shorter than in age groups with a lower inci-
dence of pregnant brides. Thus, the denominator is smaller and the asmfr high-
er. We solve this problem following a procedure developed by Wilson.52 We cal-
culate the mean intervals between marriage and first births in the case of preg-
nant and non-pregnant brides. Then we add the difference between these inter-
vals (generally about a year) to the period at risk of the pregnant brides. Figure 1
presents the asmfr by religious group. It shows that the fertility rates of the
Roman Catholics and Orthodox Protestants were very close to the natural fertili-
ty standard as depicted in Xie’s index (see also Kok, Yang and Hsieh in this vol-
ume). Liberal Protestant and mixed couples had markedly lower levels although
the convex shape of their curves suggest that they did not practice parity-specific
fertility limitation on a large scale.
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Table 3: Age at first child and percentage born within seven months after the marriage, 
by religion of the couple. Mothers born before 1860, the Netherlands
Age at first birth: Percentage of first N
Mother born children born within 
before 1860 seven months
Husband and wife both liberal Protestant 26.8 23.0 305
Husband and wife both Roman Catholic 28.9 10.8 379
Husband and wife both Orthodox Protestant 26.9 29.9 67
Mixed Catholic-Protestant marriages 29.1 30.3 33
In the contribution of Kok, Yang and Hsieh to this volume it is demonstrated
that the birth intervals of Roman Catholics and Orthodox Protestant couples
were shorter than those of liberal Protestant couples even after controlling for
the death of the previous infant. Similar results have been reached in other
recent studies.53 Longer intervals, leading to lower asmfr, may result from either
prolonged breastfeeding or from deliberate efforts among – at least a number of
– couples to limit the pace of their childbearing. Deliberate spacing has been
associated with the desire of working-class couples to prevent the mother from
being burdened with too many young children and thus reducing her income-
earning capacities.54
Figure 1 has already disclosed that massive parity-specific stopping behav-
ior did not take place in this early cohort. However, table 4 shows that among
“completed” marriage those with strict creeds stopped child bearing later than
more lenient ones. Although moderate, this kind of stopping behavior seems to
have preceded the more conspicuous differences between the religions during
and after the fertility transition.
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Figure 1: Age specific marital fertility rates, women born before 1860, by religion of couple
Table 5: Total age specific marital fertility rates, percentages of infant and child mortality and
number of children surviving to at least age five, by religion of the couple. Mothers born
before 1860, the Netherlands
Total age % infant % child Surviving N com-
specific mar- mortality mortality children pleted 
ital fertility marriages
(20-49)
Both liberal Protestant 8.04 17.7 10.1 4.54 217
Both Roman Catholic 8.89 18.4 12.1 4.36 268
Orthodox Protestant 8.93 15.0 13.7 5.23 44
Mixed Catholic- 7.07 14.4 13.0 3.79 24
Protestant
Surviving children counted in completed marriages, mother at least 45 years.
Table 4: Age at last child, by religion of the couple, mothers born before 1860, The Netherlands
Age at last child N
Both liberal Protestant 39.1 220
Both Roman Catholic 40.4 273
Orthodox Protestant 40.2 45
Mixed Catholic-Protestant 39.2 25
Completed marriages, mother at least 45 years.
As we have seen, the asmfr of Catholic and Orthodox Protestant women were
similar. In both groups women who married at age 20 and remained married
until age fifty, would have experienced an average of 8.9 childbirths (see table 4).
However, the actual family sizes of couples were much smaller, due to late start-
ing and infant mortality. The Roman Catholics exhibit the largest difference
between their “hypothetical family size” and their actual family size. Not only did
they marry later (see table 3), they also experienced relatively high levels of infant
and child mortality. Thus, they ended up with smaller families than the Protes-
tants. Obviously, this situation would change the moment sanitary improve-
ments reduced infant mortality as they did from the 1880s onwards.
We now move to the last quarter of the 19th century, when Dutch repro-
duction changed dramatically. Although the fertility of the country remained
very high until 1960, when compared to Belgium and Germany, fertility decline
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clearly started much earlier. Figure 2 offers an impression of the magnitude of
the change. Married women born before 1860 had an asmfr just below Xie’s
index for natural fertility. Roman Catholic women between age 25 and 34 even
reached a fertility level that surpassed the index. Clearly, all categories of women
born after 1860 took part in the fertility decline.
The fertility of all denominations in this later period is much lower than
Xie’s index, and the Dutch population seems to be divided in two subgroups.
Roman Catholics and orthodox Protestants are characterized by relatively high
fertility – the conservative doctrine prohibiting contraceptive practices seems to
have worked – while Liberal Protestants and mixed marriages have limited their
fertility significantly. They already display the concave shaped asmfr that is
indicative of parity specific birth control.
The asmfr does not inform us of the starting and stopping behavior of the
couples included in our analysis. Still, the total fertility realized is the result of
the asmfr combined with the ages at which women start and end their repro-
ductive career. From Table 6 we learn that among Catholics and orthodox Protes-
tants marriage restriction was maintained relatively late. Their age at first child-
birth was two years higher than among the mixed couples, considered to be rela-
tively independent from church doctrines. Examining age at last birth, again we
find striking differences. Although all women studied seem to stop having chil-
dren some ten years before biological fecundity ends, this is clearly more the
case for liberal Protestants and mixed marriages than for Roman Catholics. In
the end, then, the period in their life span that was dedicated to reproduction dif-
140 Figure 2: Age specific marital fertility rates, women born after 1860, by religion of couple
Table 6: Age at first and last child, reproductive period and surviving children by religion of
the couple. Mothers born after 1860, the Netherlands
Age at first Age at last Reproductive Number of
child child period children sur-
viving to age 5
Both liberal Protestant 25.7 33.1 7.4 3.24
Both Roman Catholic 26.4 35.6 9.2 4.28
Orthodox Protestant 26.5 35.2 8.7 4.18
Mixed Catholic-Protestant 24.5 32.9 8.4 3.41
fered markedly. Roman Catholic women used their reproductive possibilities
almost two years longer than their liberal Protestant colleagues.
When we look at the number of children surviving until age 5, we find
completed family size closely related to reproductive period. The order from
high to low number of children is exactly as described already in many studies:
Roman Catholic, Orthodox Protestant, Mixed Catholic-Protestant and Liberal
Protestant. The social and economic development of Dutch society in the period
studied now is evident. In the cohort of women born before 1860, completed
family size was heavily influenced by infant and childhood mortality. When san-
itary improvements reduced mortality at young ages markedly, completed family
size much more closely reflected the asmfr and reproductive period. 
Findings for Taiwan
Total marital fertility 
To create samples as ethnically homogeneous as possible, we restrict group
membership to married women who had both a birth mother and spouse whose
registered provenance/ethnicity was not known to differ from their own (which
almost always followed the registered provenance of the father). Women adopted
by a foster parent were included in the group of the foster parent if they married
a spouse whose registered provenance did not differ from that of the foster par-
ent. Thus individuals who were the product of mixed marriages, or who married
across ethnic lines have been excluded from the samples used to test for ethnic
differences in this paper. To be sure, mixed marriages deserve study in their own
right, but for the present paper it was thought that comparison of homogeneous
groups would be most likely to bring out cultural differences. 
Analysis of ethnic differences in marriage patterns in Taiwan is compli-
cated by the important effect the form of marriage has on the standard demo-
graphic measures. We distinguish three main categories of marriage: major,
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minor and uxorilocal. Major marriages are those that bring an adult bride into
the home of an adult groom. Major marriages are the culturally ideal and most
prestigious form of marriage in the Chinese kinship system as it was practiced
in Taiwan. Minor marriages were those that result from the adoption of a young
girl at an early age for the purpose of matching her to her foster parents’ son.
Such marriages are also known as little daughter-in-law marriages. Both the
major and the minor marriage forms are viri-patrilocal, in that they result in res-
idence of the married couple in the groom’s parents’ household. The third type is
uxorilocal marriage, which brings a groom into the household of his bride’s par-
ents. Uxorilocal marriages are attractive alternatives for parents who have failed
to raise an adult male heir; by bringing in a son-in-law for a daughter, parents
can extend their family through the daughter’s sons. 
In a large corpus of work combining ethnographic studies and data from
the household registers, Wolf has documented important demographic differ-
ences among the forms of marriage in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.55
Minor marriages when the age at adoption is very young had lower fertility, high-
er rates of adultery and divorce, and earlier ages at marriage than major and uxo-
rilocal marriages. Uxorilocal marriages had higher rates of divorce and higher
male age at marriage than major marriages. Because of the influence such dif-
ferences may have on fertility, form of marriage must be controlled for in our
comparisons of ethnic and locality groups. 
We begin our exploration of differences in fertility by comparing the summary
measure of total marital fertility (tmfr) for our six locality and ethnic groups. See
Figure 3 and 4. They say that consistent differences between the six groups do
not exist. In both cohorts the Chi-pei Plains Aborigines and Ta-nei Plains Abo-
rigines have both the highest and lowest fertility.
Does the conclusion that there are no significant differences between ethnic
groups hold when we differentiate form of marriage? (See Table 7) In all the groups
major marriage is the most frequent form, and among the Han minor marriages
are, excepting Ta-nei, more frequent than uxorilocal marriages. Minor marriages
were rare among the two Plains Aborigine groups and are omitted for that reason.
We divide the sample into two cohorts, one born before 1/1/1896 and
one born after 1/1/1896. Both the early and later born cohorts are sizeable,
come close to constituting halves of the total sample, and contain some women
whose births were fully observed for their entire reproductive period. Fertility
rates are known to have risen and mortality to have fallen over the period the
registers were compiled, from 1906 to 1946.56 We control for the composi-
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tional and period effects by dividing our sample into birth cohorts who experi-
enced similar rates of fertility and mortality as they aged. Distinguishing the
two cohorts also enables us to detect changes in the behavior of our compari-
son groups over time. If ethnic-cultural factors effected fertility levels among
our groups, these effects should endure temporal changes that are not them-
selves cultural. 
Table 7 presents the number of births, persons years, and the total marital
fertility rates for our locality and ethnicity groups by form of marriage for the two
cohorts. For all groups and forms of marriage total marital fertility increased sig-
143Table 7: Total marital fertility of women born before and after 1/1/1896 by locality, ethnicity
and marriage type
Locality and ethnicity Women born before 1/1/1896 Women born after 1/1/1896
Births Person tmfr Births Person tmfr
Years 15-49 Years 15-49
Ta-nei Hoklo 3540 19353 6.67 5983 19942 7.95
Ta-nei Hoklo Major 3012 16554 6.70 4797 15948 7.88
Ta-nei Hoklo Uxor 372 1975 6.90 863 2794 8.60
Ta-nei Hoklo Minor 156 824 6.17 323 1201 7.02
Ta-nei PA 467 2878 6.37 807 2578 8.37
Ta-nei PA Major 384 2451 6.29 619 1954 8.20
Ta-nei PA Uxor 75 389 7.03 175 578 8.79
Chi-pei PA 621 2848 8.14 635 1829 9.21
Chi-pei PA Major 519 2456 7.83 477 1353 9.20
Chi-pei PA Uxor 92 356 8.44 139 375 10.48
Chu-pei Hoklo 1324 8335 6.59 2532 8594 8.11
Chu-pei Hoklo Major 777 4571 7.10 1678 5440 8.53
Chu-pei Hoklo Uxor 168 857 7.59 266 852 8.01
Chu-pei Hoklo Minor 379 2907 5.32 588 2302 7.10
Chu-pei Hakka 1641 9946 6.26 2619 9276 7.82
Chu-pei Hakka Major 935 5701 6.45 1678 5714 8.18
Chu-pei Hakka Uxor 162 915 6.98 277 811 9.07
Chu-pei Hakka Minor 544 3330 5.87 664 2751 6.89
Lu-kang Hoklo 1775 10462 6.49 3002 10214 8.19
Lu-kang Hoklo Major 1272 7548 6.63 2267 7501 8.33
Lu-kang Hoklo Uxor 169 971 6.55 242 810 8.65
Lu-kang Hoklo Minor 334 1943 6.10 493 1902 7.29
nificantly from the earlier to the later born cohort, which suggests a significant
impact from improvements in health and nutrition by the latter part of the
Japanese period, a topic beyond the scope of this paper. 
We direct our attention first to the major marriages among the plains Abo-
rigines. The Chi-pei plains Aborigines had the highest total marital fertility in
both cohorts, while the Ta-nei plains Aborigines had the lowest in the earlier
born cohort and one of the lowest in the later born cohort. The age specific rates
show that the rates for the Chi-pei plains Aborigines are significantly higher than
those for Ta-nei especially from age 30. Interestingly the fertility of the Ta-nei
plains Aborigines fell below that of the Ta-nei Hoklo in the early cohort and sur-
passed them in the later cohort, when the Ta-nei Hoklo ranked lowest. The sharp
contrast between the Chi-pei and the Ta-nei plains Aborigines suggests that the
level of fertility in these groups owes little to shared cultural factors (female sta-
tus, gender division of labor, courtship practices, etc.), and much more to factors
affecting health, nutrition, standard of living, and disease, etc. 
The “footbinding” hypothesis that predicts plains aborigine women to
have lower fertility than Hoklo, is controverted by the Chi-pei fertility rate in both
cohorts and the Ta-nei plains aborigine fertility rate in the later born cohort. The
Siraya cultural premises that we speculated might have lowered natural fertility
also appear not to have had much impact on the Chi-pei plains Aborigines. 
The “standard of living” hypothesis is initially confirmed by the higher fer-
tility of the Chi-pei plains Aborigines compared to the Ta-nei plains Aborigines
in both cohorts. But what are the implications for the standard of living hypothe-
sis of the comparison between the Ta-nei plains Aborigines and the Ta-nei Hok-
lo? Presumably the relative poverty and its depressing effect on the fertility of the
Ta-nei plains Aborigines compared to their Hoklo neighbors was a consistent
feature of the entire period, but by the later cohort plains Aborigine fertility is
higher than that of Hoklo in Ta-nei. Infant mortality complicates the implica-
tions we draw from simple findings of higher fertility; is the higher fertility the
product of higher standards of living or higher rates of infant loss? Our expecta-
tion from island wide trends is that the rate of infant loss experienced by moth-
ers would decline slightly from the early born cohort to the later born cohort;
thus we would not expect rising rates of infant mortality to have caused the rise
in fertility between the cohorts. But we need an independent measure of infant
mortality to begin to sort out the degree to which differences in infant mortality
are affecting fertility. In sum, we will need much more detailed data to adequate-
ly test our initial hypothesis.
Among the Han the Chu-pei Hoklo rank highest in both cohorts in major
marriage fertility, while the Chu-pei Hakka moved up from lowest to next lowest
by the later cohort. But the hypothesis that absence of footbinding would lower
Hakka fertility is dealt a blow by the Lung-tu Hakka, who had higher fertility
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than both the Chu-pei Hakka and the Chu-pei Hoklo.57 Thus low major marriage
fertility is very unlikely to be a cultural feature of Hakka fertility. 
We turn next to minor marriages. Certainly there is no ethnic patterning in
the case of minor marriage, as the Chu-pei Hoklo and Hakka both rank lowest
and next lowest in one or the other of the two cohorts. This suggests that com-
mon locality rather than different ethnicity is a more important factor affecting
fertility levels. 
With respect to uxorilocal marriages, we find that Chi-pei plains Aborigine
marital fertility is the highest among our groups in both cohorts, and higher
than major marriage fertility in Chi-pei. While Ta-nei plains Aborigine fertility in
uxorilocal marriages is only middling among our groups, it is always higher than
Ta-nei plains Aborigine major marriage and higher than Ta-nei Hoklo major and
uxorilocal marriages. We would expect that female power would be greatest in
uxorilocal marriages where the bride does not come under the authority of her
mother-in-law. Thus if female status and power within the family is playing a
role in determining plains Aborigine fertility levels, it appears that role is to
increase rather than reduce fertility, contrary to the footbinding and related
hypotheses we discussed above. 
In sum, our initial overview of marital fertility by locality, ethnicity, and marriage
form, has revealed a considerable amount of variation within localities and eth-
nic groups and over time. The initial speculative hypotheses that we culled from
the literature, such as the footbinding hypothesis, and the standard of living
hypothesis, have all been controverted by at least a few cases and no strong eth-
nic pattern has emerged in level of total marital fertility.
However, to assess the relation between ethnic identity and the local struc-
tural position or social status of a group (e.g., as the locally dominant numerical
majority), we further considered marital fertility by ethnicity and locality (see
Table 8). The category of Ta-nei pools plains Aborigine data from across different
structural situations across an entire township – that is, it pools data from the vil-
lage of T’ou-she, where plains Aborigines were the numerical majority locally,
with villages where plains Aborigines were numerical minorities, ranging from
very small to significant local populations. (In contrast, Chi-pei is a village.) Con-
sequently, we considered lower locality levels within Ta-nei. Here, in three out of
four comparisons (for women born before 1896 in T’ou-she and for women
born on or after 1896 in both T’ou-she and Chi-pei), when Hoklo were the local
numerical minority, they had lower fertility. The small numbers and the further
pooling of the rest of Ta-nei (including the village of Wu-tou, where plains Abo-
rigines were a sizeable and influential minority) preclude definitive conclusions,
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but these data suggest that, whereas ethnicity alone is clearly not a good predic-
tor of fertility, ethnicity combined with consideration of local-level structural
relations may be interesting avenue for further investigation. 
In general, our task is to determine whether cultural differences associ-
ated with ethnicity in Taiwan have a significant impact on demographic indica-
tors of fertility in ways analogous to the differences found between Catholics
and Protestants in Europe. In the European case, groups with religious ideolo-
gies specifically addressing questions of childbearing and marital sexuality
demonstrate contrasting levels and patterns of fertility. Thus the assumption
that these ideologies shaped reproductive behavior and attitudes sufficiently to
have produced the fertility differences may well be warranted. There was no
similar ideological or behavioral cleavage in Taiwanese society, however. The
Taiwan ethnic groups demonstrate some variation by locality and by whether
they were the local dominant ethnic group (which may be class related) but
there is no clear ethnic pattern to fertility. These results suggest that either
there are not such cultural differences between these ethnic groups, which is
supported by ethnographic evidence58, or cultural differences here are not suf-
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Table 8: Total marital fertility of women by ethnicity and locality
Ethnicity and locality Women born before 1/1/1896 Women born on or after 1/1/1896
Births Person tmfr Births Person tmfr
Years 15-49 Years 15-49
plains Aborigines
Chi-pei PA 649 2818 8.46 674 1903 9.76
Ta-nei PA
T’ou-she PA 345 2068 6.54 569 1883 8.1
Other Ta-nei PA 129 755 6.55 243 709 9.42*
Hoklo
Chi-pei Hoklo 28 108 8.49 43 134 8.31*
Ta-nei Hoklo
T’ou-she Hoklo 60 412 5.05 141 526 6.68
Other Ta-nei Hoklo 3516 18420 6.89 5835 19308 7.93
Women registered as Hoklo but adopted by plains Aborigines are recorded as plains Aborigines. 
Only marriages where the spouses have the same ethnicity are counted.
* tmfr is for ages 15-44 only, as there were 0 person-years observed in the 45-49 age cohort. 
ficient to have shaped reproductive behavior and produced the fertility differ-
ences seen. 
While we have not uncovered stark contrasts among the Taiwanese ethnic
groups in total marital fertility, we cannot rule out the possibility of differences
operating at finer levels of distinction though with only minor effect on total fer-
tility. In the following sections we will pursue more detailed measures in an
attempt to discern ethnic patterns. 
Marriage form and first births: Age at first birth and 
the first birth interval
The distribution of marriage types by locality and ethnic group varied widely
across Taiwan, as can be seen in Table 9. Most striking is the extremely low pro-
portion of first marriages of the minor type among the plains aborigines of Ta-nei
and Chi-pei. Minor marriage may have been nearly absent among plains Aborig-
ines, but it also varied widely in frequency among the localities of Taiwan. That
differences between Hoklo and Hakka ethnicity do not explain these variations
among Han is evident from our data: the highest frequencies of minor marriage
occur among the Hoklo (19.9 %) and Hakka (27.3 %) of Chu-pei. The high fre-
quency of minor marriage among Chu-pei Hakka contrasts greatly with the Hak-
ka of Lung-tu, where the low frequency of minor marriage (from 1.9% to 4.2% of
marriages) more nearly resembles our plains Aborigine frequencies.59 The Hoklo
of Ta-nei (4.2 % minor), on the other hand, rank at the low end of the variation in
minor marriage frequencies in Taiwan in our sample, but do not appear to be
unique in that respect among Taiwanese of south Taiwan. The wide variation in
the frequency of minor marriage and female adoption among Han Taiwanese
remains one of the more puzzling aspects of the Taiwanese marriage pattern.
Some have suggested that this north-south differentiation among the Han may
be related to historically high rates of intermarriage between Han and plains Abo-
rigines in the south, while Shepherd suspects higher infant and child mortality in
the south lowers the possibility of minor marriage there.60 
The Ta-nei (19.8 %)and Chi-pei (13.6 %) plains Aborigines are also dis-
tinctive in having the highest frequencies of uxorilocal marriage among the com-
munities in our sample. But these frequencies are not as high as some reported
for Taiwanese Han communities (e.g. Chung-she Hoklo at 39.4%).61 Thus this
evidence alone is not sufficient to identify a high frequency of uxorilocal mar-
riage as distinctive of plains Aborigine marital culture. While the frequencies of
minor and uxorilocal marriage vary widely, their combined numbers in all sites
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significantly reduce the proportion of major marriages (least among the Ta-nei
Hoklo and Chi-pei plains Aborigines, most among Hoklo and Hakka in Chu-
pei). Let us turn to some of the consequences of this variation for the demogra-
phy of fertility among the various ethnic groups. 
Age at marriage is a key determinant of fertility among women in societies
that attempt to restrict childbearing to married women. Large differences in aver-
age ages at marriage and proportions married are a staple of contrasts between
European and Asian societies. A woman’s age at first birth is a function of her age
at marriage and the length of the first birth interval (from marriage to first birth).
148 Table 9: Marriages by form of marriage among women continuously observed from first
marriage to first birth. Ethnic groups are defined as those born and/or raised, and married
within the same ethnicity
Locality, ethnicity and form of marriage Number observed Form of marriage percentages
Ta-nei Hoklo 1377 100.0
Ta-nei Hoklo Major 1141 82.9
Ta-nei Hoklo Uxor 138 12.1
Ta-nei Hoklo Minor 58 4.2
Ta-nei PA 182 100.0
Ta-nei PA Major 142 78.0
Ta-nei PA Uxor 36 19.8
Ta-nei PA Minor 4 2.2
Chi-pei PA 132 100.0
Chi-pei PA Major 110 83.3
Chi-pei PA Uxor 18 13.6
Chi-pei PA Minor 4 3.0
Chu-pei Hoklo 457 100.0
Chu-pei Hoklo Major 316 69.1
Chu-pei Hoklo Uxor 50 10.9
Chu-pei Hoklo Minor 91 19.9
Chu-pei Hakka 587 100.0
Chu-pei Hakka Major 372 63.4
Chu-pei Hakka Uxor 55 9.4
Chu-pei Hakka Minor 160 27.3
Lu-kang Hoklo 617 100.0
Lu-kang Hoklo Major 488 79.1
Lu-kang Hoklo Uxor 35 5.7
Lu--kang Hoklo Minor 94 15.2
Table 10: Age at marriage and first birth, first birth interval and proportions adopting before
first birth of women continuously observed from first marriage to first birth, excluding
brides pregnant at marriage
Locality, ethnicity and Age at Age at First birth Proportions 
form of marriage marriage first birth interval adopting before
first birth
Ta-nei Hoklo 18.9 20.9 2.04 2.2
Ta-nei Hoklo Major 19.1 21.1 2.01 1.9
Ta-nei Hoklo Uxor 17.6 19.8 2.23 2.9
Ta-nei Hoklo Minor 17.9 20.2 2.25 5.2
Ta-nei PA 18.1 20.0 1.87 7.1
Ta-nei PA Major 18.0 19.9 1.90 6.3
Ta-nei PA Uxor 18.4 20.0 1.62 8.3
Chi-pei PA 19.0 20.8 1.82 4.5
Chi-pei PA Major 19.1 20.9 1.81 5.5
Chi-pei PA Uxor 18.5 20.1 1.62 0.0
Chu-pei Hoklo 18.0 20.0 1.96 8.8
Chu-pei Hoklo Major 18.1 19.9 1.82 7.9
Chu-pei Hoklo Uxor 18.8 20.7 1.91 10.0
Chu-pei Hoklo Minor 17.4 19.8 2.45 11.0
Chu-pei Hakka 18.1 20.3 2.19 8.7
Chu-pei Hakka Major 18.8 20.8 2.02 5.6
Chu-pei Hakka Uxor 17.6 19.2 1.59 5.5
Chu-pei Hakka Minor 16.8 19.5 2.78 16.9
Lu-kang Hoklo 18.5 20.5 1.99 6.5
Lu-kang Hoklo Major 18.8 20.7 1.90 5.1
Lu-kang Hoklo Uxor 17.8 19.6 1.79 8.6
Lu-kang Hoklo Minor 17.3 19.8 2.51 12.8
Table 10 presents these indicators for women in their first marriages who were
not pregnant at marriage. No data are reported for minor marriages among the
plains Aborigines of Ta-nei and Chi-pei where samples are extremely small. 
The average ages at marriage shown for the various ethnic and locality
groups in the table, fall within a narrow range from 18.0 to 19.0 years. Once
again, variation among the communities is determined less by ethnicity than by
form of marriage and locality. The overall average age at first marriage is lowest
among the Ta-nei plains Aborigines (18.1), and the Hakka (18.1) and Hoklo (18.0)
of Chu-pei, bringing together representatives of the three ethnic groups at the
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low end of the spectrum. The highest overall averages are among the Chi-pei
plains Aborigines (19.0) and the Ta-nei Hoklo (18.9). Thus there is little evidence
of an ethnic standard for Hoklo or for plains Aborigines at the level of group
averages. The similarity between the two Chu-pei groups in average age at mar-
riage disguises differences by form of marriage. The average age at uxorilocal
marriage is the same for the two plains Aborigine groups of Ta-nei and Chi-pei,
but any sense of ethnic uniformity is undermined by their average ages at major
marriage that are a full year apart. Age at minor marriage is consistently low, but
age at uxorilocal marriage is in two cases higher (Chu-pei Hoklo, Ta-nei plains
Aborigine) rather than lower than age at major marriage. 
The length of the first birth interval determines the wait from the mar-
riage to the arrival of the first child (brides pregnant at marriage have been
removed from the sample). The two plains Aborigine groups have the shortest
overall average first birth interval, and are also alike in having shorter intervals
for uxorilocal marriages than major marriages, a characteristic they share with
Chu-pei Hakka and Lkang Hoklo. The short birth intervals among the plains
Aborigines in Ta-nei and Chi-pei also cast doubt on any hypothesis that nutri-
tional deficiencies in one of the plains Aborigine groups delayed menarche suffi-
ciently to have impacted the first birth interval. 
The longest first birth intervals for all the Han groups are in the minor
marriages. This may be attributed both to the younger age of many of the
women married in the minor fashion (very near menarche), and the sexual aver-
sion felt for their spouses by those adopted at an early age.62 In general the first
birth intervals reported here are for all marriages lengthy, averaging around two
full years (and longer than the median lengths reported by Pasternak for Lung-tu
of around 15 months).63 
Taiwanese women who failed to produce a birth early in their marriages
had an alternative open to them that was not available to their European coun-
terparts. Childless Taiwanese women could adopt a child in anticipation of birth;
this possibility held for Hoklo, Hakka and plains Aborigines alike.64 A look at the
community averages in the table reveals that the Ta-nei Hoklo were least likely to
adopt before birth, while the Chu-pei Hoklo were the most likely (closely fol-
lowed by the Chu-pei Hakka). The plains Aborigine averages fall midway along
the spectrum, with adoption more frequent in Ta-nei than for Lu-kang Hoklo,
and less frequent in Chi-pei (though adoption in major marriages in Chi-pei was
more frequent than in major marriages in Lu-kang). Again we find a stronger
pattern of variation by locality than by ethnicity, pointing to wide differences in
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adoption markets by locality (cf. Pasternak, who documents low rates of adoption
among Lung-tu Hakka).65 Frequencies of adoption also varied greatly by form of
marriage. The proportions of women with an adoption before her first birth were
in every Han group highest for those in minor marriages, where the average first
birth interval was also the longest. 
When we examine the data by age at first birth and by length of first birth
interval (not shown here), we discover that for all marriage types the higher the
age at first birth, and the longer the first birth interval, the more likely women
were to have adopted a child prior to their first birth. This relationship holds true
for the plains Aborigines of Ta-nei and Chi-pei as well as for the Han communi-
ties; 46.2% and 50% of plains Aborigine women in Ta-nei and Chi-pei who had
first birth intervals greater than four years first had an adopted child (the compa-
rable rates are 17% of Ta-nei Hoklo, 60% of Chu-pei Hoklo, 43.1% for Chu-pei
Hakka, and 47.6% for Lu-kang Hoklo). This can be interpreted as an expression
of growing anxiety about the bearing of children by couples whose old age secu-
rity depended on the production of surviving offspring. The increasing propen-
sity to adopt as the first birth interval lengthens belies claims that long first birth
intervals were intentional means of birth control.66
Ages at first birth in our sample groups ranged from 19.2 (Chu-pei Hakka
uxorilocal marriages) to 21.1 (Ta-nei Hoklo major marriages), which is a narrow-
er range than ages at marriage, which ran from 16.8 (Chu-pei Hakka minor mar-
riages) to 19.1 (major marriages for Chi-pei plains Aborigines and Ta-nei Hoklo).
Much of that narrowing is due to the long birth intervals in minor marriages that
despite the early age at marriage delayed the age at first birth in minor mar-
riages; this was sufficient to prevent minor marriages having the earliest age at
first birth except among the Chu-pei Hoklo. 
Our analysis of age at marriage and first birth for the sample of brides
pregnant at marriage by locality, ethnic group and form of marriage yield com-
parable results. The patterns of bridal pregnancy reveal no ethnic uniformity,
beyond the absence of minor marriage among the plains Aborigines. 
Completed marriages: Age at last birth, completed fertility, and infant 
and child mortality
To study the beginning of marriage and childbearing we were able to use a sam-
ple of women who were under observation for the relatively brief portion of their
marriages from age at marriage to age at first birth. To study the fertility of mar-
riages over their full length, especially when the cessation of childbearing is of
interest, requires a set of “completed marriages”.67 Comparisons of completed
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marriages require excluding marriages that are only partially observed through
their history, and marriages disrupted by death or divorce before the end of a
woman’s reproductive period. For this paper we define the set of completed mar-
riages as those in which women remained in first marriages and were continu-
ously under observation from age at marriage (no later than the 30th birthdate)
to age 46. (The condition of marrying before age 30 ensures that a minimum of
15 years of married life is observed for each marriage.) These are stringent con-
ditions. They have the effect of severely reducing the number of marriages in our
sample (see Table 11). In many ways the few marriages that survive to fulfill these
conditions are clearly not “typical” marriages. Many more marriages in Taiwan
were broken by death or divorce. Marriages are also eliminated from the sample
because observation was interrupted by migration, either to areas outside the
study area before the marriage reached completion or into the study area after
the marriage was initiated. 
In the case of the Taiwan household registers that were open only from
1906 to 1945, these stringent requirements also mean that the sample of com-
pleted marriages is restricted to a narrow birth cohort. This sample is thus
restricted to women born before 1/1/1901 who reach age 46 by 12/31/45, the end
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Table 11: Women remaining in first marriages and continuously under observation from age
at marriage (before age 30) to age 46 by locality, ethnicity and form of marriage
Locality, ethnicity, Number of completed Number zero parity Pct. of non-zero 
form of marriage marriages observed parity completed
marriages
Ta-nei Hoklo 239 6 97.5
Ta-nei Hoklo Major 202 6 97.0
Ta-nei PA 24 1 95.8
Ta-nei PA Major 18 1 94.4
Chi-pei PA 31 0 100.0
Chi-pei PA Major 27 0 100.0
Chu-pei Hoklo 92 7 92.4
Chu-pei Hoklo Major 65 6 90.8
Chu-pei Hakka 101 7 93.1
Chu-pei Hakka Major 71 7 90.1
Lu-kang Hoklo 119 8 93.3
Lu-kang Hoklo Major 86 6 93.0
of the register period. In addition, all marriages in the sample must occur after
1/1/1906 if they are to be fully observed. As average age at first marriage is 19,
most of the women marrying after 1906 will have been born after 1886. Of
women born before 1886, only those marrying above the average age at marriage
and after 1/1/1906 will enter the sample. The bulk of the women in this sample
thus come from a much narrower cohort than that used in the tables for first
marriages and first births above where later marrying women enter the sample.
Because fertility rates are known to have risen and mortality to have fallen from
1906 to 1946, limiting the sample to a narrow birth cohort has the advantage of
minimizing compositional and period effects, but this benefit comes at the
heavy price of a reduced sample size . 
The smallness of the sample of completed marriages also constricts our
ability to fully compare the less frequent forms of marriage. The number of
minor and uxorilocal marriages surviving in our sample is small not just
because they were less frequent than major marriages among first marriages,
but also because divorce rates in minor and uxorilocal marriages were higher
than in major marriages.68 Thus for the analysis of completed marriages we
will not separately compare minor and uxorilocal marriages. In the case of our
plains Aborigine populations we are still left with very small samples of major
and total marriages, which makes the results for these groups less reliable.
Our criteria maximizing the homogeneity of the ethnicity samples remain the
same as above. 
Presented in Table 12 are the ages at first and last birth, the length of the repro-
ductive period (years from first to last birth), the average closed birth interval,
and the average number of births per woman for our ethnic groups. We have
already discussed age at first birth using our larger sample above, and will focus
here on the cessation of childbearing and the overall fertility of our completed
marriages. 
The youngest age at last birth and the shortest average reproductive period
is found among the Ta-nei plains Aborigines in major marriages. This contrasts
sharply with the Chi-pei plains Aborigines in major marriages that have the old-
est age at last birth and the longest reproductive period in our sample. The same
contrast is found between these two groups in average closed birth interval
(longest for Ta-nei plains Aborigines and second shortest for Chi-pei plains Abo-
rigines ) and in average births per woman (lowest for Ta-nei and highest for Chi-
pei). Clearly there is no single cultural pattern dictating fertility and length of the
reproductive period among the plains Aborigines in our sample. Similarly, in the
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case of the Chu-pei Hakka, except for age at last birth (which is high but not as
high as Chi-pei) the indicators for reproductive period, birth interval and births
per woman all fall in the middle of those from the Hoklo groups, and most often
are closest to those of the Chu-pei Hoklo. Thus, these measures of fertility also
fail to identify a distinctive Hakka – Hoklo difference. 
In western Europe, as the Dutch data documents, less breastfeeding and
higher infant mortality among Catholics shortened birth intervals and con-
tributed to higher fertility compared to Protestants. No differences concerning
length of breastfeeding period are known to distinguish either ethnic groups or
localities in Taiwan. Average birth intervals in our sample groups are long and
variation among groups is most likely related to different levels of infant mortal-
ity, as we will discuss shortly. The lack of uniform patterns distinguishing our
ethnic groups undermines claims that ethnic differences, for example gender
roles and the presence of footbinding, can explain differences in reproductive
behavior among Taiwanese groups. So once again, on indicators that regularly
discriminate between Protestants and Catholics in European cases, the Tai-
wanese ethnic groups are more likely to vary by locality than by ethnicity.
The average births per woman for completed marriages confirms our
finding using the total marital fertility rates that Chi-pei plains Aborigines have
154 Table 12: Women remaining in first marriages and continuously under observation from age
at marriage (before age 30) to age 46 by locality, ethnicity and form of marriage: age at last
birth, birth intervals, and births per woman
Locality, ethnicity, Age first Age last Reproductive Avg. closed Births per 
form of marriage birth* birth* period~ birth interval woman*
Ta-nei Hoklo 21.47 37.62 16.15 2.81 6.74
Ta-nei Hoklo Major 21.65 37.43 15.79 2.81 6.63
Ta-nei PA 20.57 36.09 15.52 2.97 6.22
Ta-nei PA Major 20.94 34.20 13.25 3.00 5.41
Chi-pei PA 21.41 38.15 16.74 2.51 7.68
Chi-pei PA Major 21.69 38.38 16.69 2.52 7.63
Chu-pei Hoklo 21.18 36.76 15.57 2.71 6.74
Chu-pei Hoklo Major 21.36 36.26 14.89 2.65 6.61
Chu-pei Hakka 21.44 37.96 16.52 2.77 6.96
Chu-pei Hakka Major 22.25 37.77 15.52 2.68 6.80
Lu-kang Hoklo 20.63 37.23 16.60 2.55 7.52
Lu-kang Hoklo Major 21.22 37.01 15.79 2.43 7.49
* Excludes zero parity women. ~the period from first to last birth in years.
the highest fertility but the ranking of the other groups changes, with Ta-nei
plains Aborigines now at the bottom and Lu-kang Hoklo next to Chi-pei at the
top. In all our groups, the average births per woman is higher for all forms of
marriage combined than for major marriages. This is somewhat surprising, giv-
en our expectation that the low fertility of minor marriages would depress the
overall average compared to major marriage, at least for Han groups where
minor marriages are numerous. Measures of total marital fertility which make
fuller use of the register sample compared to measures based on completed mar-
riages which discard so many cases, show higher fertility in major and uxorilocal
marriages. The divergence may also be a product of a selection effect operating
on our sample of completed marriages: higher rates of divorce in uxorilocal and
minor marriages have eliminated more low parity marriages from those samples
than divorce has eliminated from the major marriage sample.
In Table 12 we see that Chi-pei (7.68) and Lu-kang (7.52) have significantly higher
births per woman than the other groups (the lowest number of births are found
in major marriages of Ta-nei plains Aborigines, 5.41). Table 13 shows the number
of children and the number of sons surviving to a fifth birthday per woman, along
with measures of infant and child mortality. The high fertility in Chi-pei and Lu-
kang is greatly reduced by correspondingly high rates of infant and child mortali-
ty. The reduction is so great in the case of Chi-pei (where child mortality is as high
as infant mortality) that its number of surviving children put it near the bottom of
the groups, along with Ta-nei plains Aborigines. As a result of mortality, the range
of numbers of surviving children is much narrower, from 4.06 (Ta-nei plains
Aborigines) to 5.72 (Chu-pei Hakka) compared to the numbers of births. High
rates of infant and child mortality, by speeding the end of breastfeeding and its
contraceptive effect, play a role in increasing fertility in Chi-pei and Lu-kang.
Plains Aborigine women in Chi-pei and Hoklo women in Lu-kang combine the
shortest closed birth intervals with slightly longer reproductive periods to make
possible a higher number of births. The common experience of high infant and
child mortality, despite ethnic difference, is what drives up fertility in these two
populations. At the other extreme, the Chu-pei Hakka stand out for having partic-
ularly low rates of child mortality, which other evidence suggests may indeed
indicate some sanitary or other health practices that are distinctively Hakka. 
Table 14 presents for completed marriages the proportions of women who
have three or fewer births and who had nine or more births. These are women
whose fertility significantly diverged from the average. An overreliance on meas-
ures of central tendency in fertility measures obscures the important role of
women at the extremes in many discussions of fertility, which tends to give the
impression that an overwhelming majority of women were at or near the average
number of births. This table seeks to rectify that shortcoming by documenting
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the large proportion of women whose fertility substantially exceeded or fell well
short of the average. In eight of our twelve groups, from 46% to 64% of women
were at the extremes of the parity distribution. Particularly striking are the large
proportions of women who bore nine or more children in Chi-pei and Lu-kang,
where we have seen high infant mortality pushed up completed fertility. Also
striking is the very low proportion of Chi-pei women in completed marriages
that had three or fewer births, which may be an indication of the great pressure
high rates of infant mortality put on such women. Nearly as striking are the low
proportions of Ta-nei plains Aborigine women who had nine or more births,
which relates to the low fertility of this group of completed marriages. As a
result, the four groups where smaller overall proportions fell into the extremes
were all from Ta-nei and Chi-pei plains Aborigines (these are also our smallest
samples of only 24 and 31 completed marriages). 
As noted above in our discussion of adoption at the beginning of child-
bearing, adoption was an option open to Chinese women with unsatisfactory fer-
tility that was not available to European women. We interpret adopting a child
after the last birth not only as evidence that families were not satisfied with the
156 Table 13: Women remaining in first marriages and continuously under observation from age 
at marriage (before age 30) to age 46 by locality, ethnicity and form of marriage: surviving 
children and sons, infant and child mortality
Locality, ethnicity, Births per Surviving Surviving Infant deaths Child deaths
form of marriage woman* children per sons per per 100 (ages 1-4) per
woman*~ woman*~ births 100 surviv-
ing infants
Ta-nei Hoklo 6.74 5.18 2.61 11.45 13.17
Ta-nei Hoklo Major 6.63 5.13 2.55 11.70 12.38
Ta-nei PA 6.22 4.74 2.30 15.38 9.92
Ta-nei PA Major 5.41 4.06 1.88 17.39 9.21
Chi-pei PA 7.68 4.65 2.45 23.11 21.31
Chi-pei PA Major 7.63 4.63 2.33 21.36 22.84
Chu-pei Hoklo 6.74 5.15 2.64 15.36 9.69
Chu-pei Hoklo Major 6.61 5.15 2.56 13.59 9.79
Chu-pei Hakka 6.96 5.72 2.87 14.37 3.93
Chu-pei Hakka Major 6.80 5.55 2.72 15.17 3.79
Lu-kang Hoklo 7.52 5.20 2.65 20.96 12.58
Lu-kang Hoklo Major 7.49 5.35 2.73 19.53 11.20
* Excludes zero parity women. ~ children and boys surviving to a fifth birthday. 
size or sex composition of their offspring sets but also that stopping may not
have been voluntary. Certainly adding another mouth to feed to the family con-
tradicts the notion that early stopping is a deliberate means of limiting family
size. The strong son preference of the Taiwanese family might lead us to expect
that more boys would be adopted than girls, but it also meant that few families
gave up boys for adoption. Thus adoptions were in fact overwhelmingly female.
Adopted daughters could serve as son substitutes if no sons survived and an uxo-
rilocal marriage could be arranged to continue the family. Foster daughters could
also serve as little daughters-in-law, and be married at maturity in a minor mar-
riage to a son of the family at little expense and much potential gain to the
domestic control exercised by the mother-in-law cum foster mother. In larger
families, a surplus daughter might be sent out at the same time a foster daugh-
ter was brought in; this was a means of removing unwanted daughters and
replacing them with little daughters-in-law in preparation for an anticipated
minor marriage to a son. In these circumstances adoptions resulted in no net
157Table 14: Women remaining in first marriages and continuously under observation from age
at marriage (before age 30) to age 46 by locality, ethnicity and form of marriage: parity distri-
bution, proportions adopting after last birth
Locality, ethnicity, Pct. low Pct. high Pct. of all Pct. low Pct. adopt- Adoptees
form of marriage parity parity women parity ing after per low
women women adopting women last birth parity 
<=3births* >=9births after last adopting who are woman
birth* after last low parity*
birth*
Ta-nei Hoklo 17.57 28.87 7.53 30.95 72.22 0.69
Ta-nei Hoklo Major 18.82 27.72 8.42 34.21 76.47 0.71
Ta-nei PA 16.67 12.50 20.83 100.0 80.0 1.50
Ta-nei PA Major 22.22 5.56 27.78 100.0 80.0 1.50
Chi-pei PA 6.45 35.48 19.35 50.0 16.67 0.50
Chi-pei PA Major 7.41 37.04 18.52 50.0 20.0 0.50
Chu-pei Hoklo 29.35 31.52 35.87 66.67 54.55 1.70
Chu-pei Hoklo Major 30.77 29.23 43.08 75.0 53.57 1.95
Chu-pei Hakka 18.81 30.69 29.70 68.42 43.33 1.89
Chu-pei Hakka Major 23.94 28.17 33.80 70.59 50.0 1.76
Lu-kang Hoklo 21.85 39.50 19.33 69.23 78.26 1.58
Lu-kang Hoklo Major 23.26 40.70 18.60 60.0 75.0 1.40
* Includes zero parity women. 
gains in numbers of children. Our tables report any adoption occurring after the
last birth regardless of sex. 
In all the groups, substantial proportions of low parity women (having
three or fewer births) adopted after their last birth. And in all the groups except
Chi-pei, substantial proportions of the families adopting after a woman’s last
birth were for low parity women. Chi-pei is the exception because there were so
few low parity women in the sample of completed marriages in Chi-pei (two
women in a sample of 31). Adoption was a well- established custom in both the
Chi-pei and Ta-nei plains Aborigine groups, as we saw above with respect to
adoptions preceding first birth, and the high rates of adoption among the low
parity plains Aborigine women of Ta-nei confirm that pattern.69
These patterns strongly suggest that families with low parity women, far
from being satisfied with the size and sex composition of their offspring set
when stopping childbearing so early and with so few children, were in fact
strongly dissatisfied. Reinforcing this conclusion is the number of children ever
adopted (without regard to timing of adoption) per low parity woman. The high-
est numbers of adoptions occur for women stopping at the youngest ages, hav-
ing the lowest number of births, and the lowest number of surviving sons. Thus
the number and timing of adoptions cast serious doubt on notions that early
stopping can be interpreted as intentional fertility control. The perspective pro-
vided by adoption offered by these tables shows there is little difference between
the groups defined either by locality or by ethnicity with respect to desire of low
parity women to increase their holding of children. 
Conclusions and discussion
The goal of this paper was to establish what fertility differences existed, if any,
between subpopulations in the Netherlands and Taiwan. The subpopulations
chosen represent religious and ethnic categories that, according to most
authors, form basic identification for the actors involved as well as for the keep-
ers of the population and household registers. Whenever possible we took into
account the confounding effects of socio-economic and regional influences. The
results are both surprising and interesting, because they show that cultural
identifications can influence reproductive behavior strongly or not at all. We will
first present them for the two countries separately and then discuss the impor-
tance of the comparison. 
The reproduction of Dutch couples between 1880 and 1960 had two char-
acteristics that distinguished them from their counterparts in the neighboring
countries. First of all, the national average of fertility was markedly higher.
According to E.W. Hofstee we can find the reason for this in the pervasive reli-
158
69. Brown, Is Taiwan Chinese, 84-88.
gious character of the country. The power of “organized confessionalism” was
such that even non-religious inhabitants were heavily influenced by the strict doc-
trine of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Protestant churches.70 This already
hints at the importance of religion when trying to understand Dutch fertility.
To be sure, this idea is supported convincingly by the differences between
the major denominations within the Netherlands. The onset of fertility decline is
visible when comparing the asmfr for the pre-decline and post-decline eras, but
the rank order of the denominations does not change. The two orthodox reli-
gious groups (Roman Catholics and Orthodox Protestants) consistently exhibit a
higher fertility when compared to their less strict colleagues. The fertility decline
appears to have deepened the denominational differences between orthodox and
liberal groups to the extent that Liberal Protestant women and women from
mixed marriages of the second cohort already had a concave shaped ASMFR
(indicating deliberate fertility limitation).
Denominational differences also affect the beginning and the end of the
reproductive career. In the cohorts born before and after 1860, Roman Catholic
and Orthodox Protestant brides start bearing children at a later age than Liberal
Protestants. The only remarkable difference between the cohorts is to be found
for couples of mixed religion. In the first cohort they were the last to start having
children, while in the second cohort they were the first. The end of the reproduc-
tive period comes later for the strict religions too. Where contraception is not
allowed, this is to be expected. Still, even orthodox couples stop having children
five years earlier in the later cohort than they did in the earlier cohort. Not sur-
prisingly, the influence of religion is to be found also in the completed family
size of our couples. In the first cohort this effect is biased by differences in infant
and childhood mortality. Nonetheless, this finding is another indication of the
all-pervasive influence of religion on society: fertility, breastfeeding and sanita-
tion habits all differentiate according to denomination.
Our main conclusion is in line with the finding of other authors in the
Netherlands. If one wants to predict the fertility of a Dutch couple in the 19th
and early 20th century, it is to religious denomination that one must turn. A rel-
atively new conclusion is that the differentiation between denominations was
already visible long before the pillarization started. 
In Taiwan, we have searched for systematic ethnic patterning in childbearing
using measures as diverse as total marital fertility, age at marriage and first and
last birth, proportions of pregnant brides, proportions adopting before first birth
and after last birth, length of birth intervals, and rates of infant and child mortal-
ity. Our overall conclusion with respect to our main question is a negative one.
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Ethnicity in Taiwan does not appear to have a significant impact on demograph-
ic indicators of fertility in ways analogous to the differences found between
Catholics and Protestants in the Netherlands. We do not claim that there were no
significant cultural differences characterizing marriage and reproductive behav-
ior among these groups; we merely assert that such differences as existed did not
result in distinctive levels and patterns of marital fertility among the ethnic
groups. Differences were as likely to be explained by appeal to factors relating to
locality and period as to ethnicity. 
Marriage and reproduction are phenomena of major importance in human life,
in every society and historical period. They constitute a very sensitive instrument
to measure the impact of events and processes experienced by the population
studied. Historical demographic research has repeatedly shown close links
between demographic behavior and environmental and economic factors, as
well as purportedly cultural factors such as ethnicity and religion. We expected,
therefore, that the fertility differences between “cultural” subgroups of the popu-
lation of Taiwan and the Netherlands would demonstrate the importance of the
respective group identities. The results are remarkable. Being Dutch in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century implied being a member of one of the
strictly organized denominations (in the case of Roman Catholics and Orthodox
Protestants) or of less demarcated denominations (Liberal Protestants and oth-
ers). Being Taiwanese in the first half of the twentieth century implied being
aware of the provenance of ancestors, and thus being Hoklo, Hakka or plains
Aborigine. Surprisingly, we find that group identity effected nuptiality and fertil-
ity in the Netherlands, but failed to do so in Taiwan.
The question to be answered, then, is why, in this important regard, the
countries differed. Our data do not allow us to make final statements. The fol-
lowing possible answers, however, may guide future research. Religion in the
Netherlands appears to be a much more powerful predictor for fertility than eth-
nicity is in Taiwan. Issues relating to age at marriage, sexuality, breastfeeding,
and contraception were important in distinguishing religious denominations in
the Netherlands, and denominational membership thus came to have an impor-
tant influence on the demographic behavior of members. The same issues never
operated as criteria distinguishing the Hakka, Hoklo, and plains Aborigines of
Taiwan. Instead, the Taiwanese groups distinguished themselves on the basis of
criteria such as provenance, footbinding, language, and patron gods, criteria that
did not dictate distinctive fertility outcomes. As it is, we can only conclude that
the often invoked differences between ethnic groups in Taiwan are of little sig-
nificance when studying their demographic behavior. The Dutch couples in our
data not only considered themselves Protestant or Catholic, but acted according-
ly. The Taiwanese couples in our data considered themselves Hoklo, Hakka or
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plains Aborigines, but acted either according to circumstances, or simply as Tai-
wanese. This, then, takes us back to the hypothesis formulated by McQuillan.
The preconditions necessary for group identity (be it religious or ethnic) to influ-
ence demographic behavior were met by Roman Catholics and Orthodox Protes-
tants in the Netherlands, but evidently not by the Taiwanese ethnic groups.
Orthodox Protestants and Catholics in the Netherlands were worlds apart in the
same small country. With regard to their demographic behavior, Hakka, Hoklo














This chapter presents a preliminary exploration of issues surrounding the impact
of infant and early child mortality on fertility behavior in Taiwan and the Nether-
lands. A particular concern is to assess claims made about the distinctive features of
Chinese vs. European fertility behavior by the revisionist school of “anti-Malthu-
sians” led by James Lee and Wang Feng and Zhao Zhongwei, in particular claims
asserting the presence of “deliberate fertility control” by Chinese in the late imperi-
al period.1 The bulk of this chapter focuses on the impacts child mortality and sur-
vival have on women’s completed fertility and age at last birth (“stopping behav-
ior”). Lee and Wang’s finding of a low average age at last birth (“early stopping”) in
the Ch’ing imperial lineage and the banner population of Daoyi is a key element in
their revisionist “anti-Malthusian” view of marital fertility in historical Chinese pop-
ulations. Do we find indications that couples “started to stop” once they were satis-
fied with their present family size? Under what circumstances did early stopping
occur? We feel that measures such as the average age at last birth are inadequate to
distinguish subfecund couples from “deliberate stoppers”. Therefore, in this paper,
we will work with the complete fertility history of individual couples. Basically, we
ask simple questions: were couples that stopped at a low age of the wife blessed
with surviving sons early in their “procreative career”? Conversely, did couples that
supposedly stopped early voluntarily also have a low propensity to adopt children
after their last child was born? A detailed comparison of fertility histories by final
parity of completed marriages allows us to answer this kind of question. In addi-
tion, we compare multivariate models on parity progression that look at the effects
on stopping of present family composition. The focus in this paper is on Taiwan,
but where possible comparisons will be made with the Netherlands. In the case of
the Netherlands deliberate parity-specific stopping is supposed not to have occurred
among “pretransitional” cohorts. 
In the next section, we will survey the literature dealing with the relation
between infant mortality, or infant survival, and early stopping. We will also
describe our choice of data for this contribution. Then, we will present a first
inspection of the fertility histories of both Taiwanese and Dutch women with an eye
to determining the extent to which final parity is related to the experience of infant
mortality. Next, we look at the relationship between child (or son) survival and age
at last birth. In a subsequent section, we put adoption into the equation and look at
the effect of the sex of the last child as well. Were couples more eager to stop when
last child was male? Then, we compare our findings based on descriptive statistics
with a multivariate model that predicts parity progression while controlling for fac-
tors such as age of the mother, marriage duration and family composition. In a final
section we test Zhao’s assertion that mothers who had experienced reproductive
success at a young age were particularly likely to stop childbearing early.
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Women’s fertility and their experience of infant mortality: 
Preliminary considerations 
The relationship between the number of children a woman bears and the num-
ber of children a woman loses to an early death has many dimensions. One
dimension relates fertility to infant mortality through the impact of breastfeed-
ing on birth spacing. In a society like that of early twentieth century Taiwan
where the average period a child was breastfed extended well beyond the first
year of life, the death of a child in infancy will cut short the amount of time the
mother breastfeeds. This is important because of the role played by intense
breastfeeding in the hormonal suppression of ovulation and menstruation.
When ovulation is no longer suppressed by intense breastfeeding, the mother
returns to a fecund state, and can be expected to conceive her next child earlier
than might have been the case had her nursling survived the full period of
breastfeeding. Thus we can expect that a woman who loses many children in
infancy (by death, or, as we should not forget in the Taiwanese case, by adoption
out) will have shorter intervals between births, on average, and thus in a given
amount of time will bear a larger number of children. The same effect is found
in Dutch society among the portion of the population breastfeeding for extended
periods. This result requires no intent or special volition on the part of the
woman or her spouse. So long as other factors affecting fecundability remain the
same, this effect occurs automatically as the joint result of biological processes
and breastfeeding customs. Our shorthand for the relationship connecting
shortened breastfeeding and infant mortality to fertility will be the “lactation
interruption effect”.2
However, it would not be correct to assume the lactation interruption
effect excludes all deliberate attempts to affect fertility. Because of the high value
of sons, Taiwanese women are known to breastfeed sons for longer periods than
daughters. This means birth intervals should be longer after a surviving son than
a surviving daughter (the average interval after all births may show little differ-
ence between boys and girls, because higher male infant mortality reduces the
average interval following male births). Women can speed their return to fecund-
ability following the birth of a daughter not just by shortening the breastfeeding
period but also by giving a daughter away in infancy and through female infanti-
cide. The earlier return to fecundability speeds the possible conception of a boy.
The deliberate shortening of the breastfeeding period following birth of a daugh-
ter may be seen as a woman’s attempt to raise her fertility, and her prolonging
the breastfeeding of a daughter could be interpreted as an attempt to limit fertil-
ity. However, prolonging the breastfeeding of a son was surely intended to
ensure his survival, not to limit fertility. When might we expect the breastfeeding
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of a daughter to be prolonged as an attempt to limit fertility? Perhaps the daugh-
ters of women with many surviving sons were breastfed for longer periods and
given away in infancy at lower proportions than the daughters of women anxious
to bear additional sons? The extent to which such practices were important can
be demonstrated by analysis of birth interval spacing, a subject being dealt with
in other contributions to this volume.3
A different pathway connecting infant mortality and fertility involves the role
of planning and intent of parents in response to the experience of infant loss. Cou-
ples may take steps to increase their fertility to replace a lost child (“replacement”) or
in anticipation of child loss (“hoarding”). Wives in Chinese families were judged by
their ability to produce male heirs for the family, and a woman who failed to produce
sons lived an uneasy existence in her husband’s family. But more was at stake in the
survival of sons than status in the family. Women’s long term welfare and security
depended on raising sons to adulthood who would loyally support their mothers in
old age. Maternal self-interest demanded that priority be given to raising sons. If no
sons survived, a daughter (or adopted daughter) who married uxorilocally could
serve as a son substitute. Daughters too had value, at least as insurance against the
possibility of no sons surviving. Because of the cultural priorities of the Chinese
family, married women understood that much was at stake in the raising of sons.
This nexus of relationships and cultural premises stressing the importance of sons
suggests that women who lost children, especially sons, in infancy or early child-
hood, can be expected to make a special and deliberate effort to conceive additional
children, and perhaps to extend the usual period of childbearing to a later age. This
pathway also suggests that women who lost few children, and were successful in
producing surviving sons, might prefer to take more time between births, and per-
haps to terminate their childbearing years earlier than their less fortunate sisters. 
John Knodel identifies the replacement effect as one “whereby couples have
replacement births in response to their own actual (as opposed to anticipated) expe-
rience with child loss”4, but Knodel quickly inverts the notion to one that links early
stopping to experience with high rates of child survival. He points out that the replace-
ment effect assumes that limitation is practiced to some degree in the population at
large. If limitation is absent we expect all couples to continue childbearing to the
end of the reproductive span, regardless of their experience with child mortality.
With no limitation, there would be no difference in the age at last birth between
those who lost children in infancy and early childhood (and are assumed to want
“replacement”) and those who did not. Under such conditions Knodel suggests we
may find instead of replacement by couples that have lost children in infancy earli-
er stopping by couples that have not.5 Our shorthand for these relationships con-
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necting infant mortality and fertility in the absence of limitation will be the “early
stopping hypothesis”. In theory, only if fertility limitation were broadly practiced
would we expect to detect a replacement effect by which couples experiencing
infant loss prolonged their childbearing in order to have additional births. In prac-
tical terms, given the relative nature of “early” and “late”, it may be difficult to deter-
mine if a difference in age at stopping between two groups should be attributed to
early stopping in one group rather than later stopping in the other. 
Finally, an alternative hypothesis, which we shall call the “natural fertility
hypothesis”, states that couples continue childbearing to the end of the repro-
ductive span and take no actions “to stop childbearing at any particular parity in
order to limit family size to a given number”.6 If there is no deliberate attempt to
increase or decrease childbearing in response to infant and child mortality and
survival, as the natural fertility hypothesis predicts, then we should find no rela-
tionship between women’s ages at last birth and their experience of infant and
child mortality. The natural fertility hypothesis predicts that women who lost
children will have their last birth at ages similar to women who did not. All
women are presumed to continue bearing children until the end of their repro-
ductive spans regardless of their experience of child loss and survival; the only
difference between them will be that women who lose children in infancy will
have on average shorter birth intervals (due to the lactation interruption effect)
that make possible a greater number of births within that span. 
Note that in the Chinese case we need to distinguish stopping behavior as
a response to son survival, not just child survival. The notion of natural fertility
originates in attempts to identify limitation of family size without regard to the
sex composition of offspring. In the context of Chinese son preference, our
analysis must be sensitive to the presence of stopping behaviors as a response to
survival of sons not just children overall. Both the replacement effect and the
early stopping hypothesis predict that women with few surviving sons will have
a higher age at last birth than women with many, and conversely that the more
surviving sons a woman has, the earlier her age at last birth will be. An addition-
al corollary holds that the earlier a woman has surviving sons, the earlier will be
her age at last birth. 7
Who are the early and late stoppers?
Lee and Wang construct a model of Chinese fertility in which a pattern of early
stopping is one of three demographic mechanisms (the other two are late start-
ing and long birth intervals) that they interpret as evidence of marital fertility
restraint.8 They cite the finding of a mean age at last birth for the women of
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Daoyi at age 33.5 (35 sui) (in completed marriages defined as those under obser-
vation until the woman is 46 sui), in contrast to much higher averages in Euro-
pean populations, as evidence of marital fertility control in Daoyi.9 But Lee and
Campbell make little further inquiry into the conditions under which a low age
at last birth occurred that might test its relationship to marital restraint. They
interpret a low age at last birth as evidence of intentional and voluntary “early
stopping,” without consideration of alternative possibilities.10
The average age at last birth in a population is the product of many vari-
ables, and reflects the parity distribution, birth spacing, and age at first birth.
When comparing populations, historical demographers commonly consider a
lower average age at last birth an indicator of fertility control, but only when age
at marriage is controlled. As Flinn notes for European populations, “the earlier
women married, the earlier they tended to give birth to their last child”.11 Early
marriage especially reduces the age at last birth of the lowest parity women. For two
populations with identical parity distributions (and thus identical stopping pat-
terns), a large difference in female age at first marriage will be enough to lower
the average age at last birth of the population marrying earlier. A very large gap
existed between the Taiwanese average age at marriage of 19.2 and the Dutch
average of 26. We show in the table below that the early age at last birth of low
parity women (1-6) is chiefly responsible for lowering the overall average age at
last birth of the early marrying Taiwanese when compared to the late marrying
Dutch. Indeed our comparison shows that having a lower average age at last birth
does not prevent the early marrying Taiwanese from having a higher mean parity,
which is hardly suggestive of fertility limitation. It is the early age at marriage that
lowers the Taiwanese average age at last birth in the Taiwan-Dutch comparison,
not intentional early stopping. Lee, Wang and Campbell fail to control for the
much earlier age at marriage of the Chinese population when they claim that a
lower age at last birth demonstrates Chinese marital fertility restraint compared
to the Europeans. Instead it simply reflects the earlier Chinese age at marriage. 
We can investigate the circumstances surrounding women’s age at last birth
using individual level data from household register databases. Conventional under-
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standings of the pronatalism of the Chinese family would predict early stopping
only in those cases where a couple has achieved a sufficient holding of surviving
sons. These assumptions imply a relationship of stopping behavior to couples’
experience of child mortality and survival in accord with the early stopping hypoth-
esis (limitation otherwise absent) and the replacement effect (limitation widely
practiced). If a relationship can be established that links child survival to early stop-
ping, then it may be reasonable to conclude that birth limitation is the likely moti-
vation, on the assumption that couples have become satisfied with the size and sex
composition of their offspring sets. If however the relationship of child survival to
early stopping is weak or nonexistent, then we may doubt that couples are con-
sciously limiting their fertility in attempts to shape their offspring sets. 
However, an early age at last birth in completed marriages may be a
response not to child survival but to difficult births, poor maternal health, the
emotional stress surrounding child mortality, or low coital frequency due to long
marital duration, spousal separation or marital estrangement.12 “Early stopping”
thus may be a sign of secondary sterility or experience with difficult pregnancies
or births that renders a woman unwilling to undergo the risks of additional
childbearing. It is not plausible to claim that a woman whose last birth is at age
33, all of whose children died before age 5, is intentionally limiting her fertility,
without additional evidence. Fertility limitation is a plausible motive for stopping
only for women who have surviving children, and in the Chinese case, sons. 
If an early age at last birth may be a response to two quite divergent expe-
riences with child mortality and childbearing, we must look for evidence of both
kinds of early stoppers and ask which kind is more numerous when the last birth
is at a given age: is it those that have many surviving children or those that have
lost infants in relation to difficult pregnancies and birth traumas? As early stop-
ping may be the product of either situation, evidence of the presence of early
stoppers in the population is not itself evidence of intentional birth limitation.
Indeed where we find an early age at last birth followed by death of spouse,
divorce and a husband’s remarriage, and for women who remain married, adop-
169
12. Knodel, Demographic Behavior, 378.
Table 1: Mean age at last birth by final parity
Taiwanese N Dutch N
All parities 37.4 621 39.5 603
Parities 1-6 32.6 265 38.1 366
Parities 7 + 41.0 356 41.6 237
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14. The Taiwan sample also eliminates women married after the thirtieth birthdate to ensure that a minimum
of 15 years of married life is observed for each marriage.
tion of children, husbands acquiring concubines (behaviors inconsistent with an
intention to limit fertility), and uxorilocal marriages arranged for daughters sig-
naling failure to raise a son to adulthood, we justifiably see such events as indica-
tive of involuntary cessation of childbearing. Thus, we need to probe our data for
relationships between age at last birth, child mortality, and child survival that
consider the fuller context of women’s fertility decision making. 
The Taiwan and Dutch samples of completed marriages
Study of the fertility of marriages over their full length, especially when the ces-
sation of childbearing is of interest, requires a set of “completed marriages”.13
The samples employed in this paper are of Taiwan and Dutch completed mar-
riages in which women remained in first marriages and were continuously
under observation from age at marriage to age 46.14 These are stringent condi-
tions. They have the effect of severely reducing the number of marriages that
qualify for our samples. In many ways the marriages that survive to fulfill these
conditions are clearly not “typical” marriages. Many women’s marriages were
interrupted by death or divorce and followed by remarriage, but excluding these
from the sample is necessary to eliminate marital disruption as a reason for stop-
ping childbearing at lower parities. Marriages are also eliminated from the sam-
ple if observation is interrupted by migration, either to areas outside the study
area before the marriage reached completion or into the study area after the mar-
riage was initiated. Restricting our sample to completed marriages lasting to at
least age 46 is also necessary to ensure that even the later born children of these
women remain under observation for at least some years (so we know with great
certainty whether the children survived their first years of life) and that what
appears to be the woman’s last birth is indeed her last birth. The counts of births
and infant and child deaths include only legitimate births. 
Figure 1: Hypotheses relating age at last birth and experience of child survival
Experience of Child Survival
Age at Last Birth Few children survive Many children survive
Later Replacement Strategy
‘Natural’ ‘Natural’ Fertility (lactation interruption effect)
Earlier Involuntary Stopping Early Stopping 
Because the Taiwan household registers were open only from 1906 to
1945, the sample of completed marriages is restricted to a narrow birth cohort.
The sample includes only women born before 1/1/1901 who reach age 46 by
12/31/1945, the end of the register period. In addition, all women in the sample
must marry after 1/1/1906 if their marital fertility is to be fully observed. As aver-
age age at first marriage is 19, most of the women marrying after 1906 will have
been born after 1886. Of women born before 1886, only those marrying above
the average age at marriage and after 1/1/1906 will enter the sample. The bulk of
the women in this sample thus come from a narrow birth cohort born between
the 1880’s and 1901. Because fertility rates are known to have risen and mortali-
ty to have fallen from 1906 to 1946, limiting the sample to a narrow birth cohort
has the advantage of minimizing compositional and period effects.
This paper draws data from the household registers of four Taiwan locali-
ties. Two sites come from southwestern Taiwan, Ta-nei (N=277), which has a
majority Hoklo population but also a significant plains Aborigine minority, and
Chi-pei (N=49 ) which has a plains Aborigine majority population. Our third
site, Chu-pei (N=206 ), located in the northwestern county of Hsin-chu, had a
population evenly divided between a Hoklo area (Chiu-kang) and a Hakka area
(Liu-chia). The fourth site, Lu-kang (N=119 ), a medium sized town on the cen-
tral western coast of Taiwan, is predominantly Hoklo. These four sites thus con-
tain representatives of three of the four main ethnic groups of Taiwanese society,
and are located in the three main regions of Taiwan (north, center and south). (In
separate analyses we have found minimal systematic variation in fertility due to
ethnic differences but larger differences related to locality.) We make no claims
that the sample is “representative” of some all-Taiwan average, but note only that
it is draws women from a diversity of local populations. 
The Dutch sample is drawn from women born between 1800 and 1860 in
five localities. These localities include urban Amsterdam (N=36), urban and rural
parts of Utrecht (N=198), the medium sized provincial town of Nijmegen
(N=105), the proto-industrial agricultural community of Borne in the eastern
province of Overijssel (N=98), and the agricultural community of Akersloot in
North Holland (N=166). Throughout this chapter parity distributions are used in
preference to single figure summary measures to explore and represent women’s
actual fertility experience. Parity distributions of women’s completed fertility doc-
ument the range and heterogeneity of fertility that characterize human popula-
tions. Thus parity distributions are in many ways a superior measure compared
to age specific fertility rates that focus solely on pacing and reduce real variation
to averages of women’s experience, and total fertility rates that sum those aver-
ages (without regard to differences in marital duration). Mean parity also better
reflects the average of women’s actual fertility (determined by both duration and
pacing of childbearing), compared to total fertility rates. Total fertility rates are
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based on the statistical fiction of a synthetic cohort experiencing a succession of
age specific fertility rates, and thus assume in the case of total marital fertility,
contrary to fact, that women are married the entire fertile period, age 15-49. Total
marital fertility rates derived from synthetic cohorts can be seriously misleading
when comparing populations, such as the Chinese and the Europeans, which
have different ages at marriage and marital durations and real differences in
mean parity. Our parity distributions present the actual experience of women in
completed marriages. We use tables organized by parity, number of surviving
sons, and age at last birth to display a variety of indicators that characterize the
experience of women at different parities, and ages at last birth. 
Figures 2 and 3, presenting the parity progression ratios and the parity dis-
tributions (also Tables 2 and 3 below) provide an overview of childbearing in our
sample marriages. The parity progression ratios confirm that both populations
are characterized by natural fertility where parity specific limitation is absent.
The parity progression ratios show the proportion of women progressing to the
next birth remaining at .80 or above from parity one until parity five in the
Netherlands and until parity seven in Taiwan; after that the ratios decline slowly
and are still above .50 at parity eleven in both samples. Such patterns are typical
of natural fertility populations where women do not control their fertility.15
Figure 2: Parity Ratios, Completed marriages, Taiwan and the Netherlands, zero parity excluded
Mean parity: Taiwan 6.98, Netherlands 5.73
The mean final parity of women (excluding zero parity) was 6.98 births in
Taiwan and 5.73 births in the Netherlands. Differences in mean age at marriage,
about 19 in Taiwan and 26 in the Netherlands, cause marital durations and the
number of years from first to last birth to diverge widely (discussed below), with
the Dutch only partly making up for late marriage and short durations by a more
rapid pace of childbearing. Figure 3 shows that the distribution of individual
women by parity was highly dispersed around the average parities. Excluding
zero parity women, women having one to three births were 15.6% of the Taiwan
population and 25.6 % of the Dutch population. Women having nine or more
births were 33% of the Taiwan population and 19.3 % of the Dutch population.
Thus in both populations at least 45% of childbearing women were substantially
below or above the mean parity. In the Taiwan sample 57% of women had seven
or more births while in the Dutch sample 51% had six or more births. 
Infant mortality at 15.8 per 100 births in Taiwan was just slightly lower
than the rate of 16.7 per hundred in the Netherlands (see Tables 2 and 3). The
proportion of children who survived to age one but died by their fifth birth date
was 12.0 per hundred in Taiwan and 10.3 per hundred in the Netherlands.
Thus both our populations combine high natural fertility with high levels of
infant and child mortality. 
No conclusions should be drawn from the large difference in the pro-
173Figure 3: Parity distributions, Completed marriages, Taiwan and the Netherlands, zero parity
excluded
Mean parity: Taiwan 6.98, Netherlands 5.73
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portions at zero parity between the two populations. This is most likely an arti-
fact of differences in sample construction (the Taiwan sample excludes women
married after age 30, many of whom bore no children, while the Dutch sample
does not) as well as real differences in average age at marriage between the
samples (circa 19 in the case of Taiwan and circa 26 in the case of the Dutch).
Completed marriages do not provide an appropriate sample for estimating the
proportion of women sterile in a population, especially given the higher likeli-
hood in Taiwan that infertile women will be divorced compared to fertile
women.16
Fertility and infant mortality: Cause or consequence?
We begin our exploration of hypotheses linking infant and early child mortali-
ty and women’s fertility behavior with Tables 2 and 3 below which present dis-
tributions of women by their completed fertility and the number of infant loss-
es experienced by these women. 
What relationship, if any, does the broad distribution by parity have to the
experience of infant mortality? The lactation interruption effect and replace-
ment both assume that infant mortality is independent of parity, and that
women increase their parity in response to infant loss. In Tables 2 and 3 if we
look at the columns headed “infant deaths per woman”, we notice that women
who had more births were also more likely to have lost one or more of those
births in infancy than women who had fewer births. At first glance this sug-
gests that the lactation interruption effect and/or replacement must be playing
a strong role because women at the highest parities have lost the most births.
But it also suggests other possibilities we must consider. We know that the risks
of infant mortality are higher for high parity births. Some deaths of this nature
are likely contributing to the total numbers of infants lost to women at high par-
ities. Another possibility is that high parity women have more crowded birth
spacing that leads to higher rates of infant morality, which then in recursive
fashion results in foreshortened birth intervals and more births (the “crowding
hypothesis”). Is infant mortality a cause of high fertility (as the lactation inter-
ruption effect and replacement assume) or its consequence ?
If infant mortality were a consequence of high fertility, we would expect
to find that infant deaths per births increases regularly with parity. When we
look at the columns headed “infant deaths per 100 births” we learn that there
is a much weaker and inconsistent relationship between the probability of an
infant dying and parity. In the Taiwan case, infants born to women at the high-
est (11-14) and also the lowest (1-3) parities were more likely to die than those
born to women at middling parities. A similar pattern is found in the Dutch
case, where infants born to women at parities 9-13 were more likely to die than
those born to women at middling parities. The increases in the rate of loss per
infant born (to a maximum of 63% and 66% over the averages for the Tai-
wanese and Dutch respectively) is much less than the increase in the numbers
lost per woman (to a maximum of 3.3 and 3.75 times the averages). If women at
higher parities suffer more infant losses per woman it is primarily because the
more children born, the greater the likelihood that one child will die, and only
secondarily because the probability of infant mortality (per birth) increases
with parity. Though women are more likely to have suffered an infant loss at
higher parities this does not demonstrate that such losses were a cause of their
progressing to higher parities. Average closed birth intervals in both samples
also decline with increasing parity and the number of infant deaths per
woman; but is this because short intervals raise infant mortality, or is infant
mortality via the lactation interruption effect reducing the average birth inter-
val? That infant mortality is not independent of parity complicates our analysis
of the responses to it, and we must beware in our interpretations of the data of
assuming the causal arrow flows in only one direction. 
At the lowest parities in the Taiwan sample the rates of infant loss per
birth are also elevated (though to a lesser extent than at high parities) but infant
deaths per woman are among the lowest. We know that the risks of infant mor-
tality are higher for first births. Deaths of this nature are surely a significant pro-
portion of the infants lost to women who remain at these low parities, which sug-
gests that for some of them early experience with infant loss may signal difficul-
ties in childbearing that terminate further childbearing, rather than spurring it
to higher levels. 
Both tables show that women experiencing broadly similar rates of loss
per birth have widely divergent total numbers of births. In general these patterns
give at best weak support to the crowding and replacement hypotheses. Women
who had fewer than average births did not lose fewer infants per birth, and can-
not be said to have stopped childbearing early because more of their children
survived. And women having higher than average births did not all lose more
infants per birth, nor can these women be said to have continued childbearing to
higher parities because they lost a higher proportion of births in infancy.
Nevertheless, the increase with parity in the average number of infant
deaths per woman shown in these tables suggests a strong relationship between
women’s experience of infant mortality and their fertility. But is that relationship
explained by the early stopping hypothesis and/or replacement (women whose
children survive stop earlier than women with fewer surviving children) or by the
lactation interruption effect in conjunction with natural fertility (women continue
bearing children to the end of their reproductive lives at a pace determined by the
time spent breastfeeding surviving infants)? The lactation interruption effect pre-
dicts that women whose children survive bear fewer children because breastfeed-
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ing slows their pace of childbearing compared to women who lose children in
infancy. The early stopping hypothesis predicts stopping when women reach a
satisfactory number of surviving children or sons in contrast to the natural fertil-
ity hypothesis that predicts stopping only when fecundity declines (either due to
secondary sterility (early) or old age (late)) without regard to the number of sur-
viving sons. To test these alternative explanations we need to explore our data fur-
ther for evidence that would discriminate between these two hypotheses. 
Age at last birth and surviving children and sons
If some women were stopping childbearing “early”, did they do so in terms of
parity, age, or number of surviving children and sons? Our tables relating com-
pleted parity and infant mortality showed large numbers of women stopping at
176 Table 2: Final parity and infant losses of Taiwanese women remaining in first marriages and
continuously under observation from age at marriage (by age 30) to age 46 by births, surviv-
ing sons, infant deaths, etc., 1906-1946
# Births Number of Total births Infant Infant Infant Avg. closed
women deaths deaths per deaths per birth interval
woman 100 births:
0 30 0 0 0 --- ---
1 30 30 6 0.20 20.0 ---
2 32 64 13 0.41 20.3 5.40
3 35 105 23 0.66 21.9 3.65
4 48 192 33 0.69 17.2 3.57
5 47 235 24 0.51 10.2 3.50
6 73 438 59 0.81 13.5 3.04
7 61 427 56 0.92 13.1 2.93
8 90 720 117 1.30 16.3 2.74
9 68 612 75 1.10 12.3 2.56
10 61 610 85 1.39 13.9 2.53
11 36 396 79 2.19 19.9 2.33
12 23 276 59 2.57 21.4 2.13
13 10 130 33 3.30 25.4 1.93
14 5 70 18 3.60 25.7 1.97
15 1 15 2 2.00 13.3 1.86
16 1 16 1 1.00 6.3 1.49
Total 651 4336 683 1.10* 15.8 2.71
* Average excludes zero parity women.
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every parity up to 12 and even higher but told us little about the circumstances
characterizing these women. Did women stopping at lower parities have more
surviving sons in the case of the Taiwanese, and surviving children in the case of
the Dutch, than women stopping at higher parities? And did they do so at
younger ages or after shorter childbearing periods, defined here as the years
from first to last birth? The importance of producing surviving sons to the long
term welfare of women in the Chinese family, meant that Taiwanese women
were strongly motivated to continue childbearing until they could be sure that at
least one son would survive. The early stopping hypothesis predicts that Tai-
wanese women with many surviving sons will stop childbearing earlier than
women who have few or no surviving sons and who must continue childbearing
until they reach a satisfactory number or come to the end of their reproductive
period. Will we find analogous patterns for Dutch women anxious to produce
surviving children and sons? 
“Surviving children” and “surviving sons” are defined as those who sur-
vived early childhood and lived to at least age five. The definition used here
selects survival to age five in order to balance two countervailing pressures, iden-
Table 3: Final parity and infant losses of Dutch women born before 1860 remaining in first
marriages and continuously under observation from age at marriage to age 46
# Births Number of Total births Infant Infant Infant Avg. closed
women deaths deaths per deaths per birth interval
woman 100 births:
0 118 0 0 0 --- ---
1 34 34 5 0.15 14.7 ---
2 59 118 13 0.22 11.0 3.00
3 58 174 21 0.36 12.1 3.20
4 63 252 35 0.56 13.9 2.80
5 76 380 60 0.79 15.8 2.78
6 71 426 66 0.93 15.5 2.44
7 62 434 81 1.31 18.7 2.23
8 50 400 49 0.98 12.3 2.34
9 49 441 79 1.61 17.9 2.10
10 30 300 64 2.13 21.3 1.80
11 14 154 31 2.21 20.1 1.87
12 15 180 40 2.67 22.2 1.76
13 5 65 18 3.60 27.7 1.82
Total 704 3358 562 0.96* 16.7 2.33
* Average excludes zero parity women. 
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tified by Knodel: “This age…. encompasses the age range of most pre-adult mor-
tality, while minimizing the chance that the parents will have become sterile by
the time of the child’s death”.17 If we are to observe mothers employing limita-
tion and replacement strategies in response to the survival and loss of previously
born children, the child’s death must occur before the end of the mother’s repro-
ductive period. Mothers are likely to have remaining childbearing capacity to
adjust their birth planning to the death of a child as late as age five even in the
case of later born children. It is also important from the point of view of sample
construction that children of mothers continuously under observation to at least
age 46 are also highly likely to remain under observation to age five. 
The tables below present data on numbers of births, surviving children
and sons, infant losses, and age at last birth for women in completed marriages.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 display these data organized by age at last birth, number of sur-
Table 4: Age at last birth of Taiwanese women remaining in first marriages and continuously
under observation from age at marriage (by age 30) to age 46 by births, surviving sons,
infant deaths, etc., 1906-1946
Age at # Total Births/ Surviv- Surviv- Surviv- Surviv- Infant Infant
last birth Women births woman ing ing ing ing deaths/ deaths/
children/ sons/ children/ sons/ woman 100
woman woman 100 100 births
births births
15-17 2 2 1.00 0.50 0.50 50.0 50.0 0.50 50.0
18-20 11 15 1.36 0.73 0.45 53.3 33.3 0.45 33.3
21-23 17 33 1.94 1.47 0.76 75.8 39.4 0.29 15.2
24-26 33 99 3.00 1.94 0.97 64.6 32.3 0.70 23.2
27-29 38 124 3.26 2.37 1.00 72.6 30.6 0.68 21.0
30-32 30 134 4.47 3.40 1.90 76.1 42.5 0.57 12.7
33-35 56 310 5.54 4.20 2.02 75.8 36.5 0.88 15.8
36-38 98 659 6.72 4.94 2.67 73.4 39.8 1.03 15.3
39-41 178 1477 8.30 6.10 3.11 73.5 37.4 1.35 16.2
42-44 138 1282 9.29 6.99 3.62 75.3 39.0 1.34 14.4
45-47 19 193 10.16 7.89 3.89 77.7 38.3 1.58 15.5
48-50 1 8 8.00 7.00 4.00 87.5 50.0 1.00 12.5
Total 621* 4336 6.98 5.18 2.66 74.2 38.1 1.10 15.8
* Excludes 30 zero parity women.
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viving sons, and completed parity for the Taiwanese, and Table 7 displays the
data for the Dutch by completed parity. All tables show a consistent positive rela-
tionship between age at last birth, number of births per woman, and number of surviv-
ing children and sons per woman. Women could produce more surviving children
and sons only by having more births and extending childbearing to a later age.
The average age at last birth was 37.45 years in Taiwan, which is similar to Zhao’s
finding of an average age at last birth of 38.2 in the 1982 one-per-thousand pop-
ulation fertility survey18, and much higher than the reported age of 33.5 for Daoyi
village in the nineteenth century.19 Women in the Netherlands who married and
had first births much later than the Taiwanese stopped childbearing at an aver-
age age of 39.5 years. Women who stopped childbearing earlier than the average
age at last birth had below average numbers of surviving children and sons while
women who continued bearing children to later than average ages were reward-
Table 5: Surviving sons of Taiwanese women remaining in first marriages and continuously
under observation from age at marriage (by age 30) to age 46 by number of surviving sons,
births, age at last birth, infant loss, etc., 1906-1946
# # Total Age at births Surviv- Surviv- Surviv- Infant Infant
Surviv- Women births last woman ing ing ing deaths/ deaths/
ing birth children/ children/ sons/ woman 100
sons woman 100 100 births
births births
0 51* 147 28.18 2.88 1.29 44.9 0.0 1.08 37.4
1 116 549 33.10 4.73 2.98 63.0 21.1 1.13 23.9
2 150 997 37.59 6.65 4.80 72.2 30.1 1.14 17.2
3 127 1015 39.73 7.99 5.98 74.8 37.5 1.25 15.7
4 92 795 40.71 8.64 6.85 79.2 46.3 0.93 10.8
5 44 415 41.62 9.43 7.77 82.4 53.0 1.09 11.6
6 25 245 41.22 9.80 8.00 81.6 61.2 1.04 10.6
7 13 135 43.17 10.38 9.23 88.9 67.4 0.38 3.7
8 2 22 41.59 11.00 9.00 81.8 72.7 0.50 4.5
9 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
10 1 16 42.09 16.00 15.00 93.8 62.5 1.00 6.3
Total 621* 4336 37.45 6.97 5.18 74.2 38.1 1.10 15.8
* Excludes 30 zero parity women.
ed with above average numbers of surviving children and sons. Thus there is no
indication that women continued bearing children to late ages because of a fail-
ure to produce surviving children as the replacement hypothesis predicts; if any-
thing they enjoyed, and presumably wanted, a surplus. Contrary to the predic-
tions of the early stopping hypothesis, early stoppers had fewer than average sur-
viving children and sons. 
Zhao found a similar positive relationship between age at last birth and
the number of children born in his analysis of women’s ages at last birth by the
sex composition of their children, and he recognizes that “this is to be expected
because a large family size naturally requires a longer time to achieve”.20 But
180 Table 6: Parity distribution of Taiwanese women remaining in first marriages and continu-
ously under observation from age at marriage (by age 30) to age 46 and age at last birth etc.,
1906-1946
# # Total Age at Surviv- Surviv- Surviv- Surviv- Infant Infant
Births Women births last ing ing ing ing deaths/ deaths/
birth children/ sons/ children/ sons/ woman 100
woman woman 100 100 births
births births
0 30 0 --- 0 0 --- --- 0 ---
1 30 30 24.07 0.73 0.40 73.3 40.0 0.20 20.0
2 32 64 28.34 1.53 0.84 76.6 42.2 0.41 20.3
3 35 105 28.97 2.06 1.14 68.6 38.1 0.66 21.9
4 48 192 33.09 2.79 1.31 69.8 32.8 0.69 17.2
5 47 235 35.92 4.06 2.02 81.3 40.4 0.51 10.2
6 73 438 37.32 4.71 2.47 78.5 41.1 0.81 13.5
7 61 427 39.23 5.52 2.89 78.9 41.2 0.92 13.1
8 90 720 40.28 5.83 3.14 72.9 39.3 1.30 16.3
9 68 612 41.16 6.90 3.54 76.6 39.4 1.10 12.3
10 61 610 42.11 7.56 3.89 75.6 38.9 1.39 13.9
11 36 396 42.20 7.61 3.72 69.2 33.8 2.19 19.9
12 23 276 42.36 8.04 4.09 67.0 34.1 2.57 21.4
13 10 130 42.14 7.80 3.90 60.0 30.0 3.30 25.4
14 5 70 44.40 9.60 3.60 68.6 25.7 3.60 25.7
15 1 15 44.55 12.00 3.00 80.0 20.0 2.00 13.3
16 1 16 42.09 15.00 10.00 93.8 62.5 1.00 6.3
Total 651 4336 37.45* 5.18* 2.66* 74.2 38.1 1.10* 15.8
* Average excludes zero parity women.
Zhao interprets the pattern differently, emphasizing the low fertility of those
who stopped at younger ages as evidence of deliberate limitation, while ignoring
the high fertility of those who continued even though they had numerous sons. 
Is there any indication in the tables of a relationship between experience of
infant and child mortality and age at last birth? Did women continue to have
births to later ages because they experienced higher-than-average losses among
their children? Is there a “positive relationship between the age of mother at last
birth and the number of previous child deaths”?21 The number of infant deaths
experienced by a woman bears a direct relationship to the number of births; the
more births the greater the probability that any one newborn will suffer an early
death. This direct relationship between number of births and number of infant
181
20. Zhao, “Deliberate birth control”, 739.
21. Knodel, Demographic Behavior, 418.
Table 7: Parity distribution of Dutch women born before 1860 remaining in first marriages
and continuously under observation from age at marriage to age 46 and age at last birth etc.
# # Total Age at Surviv- Surviv- Surviv- Surviv- Infant Infant
Births Women births last ing ing ing ing deaths/ deaths/
birth children/ sons/ children/ sons/ woman 100
woman woman 100 100 births
births births
0 118 0 --- 0 0 --- --- --- ---
1 34 34 34.9 0.85 0.53 85.3 52.9 0.15 14.7
2 59 118 35.1 1.66 0.86 83.1 43.2 0.22 11.0
3 58 174 37.6 2.33 1.29 77.6 43.1 0.36 12.1
4 63 252 38.8 3.11 1.76 77.8 44.0 0.56 13.9
5 76 380 39.8 3.83 2.07 76.6 41.3 0.79 15.8
6 71 426 40.1 4.52 1.90 75.4 31.7 0.93 15.5
7 62 434 40.3 5.16 2.52 73.7 35.9 1.31 18.7
8 50 400 41.8 6.32 3.98 79.0 49.8 0.98 12.3
9 49 441 42.3 6.67 3.10 74.1 34.5 1.61 17.9
10 30 300 41.3 6.93 4.07 69.3 40.7 2.13 21.3
11 14 154 42.5 7.71 4.50 70.1 40.9 2.21 20.1
12 15 180 43.3 7.87 3.87 65.6 32.2 2.67 22.2
13 5 65 44.2 8.00 3.00 61.5 23.1 3.60 27.7
Total 704 3358 39.5* 4.28* 2.24* 74.7 39.1 0.96* 16.7
* Average excludes zero parity women.
deaths per woman shows up clearly in the tables organized by parity. But did
women having higher numbers of births also suffer a higher rate of infant loss
per birth? Or a lower proportion of surviving sons and children per birth? And
did this high rate of loss affect their age at last birth?
There appears to be a weak and somewhat inconsistent relationship
between infant deaths per birth and parity, as discussed above. In Tables 6 and 7
organized by parity we find that at high parities, 11 to 14 for Taiwanese and 10 to
13 for the Dutch, a lower than average proportion of births have survived to age
five and a higher than average proportion of births have died in infancy. These
high parity women also have higher ages at last birth. This suggests that these
women may have continued childbearing to such high parities and late ages
because of infant and child losses, in accordance with replacement. But when we
look at the numbers of surviving children and surviving sons per woman pro-
duced by these high parity women it is clear that overall they were more success-
ful than even their above average but lower parity sisters. 
In Tables 4 and 5, organized by age at last birth and by number of surviv-
ing sons of Taiwanese women, we find that women stopping childbearing early
(especially those stopping by age 29) and women with fewer than average sur-
viving sons experienced higher rates of infant death per birth and lower rates of
child and son survival than women stopping at later ages and women having
higher-than-average numbers of surviving sons. Thus the tables organized by
age at last birth and number of surviving sons show that Taiwanese women stop-
ping early and with fewer surviving sons had more infant deaths per birth rather
than fewer. This pattern is contrary to what the replacement hypothesis would
lead us to expect. The women who continue childbearing to later ages are more
successful in avoiding infant and child loss per birth, and better able to achieve
the benefits of a larger number of surviving children and sons. 
We are thus left with strong hints that infant and child mortality played a
role in preventing some low parity women from continuing childbearing, and
somewhat weaker hints that infant and child mortality played a role in delaying
stopping by some high parity women who had already produced above average
numbers of children. But these are minor notes in an overall picture showing a
consistent positive relationship between age at last birth, number of births per
woman, and number of surviving children and sons per woman that accords
well with the natural fertility hypothesis that women continued childbearing to
the end of their reproductive spans with little regard to their experience of infant
and child loss. 
Early stopping further explored
What explains early stopping if it is not an early satisfaction with the number of
surviving sons and a desire to limit subsequent childbearing? Is such early stop-
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ping voluntary, part of a deliberate birth limitation strategy, or is it involuntary,
and perhaps the result of secondary sterility, infertile husbands, marital
estrangement or other difficulty that makes further childbearing either impossi-
ble or dangerous to the health of the woman? First of all, we look at the effect of
an early start.
If women were limiting their births after achievement of a satisfactory
holding of surviving sons, we might expect that on average those who started
their childbearing period early would stop early and those who began late would
stop late, as claimed for the imperial lineage.22 According to Zhao Zhongwei
“women’s age at birth of their last child (or son) was positively related to their
age at having a first child (or son)”.23 The result of such a pattern would be a
convergence of childbearing spans around a narrow range of years. Table 8
below, organized by age at last birth, shows that the Taiwanese women who
stopped childbearing at the youngest ages (up through age 26) started on aver-
age at the earliest ages, while the remaining women had starting ages that clus-
ter within a narrow range around the average of 21.2. This gives the impression
that there may be a weak positive relation between early starting and early stop-
ping as predicted by the revisionists. However, for the entire range of stopping
ages a strong positive relationship emerges between women’s age at last birth
and their number of childbearing years. The result shown in Table 8 is a greater
number of years of childbearing the later the age at which women have their last
birth, rather than a convergence of the spans, regardless of starting or stopping
ages. Tables 9 and 10, organized by number of surviving sons and completed
parity, show an inverse relationship between starting and stopping ages, rather
than a positive one, and a strong positive relationship between the length of the
childbearing span and the number of surviving sons in Table 9, and births in
Table 10. These tables show that the most fertile women in Taiwan had the
longest childbearing periods, achieved by starting early and stopping late, while
the least fertile started late and stopped early, and had short childbearing spans.
From the perspective of surviving sons and parity, it appears the early stoppers
were not early starters who have achieved their childbearing targets early, and are
not deliberately limiting their fertility but are more plausibly women who had
their fertile years cut short involuntarily, before they could achieve a higher
number of surviving children and sons. We find that the same inverse relation
between starting and stopping ages, and positive relation between length of
childbearing span and the number of births, also characterize the Dutch parity
distribution in Table 11. 
More direct evidence of intent surrounding age at last birth comes from
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the patterns of adoption employed by the Taiwanese women (Dutch women did
not have the option of adopting). We interpret adopting a child after the last birth
not only as evidence that women were not satisfied with the size or sex composi-
tion of their offspring sets but also that stopping may not have been voluntary.
Certainly adding another mouth to feed to the family contradicts the notion that
early stopping is a deliberate means of limiting family size. The strong son pref-
erence of the Taiwanese family might lead us to expect that more boys would be
adopted than girls, but it also meant that few families gave up boys for adoption.
Thus adoptions were in fact overwhelmingly female; 84.8% of our sample’s 564
total adoptions were female. Families adopting girls could use them as son sub-
stitutes; if no sons survived they could arrange a uxorilocal marriage to continue
the family. Foster daughters could also serve as little daughters-in-law, and be
married at maturity to a son of the family at little expense and much potential
gain to the domestic control exercised by the mother-in-law cum foster mother.
184 Table 8: Age at last birth of Taiwanese women remaining in first marriages and continuously
under observation from age at marriage (by age 30) to age 46 by births, surviving sons,
infant deaths, etc., 1906-1946
Age at # Age at Avg. # % # Adopted % Male
last Women first child- Women Adopt- Adopted children/ of last
birth birth bearing adopting ing children woman births
years (1) after last after last
birth birth
15-17 2 17.6 0.0 2 100.0 3 1.50 50.0
18-20 11 19.2 0.6 9 81.8 18 1.64 63.6
21-23 17 20.2 2.2 10 58.8 19 1.12 52.9
24-26 33 20.2 5.5 12 36.4 28 0.85 60.6
27-29 38 22.3 6.3 15 39.5 33 0.87 60.5
30-32 30 21.3 10.5 9 30.0 31 1.03 50.0
33-35 56 21.2 13.3 10 17.9 44 0.79 44.6
36-38 98 21.5 16.2 10 10.2 59 0.60 64.3
39-41 178 21.1 19.4 13 7.3 137 0.77 52.8
42-44 138 21.3 22.0 5 3.6 108 0.78 62.3
45-47 19 21.7 24.3 0 0.0 19 1.00 57.9
48-50 1 25.3 23.3 0 0.0 3 3.00 0.0
Total* 621* 21.2 16.2 95 15.3 502** 0.81* 57.0
* Excludes zero parity women; ** Excludes 62 children adopted by zero parity women.
1. “Childbearing years” are the years from the first to the last birth. 
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In larger families, a surplus daughter might be sent out at the same time a foster
daughter was brought in; this was a means of unloading unwanted daughters
and replacing them with little daughters-in-law in preparation for an anticipated
minor marriage to a son. In these circumstances adoptions resulted in no net
gains in numbers of children. 
Our tables report any adoption occurring after the last birth regardless of
sex. The highest proportions adopting after the last birth are found at the earliest
ages at last birth (Table 8), among those with no or only one surviving son (Table
9), and at the lowest completed parities (Table 10). These patterns strongly sug-
gest that women, far from being satisfied with the size and sex composition of
their offspring set when stopping childbearing so early and with so few children,
were in fact strongly dissatisfied. Reinforcing this conclusion is the number of
children ever adopted (without regard to timing of adoption) per woman (as no
account has been taken of daughters given out, these are gross and not net num-
bers adopted). Women stopping at the youngest ages (Table 8), having the lowest
Table 9: Surviving sons of Taiwanese women remaining in first marriages and continuously
under observation from age at marriage (by age 30) to age 46 by number of surviving sons,
births, age at last birth, infant loss, etc., 1906-1946
# # Age at Age at Avg. # % # Adopted %
Surviv- Women first last child- Women Adopt- Adopted children/ Male
ing birth birth bearing adopting ing children woman of last
sons years (1) after last after last births
birth birth
0 51* 22.6 28.2 5.6 26 51.0 63 1.24 29.4
1 116 22.0 33.1 11.1 29 25.0 102 0.88 61.2
2 150 21.3 37.6 16.3 17 11.3 111 0.74 53.3
3 127 21.2 39.7 18.6 14 11.0 102 0.80 54.3
4 92 20.5 40.7 20.2 8 8.7 67 0.73 60.9
5 44 20.2 41.6 21.4 0 0.0 32 0.73 70.5
6 25 19.3 41.2 21.9 0 0.0 17 0.68 80.0
7 13 20.8 43.2 22.3 1 7.7 7 0.54 69.2
8 2 18.5 41.6 23.1 0 0.0 1 0.50 100.0
9 --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
10 1 19.6 42.1 22.4 0 0.0 0 0.00 100.0
Total 621* 21.2 37.4 16.2 95 15.3 502** 0.81 57.0
* Excludes 30 zero parity women; ** Excludes 62 children adopted by zero parity women. 
1. “Childbearing years” are the years from the first to the last birth. 
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number of surviving sons (Table 9), and having the lowest number of births
(Table 10), have always adopted more than the average number of adopted chil-
dren per woman. Thus the number and timing of adoptions cast serious doubt
on notions that early stopping can be interpreted as intentional fertility control. 
The last remaining measure presented in the Taiwanese tables is the pro-
portion of last born children who are male. Given the son preference of the Chi-
nese family, and a desire to have as many surviving sons as possible, women
may have felt more secure stopping further childbearing if their last born was a
Table 10: Parity distribution of Taiwanese women remaining in first marriages and continu-
ously under observation from age at marriage (by age 30) to age 46 and age at last birth etc.,
1906-1946
# # Age Age Avg. Avg. # % # Adopted %
Births Women at at child- closed Women Adopt- Adopted child- Male
firs last bearing birth adopt- ing child- ren/ of last
birth birth years (1) interval ing after last ren woman births
after last birth
birth
0 30 --- --- 0 --- --- --- 62 2.07 0.0
1 30 24.1 24.1 0.0 --- 19 63.3 35 1.17 56.7
2 32 23.0 28.3 5.4 5.4 12 37.5 33 1.03 62.5
3 35 21.6 29.0 7.3 3.65 13 37.1 38 1.09 51.4
4 48 22.4 33.1 10.7 3.57 14 29.2 47 0.98 66.7
5 47 21.9 35.9 14.0 3.5 8 17.0 35 0.74 48.9
6 73 22.1 37.3 15.2 3.04 10 13.7 51 0.70 52.1
7 61 21.6 39.2 17.6 2.93 4 6.6 32 0.52 50.8
8 90 21.1 40.3 19.2 2.74 5 5.6 70 0.78 65.6
9 68 20.7 41.2 20.5 2.56 7 10.3 40 0.59 64.7
10 61 19.3 42.1 22.8 2.53 1 1.6 47 0.77 42.6
11 36 18.9 42.2 23.3 2.33 0 0.0 36 1.00 72.2
12 23 18.9 42.4 23.4 2.13 1 4.3 19 0.83 47.8
13 10 18.9 42.1 23.2 1.93 0 0.0 8 0.80 50.0
14 5 18.8 44.4 25.6 1.97 1 20.0 11 2.20 60.0
15 1 18.4 44.5 26.1 1.86 0 0.0 0 0.00 0.0
16 1 19.6 42.1 22.4 1.49 0 0.0 0 0.00 100.0
Total* 651 21.2* 37.4* 16.2* 2.71 95 15.3* 564 0.87** 57.0
* Average excluding zero parity women; ** Average includes zero parity women.
1. “Childbearing years” are the years from the first to the last birth. 
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male child. High proportions male of last births may indicate that couples wait-
ed to have a son before stopping further childbearing. However, there appears to
be no consistent relationship between proportion male of last born and either
age at last birth (Table 8) or completed parity (Table 10). There is however a
strong likelihood that women with five or more surviving sons will end with a
male birth (Table 9). Thus it appears that women who had achieved twice the
average number of surviving sons were likely to stop further childbearing fol-
lowing the birth of a boy, but we note that the average age at last birth of these
women is already much higher than average. If this is “early stopping” it could
have little effect in preventing additional births. 
The general picture of the childbearing patterns of married women that
emerges from these tables reveals no clear signs of the practice of fertility limita-
tion. Taiwanese and Dutch women who came close to the average numbers of
births and the average ages at last birth were likely to produce the average num-
bers of surviving children (5.18 and 4.28) and sons (2.66 and 2.24). Does this
Table 11: Parity distribution of Dutch women born before 1860 remaining in first marriages
and continuously under observation from age at marriage to age 46 and age at last birth etc.
# # Age at Age at Avg. Avg. closed
Births Women first birth last birth child-bearing birth interval
years (1)
0 118 --- --- --- ---
1 34 34.9 34.9 --- ---
2 59 32.1 35.1 3 3
3 58 31.2 37.6 6.4 3.2
4 63 30.4 38.8 8.4 2.8
5 76 28.7 39.8 11.1 2.78
6 71 27.9 40.1 12.2 2.44
7 62 26.9 40.3 13.4 2.23
8 50 25.4 41.8 16.4 2.3
9 49 25.5 42.3 16.8 2.1
10 30 25.1 41.3 16.2 1.8
11 14 23.8 42.5 18.7 1.87
12 15 23.9 43.3 19.4 1.76
13 5 22.4 44.2 21.8 1.82
Total* 704 28.5* 39.5* 11.0* 2.33
* Average excluding zero parity women; ** Average includes zero parity women.
“Childbearing years” are the years from the first to the last birth.
represent a “target” family size around which women converge? Rather than a
large number of women reaching this target with only a few women exceeding
the target, as might be expected if replacement and fertility limitation by early
stopping were important determinants of women’s childbearing, women are
broadly dispersed across a wide range of levels of total births and numbers of
surviving children. Sizeable numbers of women had below average numbers of
births and surviving children and sons and sizeable numbers exceeded those lev-
els by more than one birth. 
A better view of these childbearing patterns is that there are two groups of
women, a subfertile group of early stoppers and a fertile group. Members of the
first group are women whose fertility was impaired or interrupted before they
reached the average number of surviving children. This group of women had
below average numbers of births and surviving children, earlier ages at last birth,
shorter childbearing periods, and because they were dissatisfied, more adop-
tions. This is a record of failure and disappointment, not one of birth targets
attained followed by limitation. It appears likely that these women’s childbearing
was cut short prematurely by couple infertility or other problems making child-
bearing dangerous for the woman’s health, and not by voluntary choice. 
On the other hand we have more fertile women who enjoyed greater suc-
cess in producing surviving children and sons. This group of women reached or
exceeded the average number of births and surviving children, but they did this
by continuing childbearing for a longer period and having their last birth at or
above the average age. Those who were fortunate to reach the average number of
surviving children early did not stop but continued to bear children and surviv-
ing sons, adding to their prior success. The 28.5% of fertile Taiwanese women
having four or more surviving sons (Table 9) and the 27.8% of fertile Dutch
women having eight or more births and more than six surviving children (Tables
7 and 11), had significantly longer childbearing periods and later ages at last
birth, and apparently saw no benefit in stopping earlier. 
Family composition and parity progression 
Figure 2 has shown that, overall, parity progression ratios in Taiwan were higher
than in the pretransitional Netherlands. A much lower age at marriage can prob-
ably account for this. However, it has often been asserted that the duration of
marriage, with its inverse relation to coital frequency, is an autonomous factor in
itself and should be taken into account when marital fertility is analyzed.24 To
some extent, these factors balanced one another. Thus, notwithstanding their lat-
er age at marriage, Dutch women might have been quite fertile because their
marriages were “fresher” than those of their Taiwanese counterparts of the same
188
24. Van Bavel, “Does an effect of marriage duration”.
age. Controlling for age at marriage and marriage duration simultaneously will
allow us to look from yet another angle at the motivation to stop or to continue
child bearing. 
We can surmise that, at least before the fertility transition, couples were
more “satisfied” when they had at least two sons and at least one daughter.25 One
son was needed to inherit headship status and to take care of the rites connected
with the ancestral cult. At least one other son was needed as a reserve and to pro-
vide additional labor. At least one daughter was needed to assist with household
chores. Also, she could bring in a bride price. Thus, couples who had not
achieved this minimum “target” would be more likely to continue with child
bearing than couples otherwise similarly situated (especially with regard to age
at marriage and marriage duration). At each parity, we ask what the probability is
that another child will come. For instance, in Taiwan at parity eight this proba-
bility is .695 and thus the probability of “stopping” is .305 (see Figure 2). In a
logistic regression model, the probability (p) of the dependent variable stopping
is calculated in terms of odds, that is the probability of a “yes” divided by the prob-
ability of a “no” (p/(1-p)).26 In our example the odds are .305/.695. The regres-
sion coefficients of the independent variables are the natural logarithms of the
odds. By exponentiating them, we obtain odds ratios. These indicate the increase
in the odds of the dependent variable being a yes resulting from an increase of
one unit in the independent variable (Menard 1995). Again, we work with com-
pleted marriages only. In the model we include variables for the age of the moth-
er at the time the present child was born and the duration of her marriage. We
also include the length of the previous birth interval. By doing this we control for
subfecundity, either caused by unfavourable health conditions of the couple or
by prolonged breastfeeding. We assume that the longer the previous interval, the
higher the chance that stopping will occur. To measure the effect of the family
composition at the time the present child was born, we have created four dum-
my variables: 1) less than two sons survive (including the one just born) and no
daughter; 2) less than two sons survive (including the one just born) but at least
one daughter; 3) at least two sons survive (including the one just born) but no
daughter and 4) at least two sons survive (including the one just born) and at
least one daughter. By taking the last variable as the reference, we assume that
the non-ideal family compositions (1-3) will result in lower odds of stopping.
Finally, when couples had some kind of target, we expect that their odds of stop-
ping decreased when the present child died quickly. Obviously, in populations
that did not restrain their fertility in any parity-specific way, this kind of replace-
ment behaviour is not to be expected.
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In Tables 12 and 13 we present the outcomes of our calculations. Since we
look at the effect of children present on the odds of stopping, we have substract-
ed daughters who had been adopted out in calculating the family composition at
each parity in the Taiwan case. Both tables show the paramount importance of
both age and marriage duration in predicting the odds of stopping. Also, their
impact increases with parity. For instance, at parity eight in Taiwan, the effect of
an additional year of the mother’s age at marriage is to shift the odds by 41% in
favour of stopping. At the same parity, each additional month that the couple had
been married, increases the odds of stopping by 4%. Interestingly, the Dutch
model (Table 13) is quite significant already at low parities, whereas the Tai-
wanese model gains significance per parity. Clearly, in the Netherlands age at
marriage is already relevant to explaining the end of childbearing when only a
few children have been born. As we expected, there is a direct relation between
the length of the previous birth interval and the odds of stopping. However, this
is only significant in a limited number of the models.
The influence of the actual family composition is very limited. Interesting-
ly, we find slightly more evidence of “targeting” in the Netherlands than we do in
Taiwan. For instance, having less than two surviving sons (but at least one daugh-
ter) lowered the chance of stopping in the Netherlands both at parity five and
190 Table 12: Odds ratios of stopping per parity, completed marriages Taiwan (models per parity)
Birth Age at Dura- Inter- Less Less Ar least Ar least Child Model R2 N
order mar- tion of val than than 2 sons 2 sons dies chi-
riage mar- with 2 sons 2 sons surviv- surviv- within square
riage previ- surviv- surviv- ing but ing and a year
ous ing and ing, at no daugh- at least
child no daugh- least 1 ters 1 daugh-
ters daughter ter 
3 0.99 1.02 *** 1.02 1.70 0.87 0.76 1.00 1.15 28.66 0.17 428
4 1.22 **** 1.02 **** 1.02 3.71 1.26 1.87 1.00 1.25 43.45 0.24 400
5 1.26 **** 1.03 **** 1.02 ** --- 1.24 0.27 1.00 0.71 64.49 0.32 367
6 1.20 *** 1.03 **** 1.03 * --- 0.29 0.64 ** 1.00 0.78 73.12 0.35 326
7 1.31 **** 1.03 **** 1.06 *** --- 0.76 1.43 1.00 1.03 77.08 0.41 276
8 1.41 **** 1.04 **** 1.03 * --- 0.47 1.02 1.00 0.59 84.81 0.44 231
9 1.79 **** 1.04 **** 1.02 --- 1.61 1.45 1.00 0.25 ** 75.51 0.50 166
10 1.70 **** 1.06 *** 1.01 --- 1.10 --- 1.00 1.04 65.46 0.61 107
R2 is Nagelkerke’s R Square; * Significance level p<.10; ** Significance level p<.05; *** Significance level p<.01;
**** Significance level p<.001
eight. Similarly, there is no systematic evidence that deceased children were
replaced. The death of a child within one year was only significant at parity four in
the Netherlands and parity nine in Taiwan. Overall, our results confirm that the
experience of infant and child mortality/survival had at best a very weak effect on
the fertility decision-making of couples. Instead the models confirm that stop-
ping was mainly determined by age at marriage and marriage duration. 
Does success at an early age lead to limitation?
Did married women, as they neared the end of their childbearing years, cut short
their fertility based on their previous success in producing surviving sons? Zhao
Zhongwei has argued on the basis of his analysis of China’s 1982 one-per-thou-
sand population fertility survey that “Women who had their first surviving son at
younger ages ceased childbearing earlier, while those who had their first surviv-
ing son at older ages stopped later”.27 Zhao interpreted a few months difference
in mean age at last birth between groups of women having five year differences
in age at birth of first surviving son as evidence of deliberate stopping behavior.
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Table 13: Odds ratios of stopping per parity, completed marriages the Netherlands, women born
before 1860 (models per parity)
Birth Age at Dura- Inter- Less Less Ar least Ar least Child Model R2 N
order mar- tion of val than than 2 sons 2 sons dies chi-
riage mar- with 2 sons 2 sons surviv- surviv- within square
riage previ- surviv- surviv- ing but ing and a year
ous ing and ing, at no daugh- at least
child no daugh- least 1 ters 1 daugh-
ters daughter ter 
3 1.36 **** 1.05 **** 1.00 0.21 0.58 0.45 1.00 0.47 120.03 0.41 508
4 1.40 **** 1.04 **** 1.01 1,34 0.72 1.24 1.00 0.32 ** 121.44 0.43 448
5 1.46 **** 1.05 **** 1.02 * --- 0.50 * 0.95 1.00 0.62 155.91 0.53 385
6 1.52 **** 1.04 **** 1.03 ** --- 1.03 0.23 ** 1.00 1.23 121.58 0.49 309
7 1.47 **** 1.03 **** 1.01 --- 1.21 0.72 1.00 1.43 63.42 0.34 237
8 1.68 **** 1.08 **** 1.01 --- 0.16 ** 2.45 1.00 1.86 95.07 0.60 174
9 1.73 **** 1.05 **** 1.02 --- 1.20 0.86 1.00 2.00 65.23 0.55 124
10 1.57 **** 1.03 *** 1.02 --- 2.59 1.7 1.00 1.04 22.92 0.36 75
R2 is Nagelkerke’s R Square; * Significance level p<.10; ** Significance level p<.05; *** Significance level p<.01;
**** Significance level p<.001
In his own test of the hypothesis relating age at birth of first surviving son
and age at last birth, Zhao limited his sample to those bearing a first child at ages
15-19.28 He reasoned that women who “started childbearing at roughly the same
age” could be expected to have very similar ages at last birth except for differ-
ences in sex composition and survivorship of offspring that led some women to
stop childbearing earlier than others.29 As age at first birth appears positively
related both to age at birth of first surviving son and age at last birth, age at first
birth may well be confounding the relationship between age at birth of first sur-
viving son and age at last birth. We can control for age at first birth by dividing
our sample into two subsamples, women having their first birth at ages 15-19
and ages 20-24, both of which will include a sizeable number of women, with
the latter group having their first birth close to the average age at first birth of 21.
Zhao imposed additional controls on his large sample by requiring that the
women in the sample have a birth at age 28 or 29 and have both surviving sons
and daughters before age 30. We will control for outlying ages at last birth by
requiring that the age at last birth be greater than 30, and limit the sample to
those having a first surviving son before age 30, but will not take into account the
presence of surviving daughters before age 30. 
Table 14 below presents the characteristics for the subsamples of women
having their first birth at ages 15-19 and ages 20-24, their first surviving son by
age 30, and their last birth above age 30, according to age at birth of first surviv-
ing son. The average ages at birth of the first surviving son are 21.3 and 23.67 for
the women having their first birth at ages 15-19 and ages 20-24, respectively (the
average age is 24.3 for the whole sample of 576 women having a surviving son).
For women having their first birth at ages 15-19 the table shows age at last birth
is unaffected by the age at which these women bore their first surviving son. For
women having their first birth at ages 20-24 the table shows age at last birth is
actually later by half a year for women who bore their first surviving son earlier.
When we compare the overall averages for the women having their first births at
ages 15-19 and ages 20-24, we find women having their first births at ages 15-19
stopping only two tenths of a year earlier than women having their first births at
ages 20-24, despite bearing a first child on average three and a half years earlier,
and a first surviving son on average two and a third years earlier. 
In sum Table 14 shows that there is no relationship between age at last
birth and age at birth of first surviving son when we control for age at first birth
and require last birth be above 30. As in the case of our larger sample, in each of
our subsamples the women who had their first surviving son at the earliest ages
also had some of the longest childbearing periods, and often had larger than
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average numbers of births and total surviving sons. 
Thus the women who had the advantage of producing a first surviving son
at an earlier age, appear not to have used that advantage to stop childbearing at
lower levels or earlier ages than less fortunate women. Instead they appear to
have built on their success to have more children and more surviving sons than
average. These women may have shortened their childbearing period by stop-
ping early by a few months as Zhao discovered in his sample, but we would be
misled if we thought the women who did so had reduced either their overall
childbearing period or their number of total births. 
Conclusions
To interpret as deliberate fertility limitation the “early stopping” by a few months
of high parity women who had lower levels of infant loss or earlier ages at birth
of first surviving son and at first birth (Table 14) requires us to ignore that these
same women have already exceeded the average number of births and surviving
sons and the average childbearing span. To see women having the earliest ages at
last birth when viewing the entire parity distribution as practicing deliberate fer-
tility limitation (“early stopping”) (Tables 4 through 8) requires us to ignore the
lower-than-average number of births and surviving sons of women whose child-
bearing period has been cut off. 
193Table 14: Age at last birth by age at birth of first surviving son and age at first birth: 
Taiwanese women remaining in first marriages and continuously under observation from
age at marriage to age 46 by age at first birth, who had their first surviving son before age 
30 and their last birth after age 30, 1906-1946
Age at birth # Women Age at Age at Age at Avg. child- Births/ Surviving




15-19 87 16.78 18.27 39.70 21.43 8.82 3.71
20-24 72 16.91 18.46 39.66 21.21 9.21 3.44
25-29 33 17.06 18.41 39.63 21.22 9.45 2.91
Total 192 16.88 18.36 39.67 21.31 9.07 3.47
First birth 20-24
20-24 142 19.62 21.65 40.03 18.38 7.75 3.43
25-29 56 20.11 22.19 39.51 17.31 7.11 2.79
Total 198 19.76 21.80 39.88 18.08 7.57 3.25
When we look at the full range of women by parity distribution, number
of surviving sons, and ages at last birth, and at a broad array of their experiences,
including infant loss, age at first birth, and number of adoptions, we see women
in a context that single indicators strip away. This broader context suggests both
that many women failed to achieve a desired number of surviving sons, and that
another sizeable group met and surpassed the average. Overall we find a broad
continuum of women less and more successful in producing surviving sons, but
rarely any hint that women limit their fertility once they have achieved the aver-
age or family ideal of two sons and a daughter. 
Our overview of women’s fertility, based on our examination of a number
of characteristics of women according to their age at last birth, parity, and num-
ber of surviving sons has produced no convincing evidence of replacement and
fertility limitation. Instead we have found that women who met early success in
producing surviving sons were more likely, not less, to have higher fertility than
women who were less fortunate. The characteristics of early stoppers, who had
fewer surviving sons, fewer births overall, more adoptions, and fewer childbear-
ing years, controvert the notion that they were practicing fertility limitation, and
suggest that they likely suffered impaired couple fertility (secondary sterility,
spousal infertility, morbidity, etc.), or troubled marital relationships. 
The fertility pattern of married women overall is better characterized by
the natural fertility hypothesis that women continued childbearing to the end of
their reproductive period regardless of their previous loss of children or success
in producing surviving sons. 
This paper has reported information on fertility in tables showing the full
range of women’s completed fertility. Parity distributions are unique in reporting
the experience of the many women at the extremes of low and high fertility (the
low extremes would be even more heavily populated if we had not restricted the
sample to women continuously married). One looks in vain in the many works of
modern historical demography and family reconstitution for reports of actual par-
ity distribution. There are thousands of pages on fertility in the works of Knodel,
Wrigley, Leridon, Bongaarts and Potter, and Wood but not one (?!) parity distribu-
tion that reports the actual distribution of women by completed fertility.30 Lutz
and Pullum et. al. are the exceptions.31 Instead there is an overreliance on meas-
ures of central tendency and on statistical fictions such as the total fertility rate
based on averaged age-specific fertility rates for a synthetic cohort. Averages that
recklessly strip away the full context of women’s experience can be highly mis-
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leading. As summary measures average rates may be indispensable, but they
should not be allowed to erase the experience of the many women outside the
average. The ‘average” experience acquires meaning only when contrasted to the
experience of women at the extremes who failed to meet or who surpassed the
average. The experience of women whose fertility diverges from the average
sheds invaluable light on the experience of all women. The full range of experi-
ence, not its central points, should be the starting point for studies of fertility.
Lee and Wang support their claim that early stopping is a general feature
of Chinese “marital restraint” in contrast to pretransition European populations
with three items of data: earlier mean age at last birth, short reproductive span,
and high proportions subsequently infertile.32 They first cite evidence from their
case studies of Daoyi and the imperial lineage of a mean age at last birth of mar-
ried wives of 33 to 34 that is much earlier than that of the Europeans (circa age
40). Our finding of a mean age at last birth of 37.4 for the Taiwanese and 39.5 for
the Dutch agrees with the general proposition that mean age at last birth is earli-
er for Chinese than Europeans, though the gap is nowhere so extreme as Lee and
Wang claim on the basis of their evidence, and even rather small considering the
much earlier mean ages at marriage (19.2 vs. 26) and first birth (21.2 vs. 28.5) of
the Taiwanese compared to the Europeans. 
A more fundamental question arises regarding Lee, Wang and Campbell’s
assumption that differences in average age at last birth between European and
Chinese populations reflect differences in stopping behavior.33 As noted above
(pages 4-5) historical demographers commonly consider differences in average
age at last birth as indicators of fertility control but only when age at marriage is
controlled. A very large gap existed between the Taiwanese average age at mar-
riage of 19.2 and the Dutch average of 26, and it is the early age at last birth of
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Table 15: Summary measures of Taiwanese and Dutch fertility
Taiwanese Dutch
Age at marriage 19.2 26
Age at first birth 21.2 28.5
Reproductive span (years) 16.2 11.0
Age at last birth 37.4 39.5
Avg. closed birth interval (years) 2.71 2.33
Mean completed parity 6.98 5.73
low parity women (parities 1-6) that is chiefly responsible for lowering the over-
all average age at last birth of the early marrying Taiwanese when compared to
the late marrying Dutch (Table 1). Indeed Table 15 shows that having a lower
average age at last birth does not prevent the early marrying Taiwanese from hav-
ing a longer reproductive span and despite longer birth intervals, a higher mean
parity, which is hardly suggestive of fertility limitation. It is the early age at mar-
riage that lowers the Taiwanese average age at last birth in the Taiwan-Dutch
comparison, not intentional early stopping. Lee, Wang and Campbell fail to con-
trol for the much earlier age at marriage of the Chinese population when they
claim that a lower age at last birth demonstrates Chinese marital fertility
restraint compared to the Europeans. Instead it simply reflects the earlier Chi-
nese age at marriage. 
Lee and Wang go on to argue from their data that “Whereas on average a
European mother had a reproductive span between first and last birth of 14
years, the average Chinese mother had a reproductive span of only 11 years”. We
find just the opposite: Taiwanese women’s mean reproductive span (childbear-
ing years) of 16.2 years was much longer than Dutch women’s 11.0 years. Thus
our findings contradict Lee and Wang’s claim that “Despite their late starting,
Chinese couples also stopped childbearing far earlier than pretransition couples
in the West”.34 
The third item of evidence cited by Lee, Wang and Campbell in support of
their claim that early stopping is a general feature of Chinese fertility is the age
pattern of stopping as represented by the proportions subsequently infertile by
age.35 The proportions of married women not fertile after a stated age for the Tai-
wanese, European and Liaoning (Daoyi) populations are presented in Table 16
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Table 16: Proportions of married women not fertile after stated age
Age Taiwan Europe (1) Liaoning (2)
20 4 1 4
25 8 6 13
30 12 16 29
35 20 27 51
40 50 56 74
45 95 97 93
Europe: based on Leridon, Human Fertility, 101-102.
Liaoning: calculated from Table 5.5 of Lee and Campbell, Fate and Fortune, 93.
Figure 4: Proportions of couples subsequently infertile
and figure 4. The Taiwanese age pattern of stopping agrees closely with that of
the Europeans36 (Leridon 1977: 101-2), while that for Liaoning diverges signifi-
cantly. Thus we must disagree with Lee and Wang’s larger claim that “The Chi-
nese and European age patterns of stopping are thus fundamentally different.
European populations contain few early stoppers and follow an exponential pat-
tern of increase, with a rapidly rising rate after age 35; Chinese populations con-
tain many early stoppers and follow a logistic pattern of increase with a slowly
tapering rise. The two curves clearly reflect two distinctive fertility patterns and
cannot be transformed simply by shifting or compressing”. Instead, we find on
the basis of the sample of Taiwanese completed marriages that the proportion of
early stoppers remains low and increases rapidly only after age 35. 
In sum, our findings contradict on every score Lee and Wang’s claims that
the pretransition Chinese population in comparison to those of pretransition
Europe is characterized by a much earlier mean age at last birth, a shorter repro-
ductive span, and much higher proportions subsequently infertile with age.
Claims by Lee, Wang and Campbell and Zhao that the historical Chinese popu-
lation is one characterized by deliberate early stopping are, in light of the Tai-
wanese evidence, untenable. 
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A few years ago, Arthur Wolf compared the oral and literary evidence that the
pretransitional Chinese had practiced deliberate birth control to an elephant in
the living room: “There would be evidence of its presence everywhere”. He stat-
ed that all suggestions of wide spread birth control were utterly misguided:
“Who, then, cleaned up after the elephant? No one. There was no elephant”.1
With these sentences he concluded an article in which he dismissed the claim of
“revisionist” demographers that historical levels of Chinese marital fertility were
low because Chinese couples had consciously limited their family size. The
“revisionists”, however, are not convinced by Wolf’s arguments and the debate
on pretransitional fertility continues unabated.2 This controversy is not restrict-
ed to the arcane field of sexuality in the Chinese past. The subject is attracting
interest from economic and “world” historians, who take a keen interest in the
diverging developments of China and western Europe in the past three cen-
turies. See, for instance, the latest issues of the Journal of Asian Studies. Indeed,
these are exciting times to analyze and compare historical fertility patterns in
China and western Europe.
The “new” historical demography of China seeks to undermine the
“Malthusian” paradigm on Chinese population history. In the wake of Malthus,
it is a widely held view that Chinese population growth was checked by recurrent
crises, such as wars and epidemics. Because the Chinese married early and uni-
versally, the birth rates are supposed to have been high. However, recent
research shows that marital fertility was actually very low, at least compared to
Europe. In addition, (female) infanticide was a commonly used method to adjust
family size to current circumstances. Some authors have described this as the
“functional equivalent of family planning”.3 How did Chinese couples achieve a
low marital fertility and was this deliberate or more or less accidental? The
debate on this issue is based on rather disparate sources. The “revisionists” draw
on John Lossing Buck’s Farm Survey (1929-1931), on Qing imperial genealogies
(1700-1830) and on the registers of the bannermen of Daoyi in Liaoning
province (1774-1873). According to Lee, Wang, Campbell and others, Chinese
marital fertility rates were low due to late starting, early stopping and the spacing
of birth intervals. In their view, reduction of fertility occurred in all social groups
as a strategic adaptation to adverse economic circumstances. Also, fertility of
couples with a humble position within the extended household was relatively
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low. Clearly, decisions at the household level overruled the aspirations of individ-
ual couples.4 According to Lee and Wang, the tradition of submission to house-
hold collective needs prepared the ground for the successful state control of fer-
tility in the People’s Republic.5
Critics, in particular Arthur Wolf, challenge this view on several grounds.
Wolf states that the Buck survey seriously underestimated Chinese marital fertil-
ity, whereas the banner registers underreported births to an alarming degree.6
Also, he contends that the Qing dynasty and the bannermen are in no way rep-
resentative of the Chinese population at large.7 More important, he refutes the
claim that Chinese couples deliberately reduced the number of offspring.
Although Wolf admits that Chinese marital fertility levels were quite low and
that the Chinese were indeed rational planners with respect to reproduction, he
says that the low fertility was a consequence of low maternal health and miscar-
riages (due to malnutrition) as well as to spousal separations when husbands
were seeking work. Also, Chinese marriages were typically secured at a very ear-
ly age. In many cases, women married before the age at menarche, leading to the
false impression of “late starting”. Since duration of marriage is negatively asso-
ciated with coital frequency, the “early stopping” can also be seen as a conse-
quence of early marriage. Finally, when prospective brides were adopted at an
early age and were raised alongside their future husband, their “natural” aver-
sion to one another resulted in very low fertility within these “minor” mar-
riages.8 In short, although Chinese couples traditionally aimed at maximizing
their (male) offspring, their low actual fertility was caused by adverse conditions.
Wolf backs up his claims with interviews of elderly mainland women held in the
1980s and with the Taiwanese household registers (1905-1945). His opponents,
in their turn, doubt that Wolf’s data have any bearing on the 18th and 19th cen-
tury mainland population, they question his statistical methods and, in particu-
lar, they challenge Wolf’s conviction that poverty and malnutrition directly
impaired procreation.9
Meanwhile, in Europe, a revived interest in pretransitional fertility is visi-
ble as well. European “revisionists” challenge the conventional view that inter-
ference with childbearing within marriage was “outside the calculus of con-
scious choice”. In this conventional view, deliberate fertility control in western
Europe began with the (innovative) adoption of contraceptive methods that were
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used once a desired family size was reached. The application of new techniques
heralded the onset of the fertility decline that generally took place in the final
decades of the 19th century. Instead, authors like Anderton and Bean, David and
Mroz, Szreter, Friedlander, Okun and Segal and Van Bavel challenge the equa-
tion of fertility control with parity specific birth control.10 They claim that delib-
erate birth spacing, regardless of parity, was an important feature of traditional
fertility behavior and prepared the (mental) ground for the later introduction of
birth control techniques. Thus, the European fertility decline was not the dra-
matic break with past practices as has often been portrayed. However, convinc-
ing empirical studies of birth spacing are still very scarce. Generally, it is consid-
ered to have been of minimal importance.11 At best, spacing is seen as a tempo-
rary stage in the fertility transition.12
These debates within historical demography may have an important bear-
ing on how differences between East and West are perceived. If the “revisionist”
claims on both sides of the continent are rejected it appears that the “Malthu-
sians” have stood their ground. This implies that Europeans were rather unique
in controlling their family size through entry into marriage. This may have given
them a crucial advantage in the form of a capacity to accumulate economic
resources. The Chinese, on the other hand, were constantly suffering the conse-
quences of their early and universal marriage pattern. These consequences, of
course, were poverty and high mortality. However, when revisionist claims can
be confirmed, this would mean that Chinese and Europeans shared, to some
extent at least, a rational attitude towards procreation. Thus, there would be no
intrinsic behavioral difference that could explain why the paths of economic
development diverged so widely from the 18th century onwards. This perspec-
tive is already taken by Pomeranz who states that the west-European took the
lead through Britain’s control of (cotton-producing) colonies and the location of
their coalmines.13
The stakes of the fertility debate are high. However, it is probably much
too early to draw firm conclusions. More empirical studies, in particular for Chi-
na, are desperately needed and the comparisons with western European case
studies have to be more finely tuned. Also, potential biases need to be removed
before comparing. A lot of discussion has been devoted to total marital fertility
rates (tmfr). An upward bias of the tmfr may result from the inclusion of the
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experience of 15-19 year old women.14 Also, pregnant brides cause an upward
bias because – often marrying because they are pregnant – they are clearly not at
risk of pregnancy. This problem is particularly acute in western Europe where
often the majority of the brides in the younger age groups were pregnant. Age-
specific marital fertility rates are attractive to portray the difference in levels
between East and West.15 Also, the concave shape of the curves are interpreted as
“natural fertility”, that is without parity-specific limitation. However, this com-
parison may be misleading because of strong differences in marriage duration
in western Europe and China. The Chinese rates tend to be dominated by the
fertility of women all marrying around age 20. In Europe, the aggregation of
women marrying at various ages reinforces the concave shape of the curve.16
Thus, it would be more precise to compare only women married in the same age
group. Finally, the debate is somewhat hampered by a lack of agreement of what
constitutes a significant difference. For instance, Arthur Wolf noted that moth-
ers with only sons stopped child bearing earlier than mothers with only daugh-
ters. They also had longer last birth intervals and lower parity progression ratios.
However, he asserted that this did not indicate reduction of births: “They had
just relaxed a little”.17
Even more important is the question how to detect deliberate birth control.
The intervals between successive births intervals and the timing of the last child
are determined by a host of biological, social and cultural factors. How to disen-
tangle all these effects and how to determine to what extent deliberate efforts
were involved? Essentially, we have to take account of four sets of factors.
1. The natural determinants of fertility. The age of mother is a very important fac-
tor, since fecundity is negatively associated with age. Thus, intervals tend to be
longer and the chance of stopping increases when the mother is older. Also,
birth intervals react strongly to infant mortality. The early death of the previous
infant puts an abrupt end to breastfeeding. Breastfeeding causes postpartum
amenorrhea during which the woman is not fecund. Therefore, the decease of
an infant leads to a quick return of fecundity and thus to a short subsequent
interval.18 Obviously, fecundability is directly related to coïtal frequency. The lat-
ter tends too declined as a function of the duration of marriage. Finally, we have
to consider individual differences in fecundability; some women have shorter
intervals and more births simply because they are more fecund.
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2. Socio-economic determinants. Many observed differences between social
groups in intervals, age at last birth etcetera may result from factors that influ-
ence fertility but have nothing to do with deliberate control. As we mentioned
above, the debate on pretransitional Chinese fertility is largely a debate on the
effects of poverty versus rational planning. First, we have to consider the effects
of chronic malnutrition. Although this appears not to affect fecundability as
such, it may have increased the risk of miscarriage and thus lengthened average
birth intervals.19 The same goes for chronic, untreated diseases. Second, factors
causing the husband and wife to be separated for long stretches will increase the
birth intervals. For instance, the absence of seamen and seasonal laborers from
home probably reduced the number of children. Third, we need to take into
account social differences in breastfeeding practices. In China, breastfeeding
seems to have been practiced widely.20 In western Europe, however, its incidence
varied widely, both regionally and across social groups. In the 19th century
Netherlands, the upper classes seem to have been ahead of the middle and work-
ing classes in adopting new insights about hygiene and breastfeeding. These
insights were slowly disseminated from around the middle of the 19th century.21
The reports also suggest that around 1850, in particular in industrial towns and
large cities, women from the lower class often did not breastfeed their children.
They either worked or they hired themselves as wet nurses. Their own children
were boarded out and were fed on a (often lethal) mixture of water, cow milk and
sugar.22 Wet-nurses probably had longer birth intervals themselves. 
3. Cultural factors. Before the transition, cultural factors that influenced fertility
included customs regulating sexuality during the first period after confinement
and customs with respect to breastfeeding. For instance, Confucianism pre-
scribed a three- month reclusion of the mother and child.23 Cultural differences
between the ethnic Hakka and Hokkien were not relevant in terms of marital fer-
tility.24 In the Netherlands, interesting differences existed between religious
groups. An individual-level enquiry in The Hague in 1908 showed that Catholics
practiced less breastfeeding than Protestants (and both groups less than Jews).25
Possibly, the difference stemmed from the second half of the 19th century when
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the Catholic clergy campaigned against breastfeeding on the ground that expos-
ing the breasts was shameful.26 Also, religious groups differed strongly in their
receptivity towards new, scientific insights in hygiene and childcare. Catholics
and orthodox Protestant groups tended to reject modern, secular views from out-
side their group. In Taiwan, the form of marriage is particularly important for the
subsequent fertility. Arranged marriage and the transfer of a girl to a subservient
position in an unknown family probably caused a lot of distress and an initial
period of antipathy towards her husband. A certain degree of premarital famil-
iarity may have attenuated this. At least, Pasternak has found higher fertility
among endogamous couples, regardless of the form of marriage.27 On the other
hand, in minor marriages in which future spouses grew up together as brothers
and sisters, marital fertility was very low. 
4. Finally, there are deliberate efforts to lengthen the birth intervals or to stop hav-
ing children altogether. Before contraceptive techniques became available these
efforts included abstinence from intercourse, coïtus interruptus or the extension
of breastfeeding.28 In order to detect such efforts, it is crucial that we hypothe-
size about situations in which couples were motivated to limit childbearing.
Women’s work could be an important motive. When married women made an
important contribution to the family income, it was sensible not to burden her
for long period with young children. In the Netherlands, women working in tex-
tiles had relatively low fertility, particularly when their jobs were not compatible
with nursing. Although these families were interested in a large number of
(income earning) children, it was also beneficial to space births.29 On Taiwan, no
association between fertility and women’s agricultural work was found.30 Apart
from household economic motives, couples may have deliberately moderated
the pace of childbearing to protect the health of both mother and child. The child
enjoys a longer period of close maternal attention, including a longer period of
breastfeeding, and will be better established in the world before his mother turns
her attention to a new infant. Second, the mother has more time to rest and
recover her strength when birth intervals are longer.31 In principle, these advan-
tages were visible to parents, and deliberately delaying a next birth would match
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well with and strengthen the basic human reproductive strategy. Spacing may
partly reflect and overlap with efforts of stopping altogether. When couples felt
the desired family size was reached they started trying to avoid a next birth.
Detection of parity-specific stopping is quite feasible, provided we control for
natural factors such as the age of the mother and the duration of the marriage.
Similarly, we can try to see if spacing was in any way parity-specific as well.
Another way of detecting deliberate control of reproduction is to see whether
deceased children were replaced. Finally, conscious control of reproduction is
revealed through the preferences of the parents for the sex composition of their
family. For instance, a preference for a minimum number of sons may have led
to longer intervals and earlier stopping when that minimum was reached. 
Clearly, there is a need to approach European and Chinese marital fertility with
exactly the same definitions. Also, we will have to use methods that separate
deliberate manipulation of fertility from all other factors affecting it through
coital frequency or breastfeeding. In this paper, we will make an effort in this
direction. We will directly compare micro level datasets on fertility from Taiwan
(1905-1945) and the Netherlands (1830-1940). Obviously, colonial Taiwan cannot
represent the experience of mainland China in all respects. Its economic devel-
opment and living standards were well in advance of the mainland, which was
translated into relative high fertility and decreasing mortality levels. However,
Japanese occupation hardly affected the family values of the Taiwanese.32 This
means that the internal hierarchy of households, the preference for sons and the
attitudes of parents towards the deployment of their offspring remained highly
traditional.
In the next section we will describe the datasets and the field sites that are
used. Then, we compare the marital fertility rates in these areas by looking at
age-specific rates corrected for prenuptial pregnancies. Instead of concentrating
on total marital fertility rates, we have chosen to compare the number of births
as determined by age at marriage, age at last confinement, sterility and birth
intervals. We focus in this paper on the building of multivariate models that take
account of as many relevant variables as possible and that will indicate the extent
and meaning of deliberate control of fertility. In the fourth section, we construct
a model of spacing behavior. The sources do not enable us to define exactly the
same variables in both countries, so we will have a separate model for each coun-
try. In the fifth section, this will be followed by a model on stopping. Finally, we
will sum up our findings in the last section.
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Field sites and databases
The Dutch family reconstructions used in this paper pertain to two areas in the
central and western parts of the Netherlands. The first dataset is drawn from the
Historical Sample of the Netherlands, a large database that contains more than
70.000 life courses. The database is built from a random sample (0.5%) in the
Dutch birth certificates of 1812-1922, linking and entering all information in
both the civil registers (birth, marriage and death certificates) and the continu-
ous population registers which started in 1850.33 We use the first, more or less
completed, part of this database that covers the province of Utrecht. We limit the
analysis to married sample persons. Their birthplaces were evenly spread over
the urban and rural parts of the province. More important, their complete life
courses were reconstructed by following them in all their successive places of
residence. From 1850 onwards, Dutch population registers recorded all life
events (birth, death, marriage and migration) of individuals within their house-
holds, and noted additional information on occupation and religion. We have
restricted the analysis to first marriages of rural couples (N=490). The second
dataset is built from a marriage cohort in one North-Holland village (1830-1879).
All first-marrying couples in Akersloot (N=281), an agricultural community
about thirty kilometres to the north-west of Amsterdam, were traced in their
migration trajectories. However, most of them remained in or near Akersloot.
This was an ordinary North-Holland village, except for the fact that its continu-
ous population registers started already in 1830. For the analysis, we have com-
bined the Utrecht and North-Holland data in a rural pretransitional cohort
(mothers born before 1870, N=534) and a rural transitional cohort (mothers born
between 1870 and 1900, N=237).
During the 17th and early 18th centuries, North-Holland and Utrecht had
benefited greatly from the commercial successes of the Dutch Republic. Howev-
er, the second half of the 18th century was characterized by economic decline.
The Napoleonic Wars sealed the fate of the Netherlands as a leading seafaring
nation. In the first half of the 19th century, the coastal province of North-Holland
was only slowly recovering from this crisis. Population size of cities like Amster-
dam stagnated until 1850. In the second half of the 19th century, the provinces of
North- and South-Holland regained their former dominance, due to a redirec-
tion of the trade streams towards Germany. Amsterdam became a world center
of financial services. Also, the area to the north of Amsterdam industrialized rap-
idly. The small, inland province of Utrecht had suffered less from the collapse of
the sea trade. Its population grew strongly, in particular in the eastern part of the
province. From around 1850 onwards, the number of factories increased with
chemical, textile and cigar making industries predominating. The province,
especially its major cities Utrecht and Amersfoort, profited strongly from is cen-
tral location at the nexus of Dutch railway lines. This attracted railroad offices
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and workshops, metallurgical industries and a host of commercial service com-
panies.34
The Netherlands as a whole was relatively late in industrializing. The
industrial “take-off” did not occur until the 1890’s. In this respect, North-Hol-
land and Utrecht were no exceptions. Apart from the service sector, their
economies were built on agriculture, in particular on dairy farming which grew
continuously in importance. This sector was characterized by farms that were
small in size and workforce but highly oriented towards producing quality prod-
ucts for export. Around the cities, horticulture expanded whereas in the coastal
parts of North-Holland bulb farming was of importance as well. By and large,
farmers in North-Holland and the western part of Utrecht were rather prosper-
ous. Due to the commercialized and specialized character of the economy in
these areas, most people depended on wages. The labor market was clearly divid-
ed into a skilled and an unskilled segment. Up until the final decades of the 19th
century, there were large numbers of unskilled day-laborers whose income was
highly insecure and who often turned to charity to supplement their incomes. In
fact, around 1850, 23% of the North-Holland population was on poor relief. In
Utrecht, this figure was 15% and in the country as a whole 14%.35
The demographic transition in the Netherlands has followed a somewhat
different course from the rest of Europe. Although mortality declined early, mar-
ital fertility declined later and slower, which caused a strong population growth
until well after the Second World War.36 Explanations of this pattern tend to com-
bine the late industrialization of the country with the strong impact of religious
organizations on Dutch mentality and procreative behavior. Marital fertility in
the Netherlands declined slowly from the 1890s onwards. In North-Holland,
marital fertility started to decline from 1885 onwards, earlier and stronger than
in Utrecht.37 In the cities, the decline started roughly at the same time as in the
countryside, but it was steeper so that by the 1930’s urban levels of marital fertil-
ity were about 30 to 40% lower than rural ones.38
In Taiwan, we analyze the first marriages from two rural field sites, Chu-shan
(N=1146) and Ta-chia (N=340). Chu-shan township is situated at the southeast
tip of Nantou County. It is an extension of the north ridge of A-Li mountain;
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thus, its southern part is higher, and its northern part lower in altitude. The total
area occupies 247,433 sq. km.; out of which 83% is a mountainous area. It meas-
ures 18.5 km. from east to west, and 23 km. from south to north; giving it the
shape of a long boot.
Chu-shan is one of the earliest areas to be cultivated in all of Taiwan, and
also the earliest developed area in the whole of the Nantou region. The process
started at the time of Cheng Ch’eng-kung in the Ming dynasty (around 1664
A.D.) when Lin Chi led over two hundred settlers to Dou-liu Gate, and went fur-
ther east to Lin Chi Po (today’s Chu-shan) to clear the land for cultivation. To
commemorate Lin’s achievement of cultivation and of pacifying the Aborigines,
the new settlement was called Lin Chi Po. It was only in 1920, when the whole of
Taiwan was divided into two prefectures, five counties, three cities, and 47 town-
ships, that Chu-shan chen (township) was set up under Taichung chou (prefec-
ture). It was the main gateway to east Taiwan for the Han entering Aboriginal
land. 
Even though Lin Chi Po had been developed as early as the time of Cheng
in the Ming dynasty, it was only in the early years of Ch’ien-lung during the
Ch’ing dynasty that the Han actively participated in the cultivation of the land.
Some of the main irrigation systems were built in this period, and farming was
first done in flooded fields.39 As a result of the Japanese government’s imple-
mentation of a colonization policy which was both dynamic and scientifically
managed, in the short span of 50 years, Taiwan’s economy experienced great
progress unmatched by that under the rule of the Ch’ing dynasty.40 The chief
agricultural products of Chu-shan were rice, tea, sugar cane, sweet potatoes and
bananas. Situated in the warmer forest regions, camphor trees and bamboo
forests flourished. The fact that economic products like wet rice, cane sugar and
camphor had already been somewhat developed and exported to overseas mar-
kets made their further and rapid development of those products easy. In addi-
tion, the rise of economic products like tobacco and bananas had led to the
increasing importance of bamboo forestry in the mountain areas. These prod-
ucts were not only consumed throughout the whole island of Taiwan, they were
further also for sale in the international market. Through the enlargement of
this kind of market network, Chu-shan evolved from a state of semi-isolation to
one of integration with a bigger social system.
As for population, a figure of 25,975 inhabitants was recorded in the first
census conducted by the Japanese government. This almost doubled from 1906-
1941, with the most largest increase coming from those whose had their ancestry
was in Changchou, Fujian.41 At the same time frame, the population growth on
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the island itself was the same; with almost a one-fold increase. There may be two
causes for this population increase. On the one hand, the natural cause of the
birth rate exceed that of the death rate; on the other hand, a influx of migrants
occurred. Nevertheless, according to Chen, owing to the extremely strict mobi-
lization laws imposed by the Japanese colonial government, relocation only had
a minute influence on the population of Taiwan.42 Ninety six percent of the pop-
ulation increase was a result of natural causes. After the Cheng era General Lin
Chi opened Lin Chi Po to cultivation, the Chu-shan area witnessed the gradual
appearance and development of both villages and temples. These supported pro-
duce ritual field of various sizes that interlocked to form a very intricate regional
organization under by increasing influence of the Han.43 
The second field site of this study is Ta-chia, which is located in the middle
of Taiwan’s west coast, about five kilometers from the seashore and at an altitude
of 500 meters. Ta-chia was under the administrative supervision of Ta-chia
Township. Because the Ta-an River cuts through the town and the Ta-chia River
lies to the south, Ta-chia had an abundant water supply and fertile land. It was
initially settled and named by Ping-pu (lowland) Aborigines of the Taokas tribe,
and thus was developed very early in Taiwan’s settlement history. The Han
migrants moved into this area around 1700; beginning in 1706 roads were con-
structed and a rural township established. Ta-chia became famous for its woven
sleeping mats, and in 1765 the Ta-chia mat became an item of tribute to the
imperial court. In 1897, Ta-chia weavers developed the Ta-chia Panama hat,
which was a very famous article and sold in the international market. 
After the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, Ta-chia’s administrative status
was not very stable, because the Japanese authorities began to re-organize local
administrative boundaries. It was only in 1922, after the completion of the
North-South railway, that Ta-chia was re-vitalized. During this period, Ta-chia’s
surrounding areas were cultivated with sugarcane fields, and the Japanese colo-
nial government built a railway branch line to connect Ta-chia with Ta-an harbor.
The location of Ta-chia Township then became a convenient place for the distri-
bution of goods and services to the surroundings area. 
Marital fertility
Correcting for biases
Although the age-specific marital fertility rate (asmfr) is the most accurate cal-
culation of marital fertility, direct comparison of these rates can be misleading in
several respects. Firstly, prenuptial conceptions lead to overestimation of the
asmfr; the substantial differences between Taiwan and the Netherlands in the
incidence of bridal pregnancies disturbs the comparison. Secondly, (female)
infanticide causes underestimation of the asmfr. Again, when this occurs more
often in one country, the comparison is flawed. Thirdly, because the form of Tai-
wanese marriage (minor, major or uxorilocal) is directly related to fertility, we
need to know the incidence of the relevant forms in Chu-shan and Ta-chia as
well as the extent of their impact on fertility before comparison with the Dutch
figures. Finally, strong differences in marriage duration will distort the compari-
son of asmfrs. We will first discuss these problems before presenting the final
comparison. 
Prenuptial pregnancies occurred more often in the Netherlands than in
Taiwan. In Chu-shan, 13.6% of all first born children were conceived before the
wedding. In Ta-chia the corresponding figure was 11.5%. In the early Dutch mar-
riage cohort (mothers born before 1870), the premarital pregnancy rate was 33%.
In this cohort, pregnant brides married almost two years earlier than non-preg-
nant brides. This means that, in many cases, the marriage took place because the
wife was already pregnant. The concentration of such “forced marriages” in par-
ticular age groups will bias the calculation of the asmfr because the period “at
risk” of conception after the wedding data is much shorter than in age groups
with a lower incidence of pregnant brides. Thus, the denominator is smaller and
the asmfr will be higher. Interestingly, we find the same problem among minor
marriages in Taiwan. No less than 40% of the first-born children of minor-mar-
rying couples in Chu-shan and Ta-chia were conceived before the official date of
marriage. According to Wolf, some parents delayed formalizing the marriage
between foster-siblings until the young couple had accepted the match, a clear
sign of which was a pregnancy. Only then was their marriage registered.44 We
have solved this problem following a procedure developed by Wilson.45 We cal-
culate the mean intervals between marriage and first births in the case of preg-
nant and non-pregnant brides. Then, we add the difference between these inter-
vals (generally about a year) to the period at risk of the pregnant brides.
Female infanticide was probably a common phenomenon in mainland
China. According to Lee and Campbell, 20 to 25% of all newborn girls in Liaon-
ing fell victim to this practice.46 Little is known about regional variations in
infanticide, but in early 20th century Taiwan it appears to have been rare. On the
basis of sex ratios in the aggregated vital statistics, Barclay calculates that in the
“worst” years, 1906-1911, only two percent of newborn girls were not reported
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and therefore probably killed.47 Obviously, these aggregate Taiwanese data may
still hide local differences. However, Pasternak reaches the same conclusion for
the field sites of Lung-tu and Chung-she.48 When we compare the sex ratios of
Chu-shan and Ta-chia with those of the early Dutch cohort, we can conclude that
female infanticide does not invalidate our comparison (see Figure 1).
In Chu-shan and Ta-chia, major marriage was the most common form. No
less than 80% of the couples in the Chu-shan dataset had married in this fash-
ion, whereas both minor and uxorilocal marriages each took up 10 percent. The
corresponding figures in Ta-chia were 65% major marriages, 9.4% minor mar-
riages and 25.6% uxorilocal marriages. The aggregate figures in the two Tai-
wanese field sites are thus highly dominated by the experiences of major marry-
ing couples. But how strong were the differences between forms of marriages in
Chu-shan and Ta-chia with respect to fertility? In Figure 2 we present the asmfrs
per type of marriage, after the correction for bridal pregnancies.
We can see that, as in Hai-shan and in Lung-tu, minor marriages were
characterized by relatively low fertility.49 Uxorilocal marriages on the other hand,
had somewhat higher fertility rates than those in major and minor marriages.
This has been found in other Taiwanese areas as well. According to Pasternak,
couples that married uxorilocally often had the opportunity to become acquaint-
212
47. Barclay, Colonial Development and Population in Taiwan.
48. Pasternak, Guests in the Dragon, 112.
49. Wolf and Huang, Marriage and Adoption in China; Pasternak, Guests in the Dragon.
Figure 1: Sex ratios by parity, Chu-shan/Ta-chia and rural Netherlands sample
ed before marriage. Also, there was no transfer of the bride to a strange house-
hold. These factors may have diminished the emotional stress of (arranged) mar-
riage and may explain why young uxorilocal brides had relatively high fertility
levels. Furthermore, when the prime purpose of the uxorilocal marriage was to
provide the household with labor, this could be a stimulus to the (continued)
high fertility that is visible after age 40.50
The timing of first marriage of women differed widely between Taiwan
and the Netherlands. In Chu-shan the average age at first marriage was 19 years
with a standard deviation of only 2.6 (N=1146). In fact, 67.6% of all Chu-shan
brides married in the age group 15-19. In Ta-chia the age at marriage was the
same (19.4), but the standard deviation somewhat larger (3.6, N=340). In the
northwestern part of the Netherlands (rural women born before 1870) the aver-
age age at first marriage was 26 years (N=534). However, the entry into marriage
was not tied to a specific age group, since the standard deviation was five years.
Only 46.3% of the brides married in the age group 25-29. When comparing fig-
ures of age-specific marital fertility rates of these two populations, we will have to
keep in mind that potential differences in either the level or shape of the curves
can be caused by differences in marriage duration. To demonstrate the effect of
marriage duration, we show in Figure 3 the “normal” aggregated asmfrs for the
Netherlands (early rural sample, corrected for bridal pregnancy) as well as the
asmfrs of women who married in the “Taiwanese” age groups 15-19 and in the –
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Figure 2: Age-specific marital fertility rates in Chu-shan and Ta-chia, by form of marriage
more or less – standard group 25-29. 
Although few women married in the age group 15-19, their fertility pattern
clearly stands out from the rates of the 25-29 group and the rates of the whole
cohort. Fertility in the young-marrying group declined already from age 20-24
onwards! 
Dutch, Taiwanese and “natural” fertility
In many historical demographic studies, the extent of birth control in a given pop-
ulation is deduced from the divergence of the shape of the asmfr curve from a
standard curve created by Coale and Trussell.51 When the curve takes a marked
concave shape this is held to be evidence of parity-specific birth control. Coale and
Trussell built their standard on the basis of ten historical fertility schedules. These
schedules refer to populations who never practiced birth control. Recently, Coale
and Trussell’s standard has been corrected by Xie,52 who weighted the size of the
populations involved. We will use Xie’s figures to compare the Dutch and Tai-
wanese data (Figure 4). All rates are corrected for premarital pregnancies. The Tai-
wanese figure combines data from major, minor and uxorilocal marriages in the
two field sites. In figure 4, we will also look at a transitional Dutch birth cohort of
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Figure 3: Age-specific marital fertility rates controlling age at marriage. Rural Netherlands
mothers born between 1870 and 1900. Finally, we will split the Taiwanese group
into a cohort of women born before 1906 and a cohort born after 1906, to see
whether there was any change during the period under consideration.
The rural Dutch pretransitional fertility rates were not far removed from
Xie’s maximum levels (Figure 4). The youngest cohort, however, had decidedly
lower levels after age 20 to 24. More important, the shape of the curve was much
more concave which probably reflects stopping efforts related to an ideal family
size. The Taiwanese levels are lower than the pretransitional Dutch, but just as
convex. So, both the Dutch (before the 1870-1900 birth cohorts) and the Tai-
wanese were “natural fertility” populations. In Taiwan, changes during this peri-
od are ambiguous. Women born after 1906, thus marrying roughly from 1920
onwards, had higher fertility in the youngest age groups but lower in the older
age groups. Because our data end at 1945, they could not be followed after age 39.
Finally, how do the Taiwanese rates look in comparison to the Dutch when
the ages at marriage are matched? In Figure 5 we compare the fertility rates of
groups of Chu-shan and Ta-chia women married in the major fashion at respec-
215Figure 4: Age-specific marital fertility rates, Taiwan (women born before and after 1906) and
the Netherlands  (women born 1800-1870 and 1870-1900)
tively 15-19 and 20-24 year with comparable Dutch groups. Even after controlling
for prenuptial pregnancies, very young Dutch women seem somewhat more fer-
tile than their Taiwanese counterparts. Possibly, this could be ascribed to a later
age at menarche among Taiwanese girls. In addition, we should consider the
emotional problems associated with arranged marriage versus the free choice
common in the Netherlands. More important, the differences between the two
countries are more moderate than in Figure 4 and certainly much less extreme
than many east-west comparisons will have us believe. We can conclude that
many of the differences in fertility levels reported can be ascribed to differences
in marriage duration and in levels of bridal pregnancy. 
Total marital fertility rates: theory and practice
Total marital fertility rates (tmfr) play an important role in the discussion on the
“true” levels of Chinese fertility. They are simply the cumulative age-specific
marital fertility rates and they give a final number of births provided a woman
married at age 20 (or even 15) and was still married at age 50. Thus, they provide
the maximum family size that is theoretically attainable given the fertility sched-
216 Figure 5: Age-specific marital fertility rates, Chu-shan and Ta-chia (major marriages) and
rural Netherlands (women born before 1870) controlling for age at marriage
ule for a particular population. Women from our rural Dutch cohort (born before
1870) would have had no fewer than 10.2 childbirths if they had spent all their
reproductive years (15-49) in the married state. Chu-shan and Ta-chia women fall
somewhat behind this with respectively 8.28 and 7.63 childbirths. To be sure,
this is much higher than the (disputed) mainland figure of 5.65 calculated from
the Chinese Farm Survey (1929-1931).53 The tmfr of 8.28 of major marriage in
Chu-shan is lower than the 8.56 found in Lung-tu, but higher than the 7.52
reported for major marriages in Hai-shan and the 7.82 found in Chung-she.54
Women marrying in the major fashion in Ta-chia had an average tmfr of 7.47. 
In our opinion, comparing tmfrs is too abstract. Does this theoretical max-
imum have any actual significance? Surely, the average married woman differed
strongly from a woman who fully conforms to a group fertility schedule. Also, we
still we do not know how Taiwanese women reached a lower tmfr than the Dutch
women. The demographer McDonald has suggested a decomposition of average
fertility of completed marriages by taking into account starting, stopping, spacing
and sterility. His formula of the average number of children born to completed
marriages55 enables us to make a more realistic assessment of differences
between the Netherlands and Taiwan, as well as the reasons for these differences.
McDonald’s formula reads T= s(1+(l-m-f)/i): T stands for the total number of chil-
dren born, s is the percentage of marriages with at least one child, m is the female
mean age at first marriage, f is the average interval between marriage and first
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Table 1: McDonald’s calculation of total number of children born to completed marriages
Netherlands (rural Chu-shan and
women born Ta-chia (major 
before 1870) marriages)
%fertile (s) 89% 93%
age at first  marriage (m) 26.5 19.4
average interval between marriage 1.33 2.14
and first birth in years (f)
Average birth interval in years (i) 2.08 2.85
age at last confinement (l) 37.45 38.29
N 372 102
Total number of children born 5 6.38
birth, i is the average birth interval and, finally, l is the mean age of the mother at
last confinement.56 In Table 1 we calculate the outcomes for our two countries.
Because the observation period is maximally restricted to the period 1906-
1945 and because out-migrations lead to censored observations, the total num-
ber of “completed” marriages in Chu-shan and Ta-chia is rather limited. Also,
infertile couples tended to divorce rapidly, which resulted in a very low percent-
age of sterile couples among completed marriages. However, the table shows
convincingly that when Taiwanese couples remained married until the wife’s
menopause, they would have had 1.38 more children than Dutch couples before
the fertility transition. Also, Dutch completed marriages appear to have realized
less than half of their theoretical maximum of 10.2 children. The Taiwanese on
the other hand realized about 80% of the tmfr (8.13).
The table shows that the difference between the Dutch and the Taiwanese
in age at last confinement was unimportant. However, the Taiwanese interval
between marriage and the first birth as well as the successive intervals were con-
spicuously longer than the Dutch intervals. Furthermore, as we already know,
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Figure 6: Changes in total family size of completed families in rural Netherlands and 
Chu-san/Ta-chia when McDonald’s parameters are exchanged
there was an enormous difference in age at marriage. Just how important were
these features in determining final family size? We can find that out easily by
substituting a Dutch parameter in the Taiwanese formula and vice versa. Doing
this with the percentage of couples with at least one child (s), we can calculate
that, had we found a similar percentage of sterile couples (11%) in the Taiwanese
cohort, the total number of children born would still only have been 6.1 children,
or 0.28 less than the 6.38 calculated above. The Dutch, on the other hand, would
gain 0.23 children if given the low “Chu-shan and Ta-chia” sterility ratio. We
have repeated this procedure for all the parameters in the formula. The results
are graphically displayed in Figure 6.
Figure 6 unequivocally shows that what really mattered in determining
family sizes were age at marriage and birth intervals. Differences in starting,
stopping and sterility were, in the end, insignificant. 
Were the Taiwanese birth intervals longer because the lactation period was
more extended? Indirect evidence on the duration of lactation can be gleaned
from looking at the effect of infant mortality on the subsequent birth interval
(Table 2). In both the Netherlands and Taiwan, birth intervals were shorter when
the infant died within its first year. However, the Taiwanese intervals were 8.3
months longer than the Dutch after the birth of a surviving boy and 5.6 months
longer after the birth of a surviving girl. Thus, it seems likely that not only were
Taiwanese infants breastfed much longer, this was particularly so for boys. We
also notice that the incidence of infant mortality was much higher in the Nether-
lands. Thus, the impact of mortality on lowering the aggregate mean intervals is
stronger in the Netherlands than in Taiwan.
219Table 2: Comparison of subsequent birth intervals by survival status and sex of of the child,
Taiwan and rural Netherlands
Taiwan (Chu-Shan) Rural Netherlands 
(mothers born before 1870)
Male Female Male Female
Birth interval when 32,8 (1554) 30,8 (1538) 24,5 (884) 25,2 (839)
infant survived
Birth interval when 22,5 (185) 23,2  (106) 21,1 (181) 21,9 (160)
infant died
Outcomes of T-tests for the effect of infant mortality in Dutch and Taiwan tables all Pr >t <0.0001.
Birth intervals are strongly influenced by coital frequency and breastfeed-
ing, which may or may not be manipulated consciously to space births.57 It is not
possible to draw conclusions about the presence or absence of controlled birth
spacing from a simple comparison of mean or median lengths of birth intervals
between groups or time periods.58 As we have explained in the introduction, only
a multivariate approach can help us unravel this knot.
Analyzing birth intervals
Building the multivariate models
We employ multivariate Cox regression in order to model the length of the inter-
birth intervals.59 As we are interested in the speed of parity progression here, not
in the probability of such progression, we include closed birth intervals only.60
By definition, then, only married couples with at least two legitimate children
born are included in the samples. One additional condition is that, in order to
exclude sterile and extremely sub-fecund couples, only intervals closed by a birth
conceived within five years after the previous one are included.61 Finally, we
model all progressions together, and include the previous fertility history in the
list of covariates. As we indicated in the Introduction, we distinguish four groups
of factors that influence marital fertility: natural determinants, socio-economic
factors, cultural factors and, finally, family composition. This categorization
reflects an increasing deliberateness in fertility control.
The natural determinants of fertility are defined in both the Taiwanese
and Dutch model as follows. First, mother’s ages at the beginning of the birth
intervals are included in the form of the commonly used five-year age categories.
Second, marriage duration is included in the regressions as the exact number of
year the marriage has lasted at the beginning of the birth interval. Third, we need
to control for differences between individual couples with respect to fecundabili-
ty and postpartum amenorrhoea. Following Van Bavel, we do this by including
crude legitimate parity in the regression.62 Crude legitimate parity is defined as
the number of children already born within the current marriage at the begin-
ning of the interval. It represents fecundity differences because couples with on
average short birth intervals in the past and, hence, relatively many births at a
given age and marriage duration, can be expected to have shorter birth intervals
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in the future as well. Differences between couples reflect differential fecundabil-
ity and breastfeeding habits. Fourth, infant mortality is included in the regres-
sion equations as a time-varying dummy variable: from the moment the previ-
ously born infant dies, it is set to one. The death of the previous infant abruptly
stops breastfeeding and restores fecundability. In principle, adopting-out an
infant could have the same effect. In Chu-shan 7.5% of girls and 1.9% of boys
were adopted out already before the first birthday (in Ta-chia these figures are
respectively 6.1% and 1.0%). Therefore we combine premature death and adopt-
ing-out of the previous child in the Taiwanese model. Fifth, even in the absence
of fertility control, final interbirth intervals tend to be much longer than non-
final intervals.63 Therefore, and in order to make sure that we don’t mix up
attempts to stop with true spacing behavior, a dummy variable differentiates
final from non-final intervals. 
Although the household registers in both countries are very rich in details
on life course events, they contain little information on the socio-economic posi-
tion of the households. At best, some information is provided on the occupation
of the husband. Thus, we lack direct information on the income position, land
use and tenure status, and property. Furthermore, we do not know if and how
often the spouses were separated because the husband was working elsewhere.
Finally, there is hardly any information on women’s labor. In the model for the
Netherlands we use six occupational categories. (1) elite occupations (employers
in industry, professionals, high civil servants and higher military); (2) farmers (3)
white collar middle class (lower level professionals, lower civil servants, foremen
and supervisors of various kinds); (4) self-employed (shopkeepers, small entre-
preneurs, merchants and self-employed artisans); (5) skilled workers (craftsmen,
skilled laborers in small business and industry) and servants with a labor con-
tract; (6) casual and unskilled laborers and peddlers. This occupational classifi-
cation is often used in Dutch historical demography.64 These occupational
groups differ in many ways. The more (security of) income, the less motivated
the couples were to space their births. Even if a woman was working after mar-
riage, as was common in farming, she could be replaced by a servant when the
children were young. The favorable economic situation of (dairy) farming in the
Dutch north-west made this a feasible option. On the other hand, because casu-
al and unskilled workers earned so little their wives were forced to work even
when she had a young child. We expect the longest birth intervals in this social
group. Apart from motivation to space births, coital frequency may have been
low because the men were often away from home seeking work elsewhere. Final-
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ly, the women in the lower classes may have worked as wet nurses. In the Taiwan
model information on the husband’s occupation is often lacking. Instead, we
have decided to focus on the household by combining the information on occu-
pation of the head of the household with his wealth (the latter with land tax data).
The “high” status was defined as land tax of 50 dollars or more or having an
occupation as teacher, physician, or commercial professionals. Also, we placed
heads in this category when they were a leader of a village and worked as a pro-
fessional. The “middle” group was defined as having a land tax between 1 and 50
dollars or the head of the household being an employee of the government or a
social organization, or a skilled worker of industry. Finally, the “lower” group
paid no land tax or worked as coolie, as a transportation worker, as a peddler or
as an unskilled worker. 
In the Netherlands, religion is a prime cultural factor influencing fertility.
Although the historiography on this subject is devoted mainly to the (post)transi-
tion period, the remarkable differences between the various religious groupings
may have had an impact before the transition as well.65 Of prime importance here,
is the openness of a particular group to (secular) information from outside and
the possibility of individual believers to approach the issue of fertility in an exper-
imental and rational manner. The official church opinion in sexual matters was
probably less important than internal social control mechanisms and the level of
identification of followers with their church. We expect Catholics to have the
shortest birth intervals. A combination of factors works in that direction: pastoral
advice against breastfeeding, high internal social control, a fatalistic attitude
towards life and little receptiveness of new, scientific knowledge.66 Possibly, there
was also less room for communication on sexual matters in Catholic marriages.67
On the other hand, couples from liberal Protestant denominations were probably
more willing to consider and experiment with birth spacing.68 In our multivariate
analysis, we will combine the liberal denominations in one group.69 We expect
the most birth spacing efforts in this group. Shorter intervals are expected among
the orthodox Protestants. In general, they shared a fatalistic attitude and a strong
social control with the Catholics. In the category “Orthodox Protestants” we have
combined members of the various Calvinist secessionist churches.70 We assign a
couple to this category when at least one of the partners was orthodox. Intermedi-
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ate positions will be held by couples of mixed Protestant-Catholic religion. In our
view, a mixed marriage is a sign of moderate religiousness. We also expect the
Jews to be in an intermediate position. They were highly inclined to breastfeeding
but had pronatalist leanings. We have also formed a group in which at least one of
the partners was a member of the (liberal) Catholic secessionist church as well as
a group in which at least one or both of the partners was nondenominational.
Finally, we include a group with parents whose religion was unknown.
Education is also considered a very important factor in the spreading of
new insights on childcare, new “bourgeois” values favoring a limited family size
and, finally, knowledge on contraceptive techniques. However, in neither coun-
try do the household registers record the educational experience of individuals.
For the Netherlands, we can make use of the capacity of bride and bridegroom to
sign their marriage certificate. Literacy is a minimal indication of education and,
thus, of responsiveness to innovative knowledge.
The “classical” Chinese marriage custom was major marriage, which was
arranged by the parents and entailed the immediate transfer of the bride to the
home of her husband’s family. Under certain economic and demographic condi-
tions, other, less prestigious, forms of marriage came into existence: minor mar-
riage, uxorilocal marriage and delayed transfer marriage. As we have discussed
above, the form of marriage could have important ramifications for fertility. In
Chu-shan, we have found major, minor and uxorilocal marriages with tmfrs of
respectively 8.28, 7.67 and 8.73. In Ta-chia, these figures were respectively 7.62,
5.36 and 9.19. Thus, we can expect minor marriages to have longer birth inter-
vals than major marriages and uxorilocal to have shorter intervals. The majority
of the marriages were arranged, which meant that, often, the spouses had not
even seen one another before the wedding day. This factor alone may be respon-
sible for low initial fertility. Exceptions to this pattern are found in uxorilocal
marriages that had higher levels of prenuptial pregnancies than major marriages
(e.g. 16.7% vs 9.9% in Chu-shan) and in endogamous marriages in which the
spouses were more or less familiar with one another.71 We include endogamy in
both the Dutch and the Taiwanese models. In the Netherlands, it is defined as
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sharing the same birthplace. In the Taiwan registers information on birthplaces
is lacking, so endogamy is defined as “both living in the Chu-shan/Ta-chia area
at least five years before the marriage”. In arranged marriages, a large age differ-
ence between husband and wife may have obstructed the process of familiariza-
tion. In Europe, a large difference in age has been associated with “instrumen-
tal” marriages and low standards of marital sexuality.72 On the other hand,
“romantic” marriage in which partners had the same age may have been more
able to discuss methods of birth control. We add the difference between the
spouses to our models.
Deliberate control of fertility can first of all be demonstrated by the parity-
dependence of birth intervals. We analyze parity-dependence by including net par-
ity in the model. Net parity is calculated as the number of children alive at the start
of the interval. If birth spacing were aimed at a final family size, and if any replace-
ment effects were at work, we would expect a negative effect of this variable on the
interval. It is of crucial importance to distinguish net parity from crude parity: the
former is the number of children still alive at the beginning of the current interval,
while the latter includes all children already born, alive as well as deceased. There-
fore, net parity equals crude parity minus the number of deceased children. If net
parity has a statistically significant effect on age-specific fertility, even after con-
trolling for crude parity (or, equivalently, the number of deceased children), this
would strongly suggest that the speed of parity progression was being controlled
with a desired offspring in mind.73 Because we are interested in the effect of the
burden of young, surviving children on fertility decisions, we also include any
stepchildren and premarital children in this variable. 
In Taiwan, family size was not only determined by births and deaths. Reg-
ularly, children – in particular girls – were adopted out. They were either given
away to their future parents-in-law (sim-pua) or sold as servants (ca-bo-kana).
Conversely, children were adopted in as well. Sons were sometimes adopted to
ensure the continuance of the patriline. However, the supply of boys was limited.
More often, daughters were adopted in. The reasons for this were varied. They
seemed to have been adopted frequently for “therapeutic” reasons. The presence
of a baby was believed to stimulate fertility and “to lead in” the arrival of a boy.74
Also, girls were adopted as sim-pua, a future bride for one of the sons. Another
motive was that these girls replaced children that had died. Finally, some fami-
lies simply may value the presence of girls as workers.75 Obviously, we have to
take account of adopted children in assessing the impact of the family composi-
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tion of fertility behavior. Did parents (temporarily) restrict their fertility when
their family had become too large, either by adoption or not?
A second indication of deliberate spacing would be any dependence of the
interval on the sex composition of the children alive. First of all, we look at the
effect of the gender of the last-born child. Recent studies of Asian populations
have reported shorter subsequent birth intervals after the birth of a girl com-
pared with the birth of boy.76 This may be caused by earlier weaning of girls, but
parents wishing a son may also be motivated to have a next child as soon as pos-
sible. Secondly, we include a covariate indicating the proportion of girls counted
among the children alive at the start of the interval. In addition, we include a
dummy indicating whether there are as yet any boys. This dummy is meant to
capture any preference for having at least one boy. Finally, following David and
Mroz, we assess whether the effect of infant mortality was sex-selective.77 This is
done by including a dummy indicating the sex of the previous child as well as a
product term for the interaction between the death of that child during infancy
and its sex. David and Mroz report that in rural France during the final decades
of the ancien regime the probability of a conception soon after the death of an
infant was significantly higher when the deceased child was a girl than when it
was a boy.78 Furthermore, in line with the household economic motivation to
space births, the proportion of the young, dependent children in the household
may have influenced parity progression. Any influence of the proportion of
small children on the hazard rate may be read as a sign of fertility control. The
proportion of dependent children alive was calculated at the start of each inter-
birth interval from the dates of birth and death of the previously born. As a work-
ing hypothesis, any child under age nine was considered to be dependent, i.e. a
net consumer of household resources instead of a net contributor. Finally, the
position of the Taiwanese father within the extended household may be relevant.
It has been asserted that men in favorable positions (in particular, the head of the
households and his firstborn son) were encouraged to produce more sons
whereas men in inferior positions were discouraged to do so. We include the
position of the father in the model in the form of dummies: head of the house-
hold, first son, non-first son and other.
Results
In Tables 3 and 4 we present our models of birth spacing in the Netherlands and
Taiwan. The regression parameters are presented in an exponentiated form,
which allows for more convenient interpretation. The parameters can be inter-
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preted as hazard ratios. When r=1, there is no effect. In addition, the table gives
the probability of the corresponding chi-squared statistic, testing the null-
hypothesis that the regression coefficient is zero (which is equal to a hazard ratio
r=1). In both models, the natural determinants had very strong effects on birth
intervals. A crucial variable was the duration of marriage. Clearly, the longer the
marriage had lasted, the less frequent sexual intercourse between the spouses
took place with the result of longer time spans between conceptions. Another
major factor was the death of the last-born child. When the previous child died
the next child was born much earlier than when it survived: in the Chu-shan/Ta-
chia model the intervals were 50% shorter (1/0.5=2.00) The effect was stronger
in Taiwan than in the Netherlands (35.5% shorter), which suggests that breast-
feeding was more extended in Taiwan. Final intervals in the Netherlands, as well
as in Taiwan, were longer than other intervals, which indicates that fecundability
of the mothers of penultimate children was already decreasing dramatically. On
the other hand, high crude legitimate parity can be seen as an indicator of high
fecundability, since there is a clear negative association: the more confinements
a woman had already had, the shorter the time span until the next effective con-
ception. 
In the Netherlands, the social and cultural parameters yield a number of
interesting and, sometimes, unexpected findings. Long birth intervals were not
associated with experimentation and openness to innovative ideas from the out-
side world. On the contrary, they appear to have been associated with proletarian
living conditions. We find strong associations with unskilled and casual work,
with illiteracy and with local endogamy. As for the latter, it has been shown that
Dutch couples with little cultural and economic capital tended towards
endogamy.79 Also, the birth cohort 1800-1829 that lived through the worst peri-
od in the recent history of Dutch living standards had long birth intervals. The
links between poverty and long intervals could in principle have been forged by
low coital frequency, as well as by malnourishment and miscarriages. However,
it is also possible that the poorest people were adjusting the pacing of their child-
bearing to accommodate for the depressed circumstances. Recent research from
the Scania region in Sweden suggests that laborers anticipated strong increases
in food prices by delaying the arrival of an additional child.80 Short intervals, on
the other hand, are associated with farming and with Catholicism. Farmers were
probably motivated to have many children and they could afford to have a servant
replace the mother during the childbearing years. What about the Catholics?
Apparently, the standpoints of the clergy concerning sexuality and breastfeeding
had a strong impact on daily life. This was possibly due to the contemporary
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227Table 3: Cox regression on the duration of closed birth intervals, western-central Netherlands
(hazard ratios)




25-29 0.870 * 0.849
30-34 0.912 0.898
35-39 0.848 1.118
40 and older 1.286 0.992
Marriage duration in years 0.917 **** 0.916 ***
Final interbirth interval 0.586 **** 0.501 ****
Crude legitimate parity 1.119 **** 1.136 *
Death of infant before birth of the next child 1.550 **** 1.559 **
(time dependent covariate)
Family composition
Net parity 1.000 0.975
Proportion of dependent children (less than 9 years old) 0.537 *** 0.578
Last child female 0.962 1.007
Last child female and deceased before birth of the next child 0.889 1.065
Proportion of girls among children alive at 1.030 1.022
beginning of interval
Already one or more boys surviving at beginning of interval 1.036 1.105
Occupation of father
Unskilled and casual worker (ref.)
Elite 0.882 0.829
Farmer 1.209 *** 1.103
Official or white collar worker 1.119 1.191
Shopkeeper or artisan 1.065 0.977
Skilled worker 1.117 0.747 *
Religion of parents
Both liberal Protestant (ref.)
Both Catholic 1.286 **** 1.166
At least one of the parents is orthodox Protestant 1.079 1.032
Mixed Catholic-Protestant 1.171 0.755
Both Jewish 0.250 0.406
Both unknown 0.975 3.669
Liberal Catholic (at least one of the parents) 2.497 ***
Nondenominational (at least one of the parents) 2.029 * 0.953
Parents same age (difference less than 4 years) (ref.)
Wife older than husband (4 year or more) 1.057 1.028
Husband older than wife (4 years or more) 1.011 0.982
Parents exogamous (different birth place) (ref.)
Parents endogamous (same birth place) 0.831 *** 0.913
Endogamy unknown 0.568 * 0.716
Father illiterate 1.006 0.833
Father’s literacy unknown 0.927
Mother illiterate 0.803 *** 1.066
Mother’s literacy unknown 1.989
Mother born between 1800 and 1829 (ref.)
Mother born between 1830 and 1849 1.176 ***
Mother born between 1850 and 1869 1.209 ***
Mother born between 1870 and 1889 (ref.)
Mother born between 1890 and 1909 0.873
Utrecht sample (ref.)
Akersloot sample 0.911 0.486
Number of intervals 2068 755
Likelihood ratio Chi2 319.30 131.00
Level of significance: *   0.1;  **   0.05; ***   0.01;  **** 0,001







40 and older 1.221
Marriage duration in years 0.917 ****
Final interbirth interval 0.428 ****
Possibly final interval (migration after last birth) 0.874 ***
Crude legitimate parity 1.191 ****
Death or adopting-out of infant before birth of 2.011 ****
the next child (time dependent covariate)
Family composition
Net parity 1.081 ***
Proportion of dependent children (less than 9 years old) 0.876
Last child female 1.101 *
Last child female and deceased/adopted out before 1.030
birth of the next child
Proportion of girls among children alive at beginning of interval 0.923
Already one or more boys surviving at beginning of interval 0.900 **




Relation father to head of household




Parents exogamous (different birth place) (ref.)
Parents endogamous (same birth place) 1.013
Parents same age (difference less than 4 years) (ref.)
Wife older than husband (4 year or more) 1.407
Husband older than wife (4 years or more) 0.919 **




Mother born after 1906 (ref.)
Mother born before 1906 (ref.) 0.848 ****
Chu-shan (ref.)
Ta-chia 1.266 ****
Number of intervals 4213
Likelihood ratio Chi2 94036.645
Level of significance: *   0.1;  **   0.05; ***   0.01;  **** 0,001
process of Catholic emancipation that increased the identification of Catholics
with their church. In this period, mechanisms of social control were developed
and strengthened which increased conformity to norms on the ideal family.
Interestingly, the small minority of the liberal Catholics (oud bisschoppelijke clere-
sij) tended towards short intervals as well. 
In Chu-shan and Ta-chia, there is less evidence for a relationship between
poverty and long birth intervals. Surprisingly, social class differentials in birth
intervals are not statistically significant. We do find that the birth intervals were
longer in the oldest cohort (mothers born before 1906). Although living stan-
dards were lower in this period, the effect may have also been caused by under-
reporting of children in this period or by the depressing effect of warfare on
coital frequency.81 Another interesting result is the fact that in Ta-chia intervals
were shorter than in Chu-shan. Future analysis will have to disclose whether this
can be attributed to differences between the two localities in living standards or
in female employment. 
As predicted, couples with a large age difference between the spouses
tended to have longer intervals. Minor marriages had much longer intervals than
major marriages, even after controlling for all other factors, such as the age of
the mother and the duration of marriage. This outcome confirms Arthur Wolf’s
hypotheses on the fertility-depressing effects of childhood association. However,
uxorilocal marriages had longer intervals as well.82 Perhaps the husband was
resenting his subjugated role in his parents-in-law’s household and therefore not
very keen on maximizing his offspring.83
Finally, we come to the factor that interests us most. To what extent did the
fertility of pretransitional couples respond to the exigencies of their households?
That is, did they deliberately delay the next birth when this was considered expe-
dient? In the Dutch pretransitional cohort, the only significant household vari-
able was the proportion of young, dependent children. Indeed, the larger this
proportion was, the longer the next birth was delayed. There is no indication that
this behavior was related to a target family size (no significant effect of net pari-
ty). Neither have we found any evidence of a preference for boys or girls. In Chu-
shan and Ta-chia, we find no evidence of spacing in relation to the family com-
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position. On the contrary, the more children were surviving (net parity) the
shorter the intervals became. This may be accounted for by the dominance of fer-
tility-maximizing families among the high parities. Interestingly, the intervals
were significantly shorter when the last child was a girl (see also Table 2). Possi-
bly, girls were weaned somewhat earlier. It is also possible that the birth of a girl
motivated the parents to increase their sexual activities in order to have sons.
The variable indicating the effect of the presence of at least one son does indi-
cates that intervals were shorter when there were still no boys.84 Finally, we have
found no indication that the fertility of couples with a “low” position in the
extended household was reduced, at least not by longer intervals. On the con-
trary, when the husband was not a son of the head of the household (but an
uncle, cousin or nephew), the birth intervals were shorter.
In the Dutch transitional cohort (mothers born between 1870 and 1902),
only the natural determinants explain the length of birth intervals. Apparently,
social and cultural differences in breastfeeding or coital frequency had dimin-
ished. Only the skilled workers tend to have longer intervals than the reference
group. Finally, birth intervals were no longer related to the family composition.
Stopping behavior
As we have seen in Table 1, both the Taiwanese and Dutch mothers tended to
have their last child around age 38. At first sight, this age does not suggest wide-
spread deliberate stopping of child bearing. Still, the aggregate figure may hide
subgroups of women who did manage to stop at a relatively early age. Did these
groups exist and can we reconstruct the motives for stopping? Again, we will use
a multivariate technique. In the model, we include all couples with at least one
child who have been followed for at least five years after the last one was born.
The crucial question is: what determined the fact that a couple stopped having
further children? Binary (or dichotomous) logistic regression is a suitable tech-
nique, specifically developed to analyze dependent variables with only two out-
comes (thus, stopping or continuing). The probability (p) of the dependent vari-
able being stopping or continuing is calculated in terms of odds, that is the prob-
ability of stopping divided by the probability of continuing (p/(1-p)). The regres-
sion coefficients of the independent variables are the natural logarithms of the
odds. By exponentiating them, we obtain odds ratios. These indicate the increase
in the odds of the dependent variable of stopping resulting from an increase of
one unit in the independent variable.85
Practically all variables used in the model in Tables 5 and 6 are the same as
already described for the spacing analysis. Obviously, the factor “final interval” is
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231Table 5: Logistic regression on stopping with childbearing, western-central Netherlands (odds ratios)





30-34 1.632 2.183 *
35-39 2.687 *** 3.648 ***
40 and older 13.416 **** 31.660 ****
Marriage duration in years 1.350 **** 1.590 ****
Crude legitimate parity 0.696 **** 0.530 ****
Death of previous infant within a year 1.005 0.338
Family composition
Net parity 0.844 *** 0.817
Proportion of dependent children (less than 9 years old) 0.652 0.690
Last child female 1.293 0.848
Last child female and deceased within a year 0.626 1.626
Proportion of girls among children alive 0.820 0.940
Already one or more boys surviving 0.837 0.64
Occupation of father
Unskilled and casual worker (ref.)
Elite 0.987 1.612
Farmer 1.281 1.099
Official or white collar worker 0.518 2.911 ***
Shopkeeper or artisan 1.321 1.423
Skilled worker 1.031 1.437
Religion of parents
Both liberal protestant (ref.)
Both catholic 1.038 0.317 ****
At least one of the parents is orthodox Protestant 0.795 0.650 *
Mixed Catholic-Protestant 1.521 0.117 ***
Both Jewish 15.251 * 2.319
Both unknown 1.119 2.363
Liberal Catholic (at least one of the parents) 1.962
Nondenominational (at least one of the parents) 2.671 1.499
Parents same age (difference less than 4 years) (ref.)
Wife older than husband (4 year or more) 1.046 1.211
Husband older than wife (4 years or more) 0.823 1.137
Parents exogamous (different birth place) (ref.)
Parents endogamous (same birth place) 0.903 1.021
Endogamy unknown 0.941 1.742
Father illiterate 1.056 0.196
Father’s literacy unknown 0.094
Mother illiterate 0.792 0.424
Mother’s literacy unknown 10.951 *
Mother born between 1800 and 1829 (ref.) 1.178
Mother born between 1830 and 1849 1.350
Mother born between 1850 and 1869
Mother born between 1870 and 1889 (ref.)
Mother born between 1890 and 1909 1.862 ***
Utrecht sample (ref.)
Akersloot sample 1.174 6.678
Number of births 2496 1007
Nagelkerkes r2 0.35 0.43
Likelihood ratio Chi2 567.52 333.58
Level of significance: *   0.1;  **   0.05; ***   0.01;  **** 0,001







40 and older 38.09 ****
Marriage duration in years 1.25 ****
Crude legitimate parity 0.76 ****
Death or adoption out of previous infant within a year 0.86
Family composition
Net parity 0.84 **
Proportion of dependent children (less than 9 years old) 0.89
Last child female 1.18
Last child female and deceased or adopted out 0.78
before birth of the next child
Proportion of girls among children alive 0.74
Already one or more boys surviving 0.93




Relation father to head of household




Parents exogamous (different birth place) (ref.)
Parents endogamous (same birth place) 1.09
Parents same age (difference less than 4 years) (ref.)
Wife older than husband (4 year or more) 0.71
Husband older than wife (4 years or more) 0.87




Mother born after 1906 (ref.)
Mother born before 1906 0.68 **
Chu-shan (ref.)
Ta-chia 2.15 ****
Number of children 4369
McFadden’s r2 0.19
Likelihood ratio Chi2 259.16
Level of significance: *   0.1;  **   0.05; ***   0.01;  **** 0,001
removed, since it is actually the dependent variable. Because logistic regression
does not include time dependent variables, the definition of child mortality is
modified. Now, we define it as the death of the previous child within a year after
its birth.
We have seen in Figure 4 that the pretransitional Dutch cohort resembled
the prototypical “natural fertility” population. Our model confirms that the end
of childbearing was solely determined by biological factors. Age of the mother,
marriage duration and fecundity (indicated by crude parity) are the crucial fac-
tors that predict whether stopping will occur. The death of a child did not lead to
a deliberate “replacement”. Interestingly, net parity was even negatively related
to stopping. Thus, the more (surviving) children a couple had, the more likely
that they would have another child. Since all natural determinants are controlled,
this suggests a positive interest in maximizing the number of children. Finally,
we cannot detect any social or cultural “forerunners” apart from the Jews.86
In the Dutch transitional cohort (second panel of Table 5), the natural
causes of stopping had lost none of their significance. However, stopping was
also associated with social class, in the sense that officials and white-collar work-
ers stopped earlier. In the countryside, they appear to have been forerunners of
birth control. Catholics and orthodox Protestants were less inclined to stop
reproduction than the liberal Protestants. Clearly, the vehement opposition of
their churches against contraception was having an effect. In this model, we can-
not find an effect of a desired family size on stopping. However, stopping
occurred more often in the birth cohort 1890-1902 compared with 1870-1889.
Indeed, when we run a separate model for the youngest cohort, we do find a sig-
nificant, positive effect of net parity on the odds of stopping. We may conclude
that, in the north-western countryside, parity-specific birth control only began
with the cohorts of women born after 1890.
In Chu-shan and Ta-chia, we find the same paramount effects from the
natural covariates of age, marriage duration and fecundity. The presence of sons
does not increase the odds of stopping, as has been reported for mainland Liaon-
ing.87 An additional finding is that couples married uxorilocally tended to con-
tinue somewhat longer with childbearing than minor and major marriages. This
contradicts our first impression based on their longer intervals that they were
less interested in maximizing their family size. Couples in Ta-chia stopped earli-
er than couples in Chu-shan. A compensation for their relatively short birth
intervals? Because Ta-chia had better connections than Chu-shan to the more
“urbanized” parts of Taiwan, it could have displayed “modern” behaviour. Stop-
ping occurred somewhat more often in the youngest cohort but overall we could
233
86. Livi-Bacci, “Social-group forerunners”.
87. Lee and Campbell, Fate and Fortune.
not find any trace of deliberate birth control. On the contrary, as in the pretransi-
tional Dutch cohort, the larger the number of children present in the family (net
parity), the lower were the chances of stopping.
Discussion
Our comparative exploration of marital fertility in rural Netherlands and Taiwan
has yielded a number of interesting results. Using the same definitions and cor-
rections for potential biases we have shown that early twentieth century Taiwanese
marital fertility rates were only slightly lower than Dutch fertility rates in the pre-
transitional period. Thus, the gap between western Europe and China with respect
to fertility may be much smaller than is assumed in the current controversy on the
divergence of East and West. In fact, by taking into account starting, spacing and
stopping we have shown that completed marriages in Taiwan actually had more
children than the Dutch. However, due to their long birth intervals, Taiwanese
families remained relatively small. How can we explain the remarkable difference
in intervals? We can think of three possible reasons. Firstly, the cause may have to
be sought in differences in living standards. Malnutrition may have increased the
incidence of miscarriages leading to longer intervals. There is some evidence for
this relationship in the Dutch case. Birth intervals were longest when the father
was a casual or unskilled worker, when the parents had married endogamously
and when the mother was illiterate. Also, long intervals occurred during the bleak
period of the 1840s and 1850s. In Taiwan, however, we find no effect of social class
on intervals, nor of intra-household differences in hierarchical position. Thus, it is
unlikely that Dutch-Taiwanese differentials were caused by differences in living
standards. Secondly, the long Taiwanese intervals may have been caused by the
conscious adjusting of births to the current or even the desired family composi-
tion. This is the viewpoint taken by “revisionists” in the current debate. However,
we have found no conclusive evidence of conscious spacing. On the one hand, the
intervals were relatively longer when one or more boys were already present or
when the last child was a boy. The latter can also be explained by later weaning of
boys. On the other hand, there was no effect of the burden of young, dependent
children on the intervals. Net parity, that is the number of children present, actu-
ally tended to shorten the birth intervals. Interestingly, the oldest Dutch cohort
showed more signs of conscious spacing than the Taiwanese. The positive effect of
the proportion of dependent children on the birth intervals shows that Dutch cou-
ples were motivated to space their births during the worst period of the family
cycle. Finally, the differences may be attributed to breastfeeding behavior. Tai-
wanese intervals after the birth of a surviving child were much longer than the
Dutch. It seems likely that Taiwanese infants were breastfed much longer and
more generally than in the (western parts of) the Netherlands.
Parity-specific stopping is often considered to be the most direct criterion
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for birth control. Not surprisingly, Dutch couples did not display any parity-spe-
cific control until the birth cohort 1890-1902. The end of childbearing could be
explained almost entirely by “biological factors”. The same was true for the Chu-
shan and Ta-chia cohorts. 
The models have proven useful in detecting deliberate fertility control
while controlling for natural, social and cultural determinants of fertility. In
future research they can be elaborated further. For instance, the composition of
the extended Taiwanese household could have more effects than those we have
detected with our simplified variables. Also, it will be very interesting to apply
these models to urban contexts as well. Possibly, forerunners of stopping are to
be found in Taiwanese and Dutch cities. The models have also shown the relative
impact of social and cultural factors on fertility in both countries. In the Nether-
lands, the cultural factors surrounding breastfeeding were important in the
explanation of differential fertility. Also, links are suggested between poverty on
the one hand, and miscarriages, low coital frequency and deliberate spacing on
the other. In Taiwan, the form of marriage mattered greatly with respect to birth
intervals, probably through coital frequency. 
Finally, we return to the “problem” of birth control in late imperial China.
The current discussion of the demographic differences between western Europe
and China centers on the levels of age-specific marital fertility. In our view, these
differences, at least judging from rural Taiwan and the Netherlands, were not
dramatic. By and large, lower marital fertility in Taiwan can be ascribed to longer
birth-intervals due to longer breastfeeding and less infant mortality. All in all,
Arthur Wolf was correct when he wrote that no elephant had walked in the living
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The argument of Malthus’s First Essay on Population is largely developed on the
basis of a comparison of three countries – England, the United States, and Chi-
na. England is presented as an example of an “old state” in which population
growth has been considerable in the past but is slow at present. The reason is
that “a foresight of the difficulties attending the rearing of a family acts as a pre-
ventative check, and the actual distress of some of the lower classes, by which
they are disabled from giving the proper food and attention to their children, acts
as a positive check.” This is true of all old states because they lack the resources
necessary to support further growth.1
The United States is presented as an example of a new state in a “healthy
country...with plenty of food and room” and institutions that made good land
cheap and agriculture a good investment. The result was that, as in new colonies
generally, the population grew “with astonishing rapidity.” Malthus underlines
the point of the example by asking his reader to consider why an equal number
of people did not “produce an equal increase in the same time in Great Britain.”
His answer is that “the great and obvious cause...is the want of food and room, or
in other words, misery.”2
China was known to Malthus as “one of the most fertile, best cultivated,
most industrious, and most populous countries in the world,” but it was also
thought to be a country in which “the poverty of the lowest ranks of people...far
surpasses that of the most beggarly nations in Europe.”3 François Quesnay
summed up the prevailing view when he noted that “in spite of...the abundance
that reigns, there are few countries that have so much poverty among the hum-
bler classes. However great the empire may be, it is too crowded for the multi-
tude that inhabit it.”4
Malthus therefore presented China as the third point of a theoretical tri-
angle. It belonged to a class of countries with periods “when population
increased permanently, without an increase in the means of subsistence.” These
were countries in which “population appears to have been forced, that is, the
people have been habituated by degrees to live almost upon the smallest possible
quantity of food.” China answered to this description because “if the accounts we
have of it are to be trusted, the lower class of people are in the habit of living
almost upon the smallest quantity of food and are glad to get any putrid offals
that European laborers would rather starve than eat.” A country in this state
“must necessarily be subject to famines.”5
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There is no evidence that Malthus ever doubted his views of England and
the United States, but he appears to have never been entirely happy with his con-
clusions regarding China. What worried him most was the report that despite
every acre of tillable land having long been under cultivation, marriage was early
and nearly universal. In his first mention of China he called for “inqueries into
the manner and habits of the lower classes and the encouraegments of early
marriage.” “Perhaps,” he wondered, “the fact of the universality of early mar-
riage may not be sufficiently ascertained.”6 He assumed that if marriage was in
fact early and universal, fertility must be high. He therefore thought it was of
“the utmost importance” to ascertain “in what manner the checks to a further
population operate; what are the vices, and what are the distresses that prevent
an increase of numbers beyond the ability of the country to support.”7
To fully appreciate Malthus’s doubts we must remember that he knew lit-
tle or nothing about most of the conditions that effect fertility. Most importantly,
he knew nothing about lactational amenorrhea. If Chinese women married ear-
lier and in greater numbers than English women, he could only conclude that
their fertility was proportionally higher. This was guaranteed by “the passion
between the sexes.” But why, then, did Chinese all marry and marry at the earli-
est possible age? Many people were already living on “the smallest possible
quantity of food.” Why, despite the misery that this must inevitably entail, did
even the poorest among them marry at the first opportunity?
Until recently most scholars agreed that developments since Malthus’s
time had largely resolved his doubts while confirming his general view of China.
Surveys conducted in the 1930’s and archival studies of genealogies indicated
that despite early and universal marriage, Chinese fertility was not as high as
Malthus appears to have imagined, largely as a result of late weaning, poor nutri-
tion, and female infanticide. It was, however, high enough to produce a popula-
tion that could appropriately be described as “forced.” All the evidence pointed to
high infant and childhood mortality, low adult life expectancy, widespread pover-
ty, and frequent famines. This is what we call “the received wisdom.” It is the
view represented most effectively in Ping-ti Ho’s Studies on the Population of Chi-
na, 1368-1953.8
This view has now been challenged by James Z. Lee and Wang Feng in a
prize-winning book entitled One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusian Mythology and
Chinese Realities, 1700-2000.9 Lee and Wang agree that marriage was early and
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as the picture painted by Malthus himself. Their radical view is that China
should not be conceived of as a third type of society distinct from both England
and the United States. In their view England and China were both old states in
which population was constrained by preventative rather than positive checks.10
The only difference was in how the two societies controlled fertility. The English
did it by controlling marriage while the Chinese did it by controlling marital fer-
tility. Lee and Wang sum up their argument in Malthus’s own language. “Where-
as European couples practiced moral restraint [i.e. they did not marry if they did
not have the means to support a family] but little marital restraint, Chinese cou-
ples practiced no moral constraint but considerable marital restraint.”11
A large proportion of Lee and Wang’s text is devoted to demonstrating that
marital fertility was lower in China than it was in England and other European
states. We will argue that they exaggerate the magnitude of the difference, but we
accept their contention that Chinese women bore fewer children per year of mar-
riage than European women. What we do not accept is their contention that this
was because Chinese couples practiced deliberate fertility control and that as a
result Chinese fertility was generally lower than European fertility. We contend
that there was little, if any, effective birth control in China, and that while marital
fertility was lower than in Europe, general fertility was far higher.
We will begin with our second contention because it is pivotal. Lee and
Wang’s primary thesis concerning the relative importance of positive and pre-
ventative checks rests on the claim that marital fertility control in China was the
equivalent of marriage control in England. To maintain this they must demon-
strate that Chinese fertility was no higher than English fertility, but this they fail
to do. Indeed, they do not even try. They report total fertility rates for China,12 but
they never compare them with English or European total fertility rates. Again
and again they contrast Chinese and European marital rates, but they never risk
comparing their general rates. A paragraph claiming that “Chinese fertility over-
all was not much higher than European fertility, while marital fertility was sig-
nificantly lower” offers data supporting the first claim but not the second.13
What, then, was the average total fertility rate in China prior to the 1949
revolution? And how does this compare with the average English rate? The one
pre-1949 rate Lee and Wang report is the figure calculated by Ansley Coale and
his Princeton colleagues on the basis of John Lossing Buck’s famous farm sur-
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whom were males who could not interview women and therefore had to depend
on their husbands or their neighbors. When Wolf revisited seven of the commu-
nities included in the study and interviewed women old enough to have been
included in the Buck study he obtained a rate of 5.78.15 The fact that older
women had trouble remembering children who died as infants suggests that the
true rate is close to 6.0.
The best reason for suspecting that the figure from the Buck survey
underestimates Chinese fertility is another survey conducted in 1930-34 by
Chiao Chi-ming and Warren S. Thompson.16 Where the Buck survey was a stu-
dent effort directed by an agricultural economist, the Chiao and Thompson
study was a professional effort directed by one of the leading demographers of
the time. Unlike Buck and his student collaborators, Chiao and Thompson did
not rely on interviews. Instead, they set up their own registration system in rural
Kiangsu and for four years recorded births and deaths as they occurred. The
result is without doubt the most reliable demographic data collected on the Chi-
nese mainland prior to the fertility survey conducted by the State Family Plan-
ning Commission in 1982. The fertility data recorded is reproduced in its origi-
nal form in Table 1. The age-specific rates for the four years yield total fertility
rates of 6.86, 6.24, 5.58, and 6.85. The decline in the second and third years of
the study is interesting as evidence of the factors effecting Chinese fertility.
Chiao and Thompson attribute it to a depression that lowered the marriage rate
and a malaria epidemic that raised the miscarriage rate.17
One of the scholarly failings of Lee and Wang’s effort is the failure to dis-
cuss the Chiao and Thompson study. The work is not even listed as a reference.
Equally egregious is their failure to refer to Chi-hsien Tuan’s 1958 study of fertil-
ity in rural Taiwan during the Japanese occupation.18 This is one of the seven
studies that form the basis of Louis Henry’s definition of natural fertility and
should be a primary source for a book devoted to Chinese demography.19 Tuan’s
data are reproduced in Table 2 in the form of period rates for the years 1903-1953.
Only the rate for 1903-07 falls below 6.0, and there is reason to believe that this
figure underestimates the true rate. Concerned that some children who died as
infants may not have been registered, Tuan interviewed 463 of the women
included in the study. He found that 9.5 percent of births by women aged 60 or
more at the time of the study did not appear in the registers. Among women
aged 45-60 the figure was only 1.5 percent.20
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Although Tuan’s work suggests some under registration before 1915, the
household registers compiled by the Japanese colonial government are the best
basis we have for estimating the fertility of any large Chinese population. House-
hold heads were required to report all births and deaths to the police within ten
days, and the police visited every household at least once a year to make sure that
these reports were accurate (see Chapter 2).21 Working with a team of anthropol-
ogists and historians at the Academic Sinica, we have computerized the registers
from a number of widely scattered communities, twenty-two of which are repre-
sented in the fertility rates reported in Table 3. The localities included in the table
are all localities in which the residents were Hokkien- or Hakka-speaking Han
Chinese. Localities with a substantial non-Han population were excluded.
The first point to note about Table 3 is that with one slight exception, the
rates for 1906-1915 are lower than the rates for the later periods. This is undoubt-
edly because of the under registration documented by Tuan. All of these rates
should be five to ten percent higher than shown. The second point to note is that
the rates for 1936-1945 are all lower than the rates for 1926-35. This is almost cer-
tainly a result of the many kinds of disruption occasioned by World War II. The
third point to note is that the rates for urban Taiwan are substantially lower than
those for peri-urban and rural Taiwan, and the rates for peri-urban Taiwan some-
what lower than those for rural Taiwan. Wolf and Gates have shown that the rea-
son is that urban and peri-urban women were less likely to marry than rural
women. Their evidence says that during the Japanese occupation nearly a fourth
of all the women raised in Taipei City failed to marry by age fifty.22 
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Table 1: Age-specific and Total Fertility in Chiang-yin County, Kiangsu, 1931-1935
Age
Year 15-19 20-12 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 40-49 tfr
1931-32 95 337 330 259 251 95 5 6.86
1932-33 67 318 338 242 202 73 7 6.24
1933-34 80 273 277 253 179 69 4 5.58
1934-35 70 372 343 288 198 95 4 6.85
Source: C. M. Chiao, Warren S. Thompson, and D. T. Chen, An Experiment in the Registration of Vital Statistics in
China (Oxford, Ohio: Scripps Foundation for Research in Population Problems, 1938), p. 45, Table 32.
What we see, then, in Table 3 is a set of figures that make two points. The
first is that in rural Taiwan – where conditions were similar to those typical of
rural China – total fertility averaged approximately 6.0. This is a little higher
than the rates calculated on the basis of the Buck survey but not as high as those
documented by Chiao and Thompson in Kiangsu. The second point is that con-
trary to Lee and Wang’s primary thesis, fertility in Taiwan was conditioned by
entry into marriage, not by deliberate control within marriage. It was only in
Taipei City where a large proportion of all women failed to marry that we find
rates that fall below 5.0. It took a European-like marriage pattern to produce
European-like fertility rates.
The evidence cited to this point all refers to the years 1900-49. With the
exception of the genealogy of the Ch’ing imperial family and the household reg-
isters of Han bannermen in Manchuria, the only evidence we have for earlier
years comes from genealogies compiled by the corporate kinship groups anthro-
pologists call “lineages.” This evidence is invaluable because it is the only evi-
dence we have, but it has serious limitations.23 These can be overcome to extract
fertility rates but only with the help of assumptions about the nature of vital
events in the distant past. The most important concern the sex ratio at birth and
infant and childhood mortality. These are necessary because lineage genealogists
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Table 2: Age-specific fertility reported by Chi-hisen Tuan for Yun-lin County in Southern Taiwan
Age
Period 15-19 20-12 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 40-49 tfr
1903-07 90 240 240 5.81
1908-12 100 280 300 280 6.32
1913-17 100 310 330 290 210 6.79
1918-23 110 310 300 290 220 110 6.74
1923-27 120 350 330 290 250 110 10 7.30
1928-32 100 330 350 320 250 130 10 7.45
1933-37 90 350 340 300 270 120 10 7.40
1938-42 70 330 320 280 250 110 10 6.85
1943-47 50 300 310 270 210 100 10 6.20
1948-53 10 290 320 320 240 120 10 6.55
Note: Underlined figures are estimates based on data for later cohorts.
Source: Chi-hsien Tuan, “Reproductive histories of Chinese women in rural Taiwan,” Population Studies, vol. 12
(1958), p. 45, Table 2.
did not record female births and only recorded male births if the boy survived to
an age specified by lineage rules. These were usually between fifteen and twenty
years.
The great majority of the fertility rates published to date are the work of
Liu Ts’ui-jung and Ted A. Telford. Liu has analyzed twenty-two genealogies from
six provinces in South China,24 and Telford has analyzed all the genealogies
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Table 3: Age-specific fertility in Taiwan by location and period
Age
Period 15-19 20-12 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 40-49 tfr
Rural Northern Taiwan
1906-15 132 263 243 206 165 78 6 5.46
1916-25 127 277 264 214 153 66 9 5.55
1926-35 145 319 295 256 201 86 9 6.55
1936-45 111 302 294 259 194 93 8 6.30
Rural Southern Taiwan (including Pescadores Islands)
1906-15 95 270 272 256 189 72 7 5.80
1916-25 86 282 289 259 195 81 7 5.99
1926-35 87 315 324 297 227 96 7 6.76
1936-45 68 302 299 260 208 95 5 6.19
Peri-urban Taiwan (Taipei Basin)
1906-15 129 251 232 209 166 85 6 5.39
1916-25 115 261 241 204 158 81 4 5.32
1926-35 128 258 263 231 174 81 6 5.71
1936-45 96 237 247 224 177 92 4 5.39
Urban Taiwan (Taipei City)
1906-15 113 192 168 147 93 39 7 3.79
1916-25 99 213 195 142 122 50 4 4.17
1926-35 114 226 195 170 133 53 7 4.48
1936-45 83 202 183 158 103 47 3 3.89
extant from a county in Anhui province.25 The rates published by Liu range from
4.47 to 6.27 and average 5.71, while those published by Telford range from 6.78
to 9.56 and average 8.21. The large difference between the two authors’ figures is
almost entirely a result of the way they handle the fact that lineage genealogists
only recorded the births of males who survived to a certain age.26 Liu bases her
rates on a simple count of the births recorded, while Telford adjusts his rates to
take account of infant and childhood mortality. He assumes an infant morality
rate of 250 and a childhood and adolescent rate of 100. When Liu’s rates are
adjusted in the same way we have a set of figures suggesting a fertility rate of
approximately 7.9 for the years 1450 to 1900. This rate would be substantially
higher if we assumed that infant mortality was as high in these years as it was
among the children of the women included in Buck’s farm surveys. The Prince-
ton group puts their infant mortality rate at 300 and their childhood/adolescent
age rate at more than 200.27
The rates Liu and Telford estimate on the basis of the lineage genealogies
are all marital fertility rates. To get general fertility rates we have to assume that
Chinese marriage rates were as high in the Ming and Ch’ing dynasties as they
were in the Republican period. We can then use the differences between the gen-
eral and marital rates reported by the studies cited above to estimate general fer-
tility in the years covered by the genealogies. These differences are 0.68 births in
the case of the rates estimated from the Buck surveys,28 1.03 births in the case of
the rates reported by Chiao and Thompson,29 and an average of 1.43 births in the
case of the rates calculated on the basis of the Taiwan household registers.30
Thus the general fertility rate in the three centuries covered by the genealogies
must have been at least as high as it was in the early decades of the 20th century.
We will therefore take 6.0 as the average general fertility rate in late impe-
rial China. It is a figure that makes obvious Lee and Wang’s reasons for avoiding
direct comparisons of Chinese and European general fertility rates. The compari-
son rejects completely their claim that there was a preventative check in China as
effective as that Malthus identified in Europe. E.A. Wrigley and colleagues esti-
mate for England in the years 1541-1871 general fertility rates that vary from 3.75
to 4.50. The average estimate for the period is only 4.35.31 General fertility was
higher elsewhere in Europe but nowhere as high as in China. Massimo Livi Bacci
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lists 4.27, 4.27, and 4.49 for Sweden in 1800, 1850, and 1870; 5.07, 4.91, and 4.95
for Finland in 1800, 1850, and 1870; 4.60 and 5.23 for the Netherlands in 1850
and 1870; 3.38 and 3.42 for France in 1850 and 1870; and 4.88 for Italy in 1870.32
We turn now to our second contention – that there was little, if any, effec-
tive birth control in China in Late Imperial China. The fact that general fertility
was high by European standards does not necessarily mean that Chinese couples
did not take steps to limit the number of children they produced. It could be that
if it had not been for deliberate fertility control, Chinese fertility would have been
as high as Malthus feared. We therefore need to address Lee and Wang’s claim
that “Chinese couples practiced no moral restraint but considerable marital
restraint.”
Lee and Wang introduce their book with the claim that “Chinese married
women had a tmfr [total marital fertility rate] of 6 or less.” “This low marital fer-
tility was,” in their view, “one of the most distinctive features of the Chinese
demographic system.”33 Their evidence is summed up in a table reproduced
here as Table 4. The first three figures are all from Liu Ts’ui-jung’s analyses of
lineage genealogies and are gross underestimates because they take no account
of infant and childhood mortality. The figures in the fourth line of the table refer
to Ted Telford’s study but misrepresent his results. The range for the rates from
the genealogies he analyzed was from 7.24 to 9.19 – not 5.4 to 8.2. 8.2 Was the
average figure!34
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Table 4: Marital fertility in China by period and location
Period Location Total marital Sample size
fertility rate
1296-1864 Hunan 6.0 2,670
1462-1864 Anhui 6.1 1,654
1517-1877 Jiangsu 5.8 1,784
1520-1661 Anhui 5.4 to 8.2 11,804
1700-1890 Beijing 5.3 3,178
1774-1873 Liaoning 6.3 3,000
1929-1032 22 provinces 6.2 50,000
Source: James Z. Lee and Wang Feng, One Quarter of Humanity: Malthusiasn Mythology and Chinese Realities
(Cambride, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), Table 6.1, p. 85.
The fifth figure – the figure that pulls the average down to “less than 6” –
should not be included in the table. The population is not relevant to the argu-
ment because it consists of Manchu noblemen who qualified for notice in the
Ch’ing imperial genealogy. Lee and Wang admit that these people are “atypical,
since the Qing imperial lineage was an elite population that depended solely on
the state for financial support, was highly regulated, and was required to live in
either Beijing or Shenyang.”35 They should have added that in addition to being
a welfare elite, these people were not Chinese.
The sixth figure in the list takes us back to Malthus’s view of the United
States. In his view, its population was growing “with astonishing rapidity”
because it was a colony “with plenty of food and room.” This was, most scholars
now agree, typical of colonies. In the years covered by Lee and Wang’s data
Liaoning was also a frontier with plentiful resources. Why, then, do they find that
fertility was no higher than in China proper where resources were exceptionally
scarce? The answer, we suspect, is that the source of their data is corrupt records
maintained by the ineffective administration of a military colony. The colonists
had good reason not to register their sons and ample opportunity to avoid doing
so. Christopher Isett writes as follows with respects to Lee and Wang’s data from
Daoyi:
Lee and Campbell’s tmfr figure for Daoyi [the figure used by Lee and Wang] is by their own
recognition an estimate based on incomplete records. Poor official record keeping in Daoyi
was entirely in keeping with what we know of bureaucratic oversight in Manchuria as a
whole, where commoners lived among serf and banner communities without soliciting much
official attention. It is not surprising therefore that by their own estimates Lee and Campbell
believe fully one half of all persons (one third of the males and two thirds of the females) were
never registered on the banner rolls, a number that is in turn predicated on their belief that all
of those who survived to age 16 (15) were registered. There were good reasons to keep children,
especially males, off the banner role after they reached 16 sui, however. Males in the banner
system were liable for uncompensated service to the state, including military service, which
heads of household would certainly wish to avoid.36
The source of the final figure in the list is the Princeton group’s reanalysis of
Buck’s 1930-34 farm surveys. The figure we get from the table Lee and Wang cite
as their source is 6.3 rather than 6.2, but this does not matter very much. What
does matter is that Lee and Wang fail to note that when Wolf revisited a number
of Buck’s field sites he obtained a rate of 7.03.37 And what matters even more is
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that the table does not include the evidence provided by Chiao and Thompson.
The total marital fertility rates for the four years of their study were 8.00, 7.23,
6.64, and 7.80. The average was 7.41.38
Many families in Northern Taiwan and the Pescadores Islands gave away
their daughters as infants or small children and raised in their place wives for
their sons. Wolf has shown that because of early association, couples married in
this fashion had markedly lower fertility than couples joined as young adults.39
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Table 5: Age-specific marital fertility in Taiwan by location and period (excluding minor mar-
riages)
Age
Period 15-19 20-12 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 tmfr
Rural Northern Taiwan
1906-15 263 303 265 229 188 102 6 6.78
1916-25 314 329 287 241 171 73 12 7.14
1926-35 338 373 354 281 238 116 11 8.55
1936-45 363 372 329 298 220 117 10 8.55
Rural Southern Taiwan (including Pescadores Islands)
1906-15 273 318 285 275 209 93 9 7.31
1916-25 294 353 317 283 236 104 9 7.98
1926-35 364 391 316 326 258 117 11 8.92
1936-45 338 385 332 287 242 119 9 8.56
Peri-urban Taiwan (Taipei Basin)
1906-15 256 295 264 212 174 93 --- 6.47
1916-25 287 336 271 231 190 74 --- 6.95
1926-35 360 354 314 261 204 109 --- 8.01
1936-45 368 362 316 279 214 107 --- 8.23
Urban Taiwan (Taipei City)
1906-15 266 262 207 155 109 39 14 5.26
1916-25 287 298 243 187 136 57 8 6.08
1926-35 377 340 267 219 167 68 10 7.24
1936-45 367 285 269 224 147 68 4 6.82
When the effect of these “minor marriages” is discounted, the data drawn from
the Taiwan household registers agree with those reported by Chiao and Thomp-
son. Allowing for five to ten percent under registration before 1915, the figures
for the rural areas in Table 5 average close to 7.50 before 1925 and rise to well
over 8.5 after 1925. The figures for the urban and peri-urban areas are lower but
still average well above 6.0 in most years. It is only in Taipei City in the years
before 1925 that we find the level of marital fertility that Lee and Wang take to be
normal for all of China.
We therefore conclude that Lee and Wang’s representation of marital fer-
tility in late traditional China is mistaken. The average rate was approximately
7.5 rather than 6.0. But this is still well below the typical European rate and far
below the rate reported for such exemplary populations as the Hutterites. Thus
the numbers leave room for Lee and Wang’s contention that Chinese couples
practiced some form of deliberate birth control. The question is whether their
failure to rise to the European level was due to deliberate control or to or some
involuntary condition. Lee and Wang admit that Chinese mothers “practiced
extended breastfeeding” and that this “contributed to long birth intervals and low
fertility,” but they nonetheless insist that their “low fertility” was the result of
“their ability and even willingness to regulate coital frequency” and their use of
“a wide variety of abortive techniques.”40
This is a surprising claim because Lee and Wang recognize that Chinese
fertility does not exhibit the characteristics that most demographers, following
Louis Henry, take to be diagnostic of deliberate fertility control. “Control,”
according to Henry, “may be said to exist when the behavior of the couple is
bound to the number of children already born and is modifed when this number
reaches the maximum which the couple does not wish to exceed.”41 Fertility that
is not bound in this way Henry terms “natural fertility.” It is high when people
are young and declines slowly as they age producing a convex curve when fertili-
ty is plotted against age. Deliberate fertility control is only suspected when fertil-
ity begins high and declines abruptly producing a concave age/fertility profile.
Although the fertility of natural fertility populations is generally high,
there is considerable variation. Consequently, one cannot take fertility that falls
short of the highest rates recorded as evidence of control. One must look at the
age/fertility relationship. In the view of most demographers, deliberate fertility
control always produces a concave age/fertility profile. A convex profile is evi-
dence of lack of control. A relevant example is provided by the Princeton team’s
interpretation of the rates estimated on basis of Buck’s Farm Survey. They char-
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acterize Chinese marital fertility as “very low,” but rule out deliberate fertility
control as an explanation because “when control of fertility is common, the fer-
tility of older married women is especially low relative to the fertility of young
women. Yet the age-specific marital fertility of older Chinese women is as high,
relative to that of the younger women, as in many populations judged by Louis
Henry to have uncontrolled or natural fertility.”42
Lee and Wang agree that Chinese fertility was “natural” in Louis Henry’s
sense of the term, but they reject the Princeton team’s conclusion regarding
birth control. They insist that despite presenting a convex age/fertility profile,
Chinese fertility was a product of deliberate control. This, they argue, was
achieved by means of “late starting, wide spacing, and early stopping.” Chinese
couples married young but deliberately delayed their first birth, deliberately
avoided producing a child in their later years, and deliberately spaced all of their
births as widely as possible. The result was a fertility profile that looked like nat-
ural fertility but was in fact the product of a life of deliberate control.44
The reason Henry’s distinction has served demographers well is that con-
trol of the kind hypothesized by Lee and Wang is both difficult and risky. Diffi-
cult because it would require restraint in the early years of life when the passions
are most insistent, and risky because a couple could not count on their repro-
ductive capacity surviving the many hazards of aging. This was particularly true
in historical societies like China where famine was frequent, epidemics com-
mon, and social stability uncertain. Given that Chinese couples all wanted at
least two sons, why would they adopt such a difficult and risky strategy? If they
were as adept at birth control as Lee and Wang argue, why not wait until they had
the children they wanted and then initiate a control program? This, indeed, was
the practice of Taiwanese couples during the fertility transition.
We grant that many Chinese women did not want as many children as
their husband and parents-in-law and may, in their later years, have made an
effort to avoid additional pregnancies. Otherwise, we contend, Chinese couples
bore as many children as possible given their circumstances. What Lee and
Wang characterize as abortifacients were, in most cases, emmenogogues,
employed to enhance rather than reduce fertility,45 and the fertility rates they cite
as evidence of deliberate control were, with the partial exception of early stop-
ping, the result of involuntary conditions producing unintended and largely
unwanted consequences.
It is true that the interval between marriage and first birth was consider-
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ably longer in China than in Europe, and it is also true that Chinese women were
younger at the birth of their last child than European women. But these are not
evidence of deliberate birth control. The great majority of Chinese women mar-
ried at or shortly after menarche if not before. A long first interval was therefore
inevitable because “the first several years following menarche are characterized
by a high fraction of annovulatory cycles” and “an elevated risk of fetal loss
should conception occur.”46 Because child bearing was an onerous burden some
Chinese women may have taken steps to avoid bearing yet another child late in
life, but this is only one of many possible explanations of what Lee and Wang call
“early stopping.” Another is the possibility that because of poverty and a high
incidence of debilitating diseases, Chinese women aged faster than European
women. Yet another is suggested by William H. James’s discovery that “coital
rates are much more closely related to duration of marriage than to age.”47 By the
time they were in their mid-thirties most Chinese women had been married
twice as long as their European counterparts.
The critical claim in Lee and Wang’s argument – the plank on which their
whole platform rests – is the claim that Chinese couples limited the number of
children they bore by deliberately prolonging the intervals between their births.
The fact that birth intervals were as long in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh as in
China tells against the argument, but the Taiwan household registers provide us
with more direct and thus more conclusive evidence. They allow us to determine
how many children a woman had borne by any age and how many she bore after
that age. With this data we can evaluate Lee and Wang’s thesis by examining how
a couple’s past reproductive performance affected their future performance. The
received view of Chinese fertility is that most couples made no effort to control
their fertility because they wanted as many sons as possible. This view predicts
that the more children a woman has borne in the past the more she will bear in
the future because her fertility history indexes her fecundity. Lee and Wang’s
view is that most couples wanted only a limited number of sons and therefore
spaced their births so that they would achieve but not overshoot this mark. This
view predicts that if there is a relationship between past and future performance
it is a negative relationship. Couples who reproduce too rapidly when they are
young should make an effort to slow down later, while those who reproduce too
slowly when they are young should made an effort to speed up later.
Figure 1 is designed to decide between these two views of the relationship
between past and future fertility. To create the figure we took all the married
women who appear in the household registers and recorded their ages at the
birth of each of their children. We then partitioned the women’s lives into five
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252 Figure 1: Fertility by Age of the Mother, Parity, and Years Elapsed since the Birth of Index Child
I: Age of mother 15-19
first 5 years after second 5 years third 5 years fourth 5 years fifth 5 years sixth 5 years
birth of index child after birth of after birth of after birth of after birth of after birth of
index child index child index child index child index child
Parity and elapsed years
II: Age of mother 20-24
first 5 years after second 5 years after third 5 years after fourth 5 years after fifth 5 years after 
birth of index child birth of index child birth of index child birth of index child birth of index child
Parity and elapsed years
253III: Age of mother 25-29
first 5 years after second 5 years after third 5 years after fourth 5 years after 
birth of index child birth of index child birth of index child birth of index child
Parity and elapsed years
IV: Age of mother 30-34
first 5 years after birth of second 5 years after birth of third 5 yearsafter birth of
index child index child index child
Parity and elapsed years
V: Age of mother 35-39
first 5 years after birth of index child second 5 years after birth of index child
Parity and elapsed years
five-year age classes – 15-19, 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39. These classes set the
upper and lower limits of the figure’s five levels. The index child for each level is
the last child born during the ages that define the level. Parity is the parity of the
index child. Thus parity 1 says that the index child was the only child the women
had borne; parity 2, that she had borne one previous child; parity 3, that she had
borne two previous children, etc. The clusters of columns on each level of the fig-
ure compare the fertility of women of different parities during five-year intervals
following the birth of the index child. Consider the cluster at the left of the top
level. It says that among women who bore a child at ages 15-19, those who had
borne two or three children bore more children during the next five years than
those who had borne only one.
Reading the figure it must be kept in mind that the age intervals were cal-
culated from the birth of the index child. This is why at the upper levels the
columns in the first cluster are consistently lower than those in the second clus-
ter. The first interval always begins with a period of post-partum amenorrhea.
The effect of this is muted at the next-to-last level and disappears entirely at the
254 Figure 2: Distribution of total fertility rates in natural-fertility and controlled-fertility populations
last level because by these ages many of the women in the second cluster are
approaching or have already passed menopause.
Comparisons of the columns within each of the twenty clusters all point to
the same conclusions – the more children women had borne by any age, the
more they bore in their remaining years. With the partial exception of women
nearing the end of their reproductive lives, the columns in each cluster rise in
step-like fashion from the lower parities to the higher parities. In many of the
clusters at the upper levels of the table the columns for the higher parities are
half again as high as those for the lower parities. This is exactly what the received
view of Chinese fertility predicts. People wanted as many sons as possible and
therefore made little or no effort to control their fertility. The result is a positive
correlation between past and future performance because fertility was largely a
function of fecundability. Couples who were fecund performed well at all ages,
and those who were not, performed poorly at all ages.
Lee and Wang could reasonably argue that it is because of deliberate spac-
ing that low fertility below a certain age predicts low fertility later. What their
argument cannot accommodate is the evidence showing that high fertility below
a certain age predicts high fertility later. To limit their fertility by means of delib-
erate spacing a fecund couple had to begin spacing early in life. Why, then, if Chi-
nese couples were adept in this regard, do we find that many couples had pro-
duced seven or eight children by the time the wife was thirty? And why, if Chinese
couples wanted to limit their fertility, did these same couples bear more children
later than their less fertile peers? It was only towards the ends of their reproduc-
tive lives that their fertility fell a little below that of couples with fewer children.
This could be evidence of birth control, but it is not the only possibility. It could be
that having already borne eight or nine children, the wife was exhausted or suf-
fering from the wear and tear. Or it could be that having completely fulfilled her
duty as a daughter-in-law, she was relieved of the burden of further child-bearing.
This could be considered a form of birth control but not the strenuous form
hypothesized by Lee and Wang and not a form that made much difference.
Lee and Wang build their thesis on a comparison of China and Western
Europe, particularly China and England. At no point do they mention any of the
other old states that, like China, were characterized by early and universal mar-
riage. It appears that in their view China was a special case requiring a special
explanation. We can therefore gain another perspective on their argument by
placing China in a larger context. Was Chinese fertility low compared to the
human average? Was it so low as to make deliberate birth control the only likely
explanation? These are demanding questions but questions that can be answered
thanks to the efforts of Kenneth L. Campbell and James W. Wood.48 In the late
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1980’s they searched all the available literature for reliable data describing popu-
lations whose fertility qualified as “natural fertility” by Louis Henry’s definition.
They were able to find such data for 70 societies for each of which they calculated
a total fertility rate. Their results are presented in Figure 2 together with the total
fertility rates of 70 societies whose fertility was judged as “controlled” by Louis
Henry’s criterion. The mean total fertility rates for the two groups are 6.1 for the
natural fertility populations and 2.6 for the controlled fertility populations.
What we find, then, when we put China in a global context is that Chinese
fertility was not low by human standards. In fact, at about 6.0 it was right on the
mean for natural fertility populations. This does not prove that the Chinese did
not practice deliberate birth control, but it does add greatly to the burden of proof
Lee and Wang must bear. They must either generalize their thesis to include
most historical societies with early and nearly universal marriage. Or they must
give reasons why in China birth control was necessary to achieve the level of fer-
tility produced by involuntary means in many other societies. 
The other societies at or near the norm for natural fertility populations
include India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. These are the societies we
must look at in evaluating Lee and Wang’s claims about China. Was deliberate
birth control common in these societies? And if not, what kept fertility far below
the recorded maximum? Bangladesh is particularly instructive because it has
been the subject of intensive study and has a reproductive regime with many of
the same characteristics as the Chinese regime. In both societies marriage was
early (somewhere between 16 and 18 years for women); the median birth inter-
val, long (30 to 34 months); and the average age at last birth, early compared to
Europe (38 to 39 years).
There is some evidence suggesting that older Bengali couples practiced
coitus interruptus as a means of preventing or delaying additional births. There
is not, however, any evidence suggesting that this was a major determinant of
Bengali fertility. The major determinant was a lengthy period of lactational
amenorrhea – eighteen to twenty months – and consequently long interbirth
intervals – thirty-three to thirty-five months.49 Whether this was primarily due to
Bengali nursing practices or to some combination of nursing practices and mal-
nourishment is not certain.50 What is certain is that when one subtracts from the
average birth interval eighteen to twenty months of lactational amenorrhea and
nine months for gestation the few months remaining do not allow much play for
birth control. An average of seven or eight months is common for women who
do not practice birth control.51
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We do not have and will never have estimates of the length of lactational
amenorrhea in Late Imperial China, but we do know that Chinese and Bengali
women led similar lives. Like Bengali women, Chinese women were poor, and,
like Bengali women, they nursed their children for two or more years. There is
then no need to invoke birth control as the only likely explanation of their low
marital fertility. The more likely explanation given what we know about the
determinants of fertility in similar societies is a long period of lactational amen-
orrhea due to some combination of malnourishment and prolonged breast-feed-
ing. This was first suggested by the Princeton team to account for estimates of
Chinese fertility that were lower than our own. After ruling out deliberate birth
control as a plausible explanation of the rates estimated from the Farm Survey,
they wrote:
Lacking further details in the observations on low marital fertility in China, we can conjec-
ture its causes on the basis of interesting parallel that are being discovered elsewhere. Frisch
suggested that prolonged breast-feeding among inadequately nourished women may lower the
fat content of their bodies sufficiently to lengthen the period of postpartum amenorrhea. An
average eighteen-month period of postpartum amenorrhea (compared with nine months in a
Chilean population) is revealed in records of menstruation collected from a rural population
in Camilla district, Bangladesh. The Bangladesh women had average inter-birth intervals
indicating a level of marital fertility not much higher than among the Chinese Farmers.52
Lee and Wang quote the Princeton team when they note that “marital fertility as
low as that in China would be expected by demographers only in populations in
which some combination of contraception and abortion is practiced,” but they
ignore them when they rule out birth control as an explanation and propose
instead “prolonged breast-feeding among inadequately nourished women.”53 
Lee and Wang’s challenge to the received view of China fails for two rea-
sons. The first is that there is no evidence of widespread, deliberate birth control.
Marital fertility was lower than in Europe but not as low as Lee and Wang claim
nor low enough to make birth control the only plausible explanation. There are
other, more likely explanations. The second reason is that contrary to Lee and
Wang’s central thesis, general fertility was much higher in China than in
Europe. Where most European fertility rates fell far below the mean for natural
fertility societies, the Chinese rate stood right at the mean. We may therefore
conclude that Late Imperial China remains more or less where Malthus put it. It
did not enjoy the favorable demographic conditions found in the United States,
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258 and it did not have the effective means of fertility control found in England. Lee
and Wang treat it as a special case. It was in fact representative of the great
majority of old states with organic economies.
Appendix
Table A-1: Woman-years for fertility rates shown in Table 3
Age
Period 15-19 20-12 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Rural Northern Taiwan
1906-15 4,865 4,539 4,570 4,262 3,573 2,888 2,362
1916-25 6,922 5,469 4,399 4,057 3,940 3,727 3,067
1926-35 7,383 6,815 5,971 4,808 3,870 3,307 3,262
1936-45 9,654 7,662 6,663 6,174 5,385 4,245 3,361
Rural Southern Taiwan (including Pescadores Islands)
1906-15 4,237 4,342 4,380 3,907 3,174 2,364 1,814
1916-25 5,249 4,368 3,986 3,803 3,665 3,161 2,617
1926-35 6,910 6,143 4,882 3,963 3,402 3,172 3,073
1936-45 7,871 7,204 6,626 5,620 4,393 3,439 2,912
Peri-urban Taiwan (Taipei Basin)
1906-15 4,570 4,452 4,659 4,098 3,345 2,704 2,132
1916-25 6,775 5,525 4,263 4,116 4,292 3,403 2,830
1926-35 8,040 7,266 6,208 4,998 3,891 3,806 3,832
1936-45 10,318 8,314 7,273 6,554 5,669 4,503 3,472
Urban Taiwan (Taipei City)
1906-15 1,770 1,744 1,796 1,702 1,389 1,087 765
1916-25 3,671 3,091 2,502 2,461 2,420 2,195 1,808
1926-35 4,793 4,750 4,126 3,116 2,406 2,244 2,207
1936-45 5,216 4,534 4,273 4,090 3,398 2,604 1,959
Table A-2: Woman-years for fertility rates shown in Table 5
Age
Period 15-19 20-12 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Rural Northern Taiwan
1906-15 1,365 2,360 2,467 2,224 1,730 1,194 728
1916-25 1,707 3,077 2,491 2,163 1,978 1,718 1,266
1926-35 1,903 4,078 3,750 2,938 2,109 1,634 1,409
1936-45 2,047 4,876 4,383 3,785 3,218 2,369 1,592
Rural Southern Taiwan (including Pescadores Islands)
1906-15 1,176 2,873 3,106 2,597 1,882 1,199 765
1916-25 1,140 2,794 2,667 2,366 2,094 1,647 1,183
1926-35 1,229 4,081 3,645 2,765 2,032 1,610 1,442
1936-45 1,340 5,001 5,045 4,112 3,029 2,093 1,447
Peri-urban Taiwan (Taipei Basin)
1906-15 998 2,085 2,182 1,783 1,381 1,036 ---
1916-25 1,102 2,465 2,206 2,028 1,185 1,373 ---
1926-35 1,287 3,214 3,234 2,561 1,913 1,684 ---
1936-45 1,465 3,847 3,860 3,510 2,906 2,180 ---
Urban Taiwan (Taipei City)
1906-15 425 913 967 927 745 460 219
1916-25 719 1,494 1,422 1,332 1,213 1,006 713
1926-35 785 2,224 2,269 1,727 1,268 1,097 926
1936-45 680 1,967 2,298 2,244 1,813 1,304 858
259
260 Table A-3: Age-specific fertility rates shown in Figure 1
Years since birth of index child
Parity 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29
Age of mother at birth of index child – less than 20
One 294 340 310 258 170 36
Two 307 352 321 274 163 16
Three 334 368 313 300 --- ---
Age of mother at birth of index child – 20-24
One 279 328 280 216 65 0
Two 280 341 293 210 89 0
Three 292 353 297 204 99 0
Four 317 371 290 198 45 0
Five 302 400 314 214 19 0
Age of mother at birth of index child – 25-29
One 222 264 169 61 1 ---
Two 228 282 204 60 0 ---
Three 259 305 216 93 0 ---
Four 274 323 226 74 0 ---
Five 294 329 236 59 0 ---
Six 312 352 227 55 0 ---
Seven 329 368 229 34 0 ---
Age of mother at birth of index child – 30-34
One 165 143 63 1 --- ---
Two 172 162 55 1 --- ---
Three 187 198 67 0 --- ---
Four 216 222 72 0 --- ---
Five 234 238 84 0 --- ---
Six 244 251 83 0 --- ---
Seven 263 263 76 0 --- ---
Eight 290 272 73 0 --- ---
Nine 307 276 61 0 --- ---
Age of mother at birth of index child – 35-39
Two 112 53 0 --- --- ---
Three 127 69 1 --- --- ---
Four 142 74 1 --- --- ---
Five 146 75 0 --- --- ---
Six 167 81 0 --- --- ---
Seven 179 87 0 --- --- ---
Eight 189 95 0 --- --- ---
Nine 204 95 0 --- --- ---
Ten 208 43 0 --- --- ---
Eleven 212 81 0 --- --- ---
Table A-4: Woman-years for fertility rates shown in Figure 1
Years since birth of index child
Parity 0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25-29
Age of mother at birth of index child – less than 20
One 16,892 11,845 8,140 5,268 3,101 1,680
Two 4,123 2,867 1,878 1,161 664 318
Three 415 283 179 110 50 11
Age of mother at birth of index child – 20-24
One 17,248 11,754 7,751 4,873 3,035 1,627
Two 21,239 14,701 9,785 6,130 3,484 1,824
Three 13,395 9,170 5,955 3,549 2,030 1,106
Four 4,543 3,115 1,983 1,160 640 305
Five 981 645 382 215 105 59
Age of mother at birth of index child – 25-29
One 3,131 2,097 1,399 940 580 ---
Two 7,019 4,882 3,267 2,179 2,093 ---
Three 11,816 8,178 5,486 3,480 1,548 ---
Four 13,084 8,805 5,727 3,481 2,011 ---
Five 8,668 5,817 3,629 2,155 1,164 ---
Six 3,754 2,457 1,447 770 376 ---
Seven 1,230 800 446 205 89 ---
Age of mother at birth of index child – 30-34
One 993 686 413 331 --- ---
Two 1,917 1,295 923 639 --- ---
Three 3,706 2,600 1,807 1,237 --- ---
Four 5,739 3,935 2,759 1,854 --- ---
Five 7,533 5,102 3,329 1,126 --- ---
Six 7,349 4,868 3,079 1,875 --- ---
Seven 5,162 3,311 2,029 1,139 --- ---
Eight 2,598 1,627 897 456 --- ---
Nine 1,099 613 278 94 --- ---
Age of mother at birth of index child – 35-39
Two 741 569 404 --- --- ---
Three 1,354 1,045 751 --- --- ---
Four 2,163 1,618 1,210 --- --- ---
Five 2,914 2,117 1,518 --- --- ---
Six 3,579 2,538 1,710 --- --- ---
Seven 3,866 2,611 1,753 --- --- ---
Eight 3,475 2,263 1,423 --- --- ---
Nine 2,446 1,557 885 --- --- ---
Ten 1,381 806 438 --- --- ---
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